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Supreme Court No. 36857-2009
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO

R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS
And THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho Corporation
Defendant/Appellants.
Appealedfrom the District Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State o.f Idaho, in and/or the County of Gem,
Honorable Juneal C Kerrick, District Judge

1

William A. Morrow I
Attorney for the APpellan1

John 1. Janis
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney for Respondent

Filed this - , Clerk
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Deputy

Shirley Youngstrom

August 17, 2007
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A. Because I was in on a meeting with Carl
Harder and them putting the agreement together.
Q. Okay. When was that meeting?
A. Oh, one or two months before the agreement.
I mean, Carl was pretty good about getting things done.
Q. Can you tell me about that meeting?
A. I didn't know Ron had agreed to what he had
agreed to in the agreements that they were putting
together. He was trying to clarify to me exactly what
property was going to go with the bUSiness, and how it
was supposed to happen. That Drew had a year to put the
agreement into effect. And he had to come up with so
much money down, be approved by Chrysler, and basically
if he did, then the business was his.
Q. And who else was present at that meeting?
A. Carl Harder, Ron, me. I don't remember
whether Rob was there or not.
Q. Okay. Did you have any -- between the time
that you had that meeting and you received these signed
documents, did you have any more conversations with your
brother about the sale of the business?
A. No.
Q. During that -A. Not that I can remember. Not that I can
remember.
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My question is: Was he still interested in
selling the business to Drew?
A. I assumed he was.
Q. Why do you assume that?
A. If he agreed to it in the first place, I
just figured if Drew could come up with another way of
getting the money or whatever, that he would.
Q. At any time during this particular time
period, after these documents were signed, did Ron ever
make a comment to you that I'm going to -- I'm going to
give the business to Drew?
A. No, I've never heard him giving the business
to Drew.
Q. Have you ever heard -- has anyone mentioned
to you that Ron said, why does Drew want to buy a
business if I'm just going to give it to him?
A. I don't recall anything like that.
Q. Has Ron ever said anything to you that, you
know, we're not going to go forward on this deal, I'm
going to give the business to Drew anyway?
A. Not in those words. I had just assumed the
boys would have the business when Ron and Elaine died.
Q. Why did you assume that?
A. Most kids do.
Q. And you figured that it would be the same
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Q.

Okay. Now, during that year, September of
1 situation in this deal?
2000 to September 2001, I think you testified that you
A. Sure. When they were gone, the boys would
2
didn't have any more discussions with Ron regarding the
3 have the business.
sale of the business; is that true?
4
Q. Did Ron make any statements regarding that?
A. Not that I can remember any.
A. No. It was an assumption on my part.
5
Q. I asked you if you had heard that Ron said
6
Q. When is the next time you had a conversation
6
7 with Ron Thomas regarding these documents or the sale of
7 anything like that. And you said "not in those words."
8
Do you remember that question?
8 the business to Drew?
A. I was curious if Drew was doing anything to
9
A. Towards the sale of the -9
10 get approved with Chrysler, or to come up with this
10
Q. Correct.
11 money, or if he was going to go ahead and go through
I asked you if Ron had ever said anything
11
12 with it.
12 like, I'm not going to go through with this deal. I'm
The date, I don't know. I -- I just knew
13 not going to sell it to him. I mean, I'm just -- we're
14 the year was going to be up, and was he going to
14 -- you know, I'm going to give the business to Drew.
15 activate any of it.
15
A. No, I've never heard him say I'd give the
16
Q. What did Ron tell you?
16 business to Drew.
17
17
A. He hadn't heard anything.
Q. What have you heard him say?
18
Q. Is that it?
18
A. That Drew was going to buy the business.
19
19
A. Just that Drew hadn't -- to his knowledge;
Q. Did he-20 he didn't know if Drew had done anything.
A. It was my assumption that when Ron and
20
21
Q. Did he still want to sell the business to
21 Elaine were gone, that the boys would have the business.
22 Drew?
22
Q. After September of 2001, did Ron ever tell
A. I don't know. They'd have to redo whole new
23
23 you that he was going to sell the business to Drew?
24 contracts, if they were going to.
A. No.
24
25
Q. That's not my question, though.
2S
Q. He never did?
1
2
3
4
5
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Shirley Youngstrom

August 17, 2007
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No.
Q. Did you discuss it with him between
September of 2001 and March of 2006?
A. With Ron?
Q. About Drew buying the business.
A. No. I didn't ask, other than just asking
about -- before this 2000 deadline was up -- or this
2001 deadline was up, if he was going to do it anymore.
I just assumed Drew was going to stay on then and manage
and -Q. Did Drew ever -- did you ever have any
conversations with Drew about anything his father told
him regarding the sale or the gift of the business?
A. No, not Drew.
Q. Were you surprised when Ron sold the
business?
A. I think I was more glad than anything,
because I didn't know how we were going to keep up with
the money thing. It was either that or bankruptcy.
Q. Did he consult with you at all?
A. No. I was in complete surprise.
Q. You were?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you find out?
A. When he met with Bottles and Corbett and
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A.

contracts. I don't remember.
MR. WILKINSON: All right. Can we take just a
one-minute break?
(Break taken from 1:13 p.m. 1:17 p.m.)
MR. WILKINSON: All right. We're back on the
record.

8
9
10

I don't remember. There would be signed

For the record, I'm going to reserve the
right to reopen the deposition after we have the
opportunity to view the numerous documents that have not

11

been produced in this case that Ms. Youngstrom has

12

testified about and has personal knowledge of.

13

And with that, we would conclude the

14

deposition of Ms. Youngstrom, unless Mr. Bjorkman has

15

questions.

16

MR. BJORKMAN: No questions.

17

MR. WILKINSON: All right. Thank you.

18

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.

19
20

(The deposition concluded at 1:18 p.m.)

21

(Signature requested.)
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they come over to the office.
Q. All right. And how did you find out? How
did they tell you?
A. They were just discussing it, and I
overheard them talking about it.
Q. Did they heavily market the business?
A. Heavily market it?
Q. Yeah.
A. I thought so, yes. I know it was on the
Internet. It was in advertiSing. There's -- they did a
walkthrough over at the business. Took pictures.
Q. Did Ron make any announcements to his
employees that he was selling the business?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did he make an announcement to you? Did he
let you know?
A. Not until that day they were over there.
Bottles and Corbett were there, and they were discussing
how to mar~et it.
Q. Did you tell any of the employees that Ron
was selling the business?
A. No.
Q. How much time elapsed between the time that
they were meeting at the office, discussing it, and the
business actually sold?
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I, SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM, being first duly sworn on
my oath, depose and say:
That I am the witness named in the foregoing
deposition taken the 17th day of August, 2007,
consisting of pages numbered 1 to 151, inclusive; that I
have read the said deposition and know the contents
thereof; that the questions contained therein were
propounded to me; that the answers to said questions
were given by me, and that the answers as contained
therein (or as corrected by me therein) are true and
correct.

16
17

Corrections Made: Yes_No_

18
19
20

SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM
Subscribed and sworn to before me this _ _ day

21
of _ _ _ _ _~. 2007, at _ _ _ _~, Idaho.
22

23
24
25

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
. Idaho.
My Commission Expires: _ __
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Shirley Youngstrom

August 17, 2007
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF IDAHO
) ss.
COUNTY OF ADA

)
)

I, PAMELA J. LEATON, Certified Shorthand Reporter
and Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, do
hereby certify:
That prior to being examined, the witness named in
the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to testify
to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth;
That said deposition was taken down by me in
shorthand at the time and place therein named and
thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction,
and that the foregoing transcript contains a full, true
and verbatim record of said deposition.
I further certify that I have no interest in the
event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 27th day of August,
2007.

PAMELA J. LEATON
CSR, RPR and Notary
Public in and for the
State of Idaho.
My Commission Expires: 2-10-2012

f~
"

I'
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\Villiam A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone:
(208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.:
2451,6023
wam@whitepeterson.com
dwilkinson@whitepeterson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R . DREW THOMAS,
Plaintift~

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants .

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
NOTICE OF TAKING AUDIOVISUAL DEPOSITION OF
SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM
PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 30(b)(4)

)
)
)

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION : Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to the applicJ.bJe
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. the undersigned will~ upon oral examination before a person
~lUthorized

by applicable la\vs to administer oaths. take the continuing audio-visual deposition of

the Jeponent at the time, date and place follo\ving:

NOTICE OF TAKING AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION OF SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 30(b)(4) - 1

Deponent:

Shirley Youngstrom

Time:

10:00 a.m.

Date:

August 17, 2007

Place:

Jury Room

Gem County Courthouse
415 E. Main Street
Emmett, ID 83617
Oral examination will continue from time to time until completed. You are respectfully
requested to have said deponent present for the purpose of taking such deposition at the time and
place indicated, and you are hereby notified to appear and take part in the examination.
DATED this

___
J day of August, 2007.

:
Q

:HITE PETE

~

Dennis P. rlk son
Attorneys for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF TAKING AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION OF SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 30(b)(4) - 2

00060 0

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of August, 2007, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-342-2927

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attomey at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, ID 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-365-4196

Associated Court Reporting
1618 W. Jefferson
Boise ID 83702

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-343-4002

x

WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
Imh/W:IWorklnThomas. R Drew 219711Thomas Motors. Inc.OOO\PleadingslNotice of Deposition.Shirley Youngstrom.doc

NOTICE OF TAKING AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION OF SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 30(b)(4) - 3
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~AGEMENTCONTRAct

TInS MANAOBMBNT CONTRACT ("Contract'1 dated this 1st day of
September 2000. is ontercdinto by and among RONALD O. THOMAS and BLAINE K.
THOMAS, husband JUldwifc C'Sbareboldcnj, THOMAS MOTORS, INC •• an Idaho
cotporation \Corporation,), ~d R. DREW mOMAS, a single person C'Gencral Manager').
In consideration of and in reliance upon the mutual covenants contained in this
Contract, the parties hereby agree as follows:

Section 1.
Employmeat as General Manager. Corporatioll hereby empJoysGenera1
Manager as the genetalllWiager of Corporatioo's business ofseUing and se1Vicing Chrysler,
Dodge, Plymouth and J~ motor vehicles and related parts and accessories from premises
located at 2121 Service Avenue, Emmett, Idaho 83617 (the "B1ISillesSj, effective immediately
and to continue thereafter through August 31, 2001, unless or until terminated earlier by either
party pursuant to the Section 8 of this Contract

.

1
1

SceUon 2.
RespoDslbWdes. General Manager shall have the responsibilities for any and all
decisions about the eonduc:t of the Business, including. without limitation, (A) the expenditure of
rcventltJS and other worlcing cap~ and (B) the employment, compensation and tetTni.nation of
aJ I Corporation ctnployees; provided, however. that General Manager shall not have the authority
to take any action on behalf of Corporation that would cause it to incur liabilities that could not
be paid through (1) Corporation's existing flooring line of credit 'With First SeCurity Bank of
Idaho, N.A. eBank" (2) Corporation's revenues., or (3) additionalworldng capital loan to be
provided by Shareholders pursuant to Section 5.. General Manager's responsibilities specifically
shall include the financial reports to Shareholders described in Section 4.
.
SectioD 3.
ColtlpensatloD. General Manager shall be compensated tho amount of Five
Thousand and No/lOO Dollars ($S,OOO.OO)eacb month during the tenn of this Contra~ payable
in aooordance with Corpotation's regular payron procedures, and shall receive other anployee
benefits that Corporation provides its salaried employees during the term of this Contract.
SectiOD 4.
Fmandal Reports to Shareholders. During the term of this Contract, General
Manager shall meet with Shareholders to provide them a financial review of Cotporation' s
Businoss, including, without limitation, a review of the StatUs of (A) Cotporation' s flooring line
of credit with Bank. (B) Corporation's revenues, (C) Corporation's monthly budget, (0) General
Manager's projections about Cotporation's need to draw upon the working capital loan to be
proVided by Sh~bo1d pursuant to Section S, and (E) such other mat1ers as Shareholders may
require. S~wee1dt..
cial reporting meetings can be suspended once Corporation has
demonstrat 1
ty, through General Manager's loaq~rshiP't1Q sustain its cash floW'withouf .
the injection of any working capital loan for at least-siX(6) we~) In addition to such weekly
/
L

.-

..-
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financial reporting meetinp, General Manager sball provide Sbarebolder$ throughout the term of
the Contract with file same financial reports and at the same times as is requked by Daimler-

Chr:Yslor Corporation.

Seetlo1l5.
Worldllg Cap .S\W!ehoIdcQ
Thousand and No/lOO Dol ($300,O?O.OO),..dunng the

challIOa:=~ Tbree Blmdn:d
x.
~~the term of~s
Contract as needed by C
or the purposes of (A) ,
. rpotation i11to comphance
with its flooring line ot credit with Bank, and (B) additional worldng capital. and as Shareholders
are able. In order for Corporation to draw upon my portion of such loan for addltional working
capital, General Manager shall give Shareholders at least fourteen (14) days written notice in
advance of the date such funds are to be made available to Corporation.

'1

Guaranty of Flooring Line or Credit Throughout the term 0 f this Contract,
Shareholders shall continue to guaranty Cotporationts existing flooring line ofOl'editwith Bank.
and Shareholders sball continue to have -use of such flooring line of credit for usc in
Shareholders' separate used car sales business.

Section 6.

Section 7.
Interim Dlsbibutions. to the extent that Corporation·s net profit ill any month
during the term of this Contract exceeds Pifty Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars (550.000.00). such
excess shall be distnbuted to Shareholders as a dividend for that month and such amount shall
tcduce the total purchase price that General Manager otbet'wisc would pay pursuant to Section 14
of that certain Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets d1rted September 1, 2000
betw~ Cotporation and General Manager (the "Agreeme1ltj.

,'

SectioD.' 8.
Termination. The parties may tenninate this Contract by mutual agreement.
Corporation and Sha.reholdets may terminate this Contract (A) upon its breach by Geneta1
:Manager by his incwrlng liabilities for Corporation in excess of the limit set forth in Section 2,
(B) tho determination, based upon inf'otll1afion supplied in the weekly financial reporting
meetings described in Section 4, that Corporation-s operations under General Manager have not
demonstrated and projectiOtlS for Corporation's futtu.-e ~QIJS do .not domonStnsto that
ColpOlatiogl,.:MU..'be-alSle"fd'"Eusbdn itself 1i'om C8$h available ftom operations by at lcast the end
o!J:lt~ month oftbe term octhls Contract, or (C) Corporation shall not be in compliance
·~e:~itlf f'tc5Grltilr"lii;of credit with Bank. General Manager may termlnate this
Cont.Tact at any time during its term upon fourteen (14) days' written notice to Shareholders and
Coiporation. Any termination of this Contract automatically shall teoninate the Agreement and
shall terminate General Manager's right aiil1 obligation to pw:chase the Purchased Real Property
as defined in that certain Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement dated September 1. 2000
among the parties.

ill WITNESS WHBRBOF, the parties hereunto executed -this Management
Contract the day and year first above Written..

MANAGEMENT CONTRACT· 2
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SHAlUBOLDERS: RONALD O. THOMAS and BLAlNB K.THOMAS

~~~
onald O. Thomas

'

~4~k:~

Elaine K. Thomas

CORPORATION: THOMAS MOTORS, INC.

...
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CO~~LEASEANDPURCHASEAG~E~

i"
\

THIS COMMERCIAL LEAS! AND PURCHASE AGRBBMENT rLease',),

dated this 1st day ofScpUmber 2000, is entered into by and betWeen RONALD O. moMAS
and BLAINE K.. THOMAS, husband and wife, of tho County of Gem, State ofld~o
(collectively referred to herein as "Landlord'). THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho
coIporation ('7enuf,). and R. DREW THOMAS, a single person., of the County of Gem. Statc
ofIdaho {"General M.anager·~.
Section 1.

Real Property and Improvements.

. 1.1
uase of Property. Landlord hereby leases to Tenant, and Tenant hereby
leases from Landlord. those two (2) certain parcels of teal property located in Gem County,
Idaho, and more particularly desaibed as Parcell and Parcel 2 on Exhibit A att8Ched to this
Lease and incorporated by this reference as if set forth in full (coUectively the "Leased
Property"'), Parcell of which teased Property conbPns an automotin sales and service facility
(the "Premlsesj. and Parcel 2 of which Leased PrOperty contains an automotive sales lot. Tho
Leased Property and the Premises are sometimes concctively refctred to as the "Property" in
!his Lease.

1.2
Substitution of Pareel 3. Parce13 o/rea1 property located in Gem
County, Idaho and more partioularly described on Exln"bit A. which adjoins Parcell, shall be
substituted for Parcel 2 under the terms of Section 1.1 at any time prior to September 1. 2005,
which date of substitution sball be made by Tenant's assignee by giving Landlord at least ninety
(90) days advance written notice. In the event ~ch notice has not been given at l~t ninety (90)
days in advance of September 1,2003. the parties shall review the space and property utilization
plans oftbe dealership and mutually determine exact1y when the substitution shall occur. In
recognltion of the fact that Parcel 3 is undeveloped real property, Tenant's assignee shall have
the right to begin construction of improvements to prepare Paroel 3 to be an automotive sales lot
as soon as such notice has been given, subject to the provisions of Section 5. From and after the
date of such notice. the Leased Property shall include a11 three (3) parcels until the time olthc
effective date of that notice, and thereafter the Leased Property shall inclUde only Parcels t and

3.
1.3

Purchase of Assets. The parties acknOWledge that, concurrcmtly herewith.,
Tenant and General Manager a.cc entering into that certain Management Contract (the
"CoDtracf), by which the General Manager first shall operate Tenant's automotive sales and
service business (the '~uslnessj for a period of up to one (1) year from and after September 1,
~OOO. The parties further acknowledge that, concurrently herewith, the parties are entering into
'bat certain Agreement for Purchase and Sa}o of Business Assets (the "Agreemenf,), by whicl1 __
General Manager thereafter shall acquire from Tenant all the asscts-u~ed oy Tenant iti connection
with the operation of the BuSiness on Parcell of the Leased Property and Parce13. All thrce (3)
CO~R~LEASEANDPURCHASEAGREEMENT·l
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parcel6 of real property ItO sOmetimes co1tee.tive1yrefemd to as the (4Rcal Property") in this
Leaso. Tho Mllcgal descriptions for all three (3) parow of real propcrt}' shall bo Inserted into
Exhibit A within thirty (30) days after the date of this Lease. which legal descriptions shall
reflect changes on the south boundary of Parcel 1 to straigbten the property line thereby affecting
tho size oltho CUtTcnt bun pen. The commoncement of this Lease is conditioned upon the
execution and delivory (If the CO~Qt qnd the Agre<;rm;nt.
r·

Section 2.

Term.

2.1
InItial Term. The initial term of this Lease (the "Initial Termj is seven
(7) years, beginning onScptember ] , 2000 (the ~Commcnccmcnt Date'') and terminating on
August 31. 2007. unless termlnated earlier pursuant to the provisions of this Lease.

2.2
Tennination upon Purchase. The Initial Term shall tenninate
concurrc;ntlywith the Gen.cral Manager's purmase of Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property
pursuant to the tenns of Section 22.1 and Exhibit B of this Lease.
Rent. Tenant shall pay to Landlo~ as tent for the Property, the following
amounts, detem1ined and payable in the manner and at the times set forth below:

Secdon 3.

3.1
Security Deposit. Initially. no security deposit snail be required of
Tenant. However, should Tenant commit a material default undor the terms oirrus Lease,
Landlord shall then have tho right to require Tenant 10 pay to Landlord a security deposit equal to
two (2) months' rent. If a security deposit is paid. Landlord may usc all or any part of the
security deposIt foe the payment of any loss or damage occasioned by Tenant's default If any
portion of the security deposit is so used. Tenant shalL upon receipt of notice from Landlord.
deposit cash with Landlord in an amouD! sufficiCt1t to restore the security deposit to il$ original
amount. No interest shall be paid on the security deposit, and Landlord shall not be required to
keep it separate from Landlord '$ genml funds. Upon full and tiInely performance of Tenant' s
obligations under this Lease, the security deposit (orremalning balance thereof) shall be returned
to Tenant at the expiration of the Initial Term t.J:u:ough the Gen¢ral Manager's purcbase of tho
Business and Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property, OT upon the tennination of the Con.tract

3.2
Rent. Tenant shall pay to Landlord, as annual r
without abatement or
off-set unless expressly allowed by this Lease, the monthly
ofTen Thousand and Noll 00
DoUars ($10}OOO.OO) for Parcell (and Parcel 3 when it is added to the Leased Property) and the
monthly amount of One Thousand Three H.undred Fifty Dollars ($1.350.00) for Parcel 2 as long
as it is a part of the Leased Property (HBase Rent"), payable in a.dvance on the first (lst) day of
each calendar month beginning on the Commencement Date. All rent shall be in lawful money
of the United States of America Each monthly payment of Base Rent is due on the first (15t)
calendar day of each month dwing the Lease tenn without the requirement of any notice: or other
reminder from Landlord to Tenant. The Base Rent shall be the same regardless of whether and
when Parcel 3 is substituted fOT Parcel 1.

COMMERCIAL LEASE AN"D PURCHASE AGREEMENT - 2
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Additional Rellt. All amount! In addition to Base Rent whic~ pursuant
to this Lease are to be paid by Tenant to or on bt.thalfofLandlord. &h.al1 be considered
"additional renf' for all purposes Ul'Ider this Lease.
3.3

3.4
Late Fee. Ifa monthly Base Rent pa.yment is not received by Landlord by
the tOnth (10th) calendar day olthe month. Tenant shall be charged a late fee of One Hundred
and No/100 Dollars ($100,00) per day (but not to exceed One Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars
[$1,000.00] per monthly payment) retroactive to the first (1st) day oftbe month for each 9eparate
monthly Base Rent payrnont that is late, Late fees shall be additional rent due with the monthly
Base Rent payment Tenant agrees that the late fee: (a) is a reasonable estimate of the costs that
Landlord would incur by reason of a late payment, and (b) is in addition to all other rights of
Landlord and shall not prevent Landlord from exercising any other right or remedy available to
Landlord by reason of Tenant's failure to pay rent when due.
-

;1

"

3.5
Application ofPllymenis. Payments made by Tenant to Landlord shall
first be applied to late fees. if any. then to additional rent, if any. then to any othc:r amounts due
ftom Tenant to Landlord. iran)', and last to Base Rent, as adjusted.

I
I

3.6
Net Lease. The parties intend that this shall be a net lease and that an tent
payable by Tenant to Landlord hereunder shall be net of all costs and expenses relating to the
Property,. and that aU such eosts and dcpertses paid at lfiClII't'ed during the term of this Lease;
including. but not limited to taxes. insurance. utilities. repairs and maintenance. shall be paid by
Tenant, unless otherwise expressly provided in this Lease.
Se<:tiOB 4.

Use of the Property.

4.1
Permitted Use. Initially. the sole permitted use of the Property under this
Lease shall be the operaU.Ql1 of an automotive sales and service business (the "'Pt.rmitted Use).
Any diff-erent use of the Property by Tenant shall require the prior written consent of Landlord.
whioh consent shall Dot be lDU'CaSonably withheld, conditioned or delayed.
.
4.2
Limitations on Use. Except with the prior written consent of Landlord
(whioh consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned or delayed). no industrial.
manufacturing orprooessing activity (eXcept as is usual and incidental to the Pennitted Use) shall
be conducted. on the Premises. Tenant sha.ll not: (a) use the Property in any manner that would
constitute waste nor shall Tenant allow the same to be committed thereon; (b) abuse walls,
ceilings, partitions, flool'St wood, stone, iron work, landscaping or other parts ofth.e Property; (c)
use 'Plumbing, fire eontro~ fire sprinkler, electrical, security, telecommunications. heating,

cooling, veotilatiQn, elevator or other Property services, syStems or facilities for any purpose
other than that for which it was constructed; (d) make or permit any noise or odor objectionable
to the public to emit from the Property; (e) create, maintain or permit a nuisance in or about the
Property; (t) permit or do anything tbatis contrary to any stat:utes, on:Iinanees, rules, r~gulations
and laws of any federal, state, or local governmental body or agency; (g) permit or do anything
CO~1MERCIAL LEASE
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measures lot the purpose o£proteedng, safeguarding, dtfending, or poUcing persollS or property
from any theft, vandalism or other loss or damage. Tenant may use or install fences. loeks~
alarms, doors or otber dmees to provide Security Services, and the instal1a1ion of any Security
Services shall be (a) COJl8istcnt with,the overall deslp and use of the Premises and Real
Proporty, and (b) subject to the tenns of this Lease regan:1ing "alterations. improvements and
additions" ift SectionS below.

I,

i

Section S.
Improvements by Tenant. Tenant shall not make any alteration, improvement
or addition to the Property without the prior written consent of Landlord. which consent may not
be unreasonably wi~cld, conditioned or delayed. All alterations, improvements, and additions:
(a) shall be performed at the solo cost and expense ofTcmant in complianoe with all1aws and
regulations of any federal. sta1~ or local governmental body, and (b) shall become and remain
the property ofLaudlOl'd. In contracting for any alterations. improVClIl.ents or additions, Tcmant
shall not act as the agent otLandlord.
Section 6. ' Quiet Enjoyment. Landlord agrees that Tenant, upon paying the rent and
performing the terms oftbls Leas~ may quietly have, hold and enjoy the Property durhig the

'- I

term hereof.

Section 7.

Taxes and Assessments.

7.1
Payment ofT:a:es and Assessments. During the term oftbis Lease,
Tenant shall pay when due and befare delinquency aU ad valorem real property taxes levied and
assessed against the value of the Real Property and improvements ~ereon, and aU personal
property taxes levied. and assessed against Tenant's trade fixtures and equipment and other
personal prOperty placed upon. or owned by Tenant in, on or about the Premises or the Real
Property.

7.1.
Right to Contest. Tenant, at Tenant's expense, shall have the right to
contest the a.ttlOlll1t or validity of all or any part of the ad valorem real property taxes and
a$Se$$rilents required tQ be paid by Tenant h~er; provid~ however. that Tenant shall
indemnify Landlord aPinst any loss or liability by reason of suoh contest. Notwithstanding such
a contest. all taxes otherwise due and payabJe to Landlord by Tenant shall be paid upon demand,
but any refimd thercofby any taxing authority shall be the property ofTen81lt. .
7.3
New Taxes. Tenant shall reimburse to Landlord promptly upon demand
any and all taxes and other charges payable by Landlord to any governmental entity (other than
net income, estate and inheritance taxes) whether or not now customarily paid or within the
contemplation oithe parties, by reason of or mtaSured by the rent payable under this Lease, or
a.tlocable to or measured by the area or value of the Premises andlorReal Property, or upon the
usc and occupancy by Tenant oithe Premises and/or Real Property, or levied for services
rendered by or on behalf of any publie, quasi-public or governmental entity.
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Section 8.

Maintenance of Property; tJtOltlCl.

Routine Malntenance and Repair. Tenant shall, at its sole cost and
eX!pCDJ<!l, at all times be responsible for routine repairs and maintenance of the Property as shall
be necessary to maintaJn the Propert)' in the condition not less than the condition oltho Property
existing as of the eommcaccmcnt oftbis Lease, normal wcar and tear excepted.
8.t

8.2 Structural alld Systems Maintenance. In addition to routine repairs and
maintcnanoc: as provided in Section 8.1 above, Tenant shall be responsible £01' paying for the
struetutal and systems maintenanoe of the Property and, in connection. thei'ewitb. shall (a) make
the repairs and replacements necessary to maintain the struetural integrity or the Premises,
inoluding repairs and maintenance olthc foundtltions and lo~-bea.ring walls, (b) repair and
maintain in good working order the roof; paved parking ateu, and the heating, ventilating, air
eondition.i.ng, plumbing. and electriCal systems, and (c) maintain the light hallam.
Tenant's LiabOity fot Repairs and Maintenance. Notwi1hstanding any
other provision. oftbis Lease. Tenant shall be liable for and shall promptly repair aU damage to
8..3

,

the Premises or Real Property c::aused by Tenant or Tenant's partners, officers, directors,
employees. Invitees, au. . customers. otients or licensees. regatdless whether tfle damage is
c.auscd by the negligence ofTcnant or such other pexsons. All repairs made by Tenant shall be at
least equal to the original work in class and quality. If Tenant fails to so maintain orrepatl', (a)
Landlord (or its agents) may, but is not required to, enter the Premises at any reasonable time to
pc:rfonn. maintenance or make repairs., and (b) Tenant Shan pay to Landlord the cost of the
maintenance or repairs performed by Landlord as additional rent due with the next monthly Base

l

Rcni payment.
Utilities. Tenant shall pay for all heat, alr conditioning. water, light,
power and/or other utility service, including garbage and ttash removal and sewage disposa1~
8.4

an

including hookup feeS or chaiges in connection therewi1h. used by Tenant in or about the
Premises and Real Property durhtg the term of this Lease. Tenant shall not be Hable for any
interruplion or failure in the supply of any utility or service to the Property.
. Se~oD 9.

Insurallce.

9.1
Tenant's Obligations. Tenant shall purchase and keep in force the
fol1o'Wing types ofinsurance in the am01ll1ts specified and in the fOIm hereafter provided:
I'

i

!

(a)
Fire and Extended Coverage.. A policy or policies offire and
extended coverage insu:ra.nce covering the Real Property and the Premises, in an amount not less
than ninetY percent (90%) of the full replacement cost (exclusive of the cost of excavations,
foundations and roofing), against any p<ml within the classification "fire and extended coverage"
or, at Landlord's election, "all-risk coverage," lIt addHio~ Tenant shall purchase and keep in
force rent msur<U1ce insuring Landlord against loss of rent during the period of repair or
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replacement of all or any portion of the Premises in the event of loss or damage. Tho instb'lnco
provided for in tbis Section 9.1 (a) may be brought within the coverage of a blBDkot polley or
potioles of insurance camed and maintained by Tenant.
.(b)
PubUe LtabUlty ud Property Damal" A policy or polic(cs of
comprehensive gcnera1liabiJity ins~ with b10ad fonn general liability endorsL':Men~ or
equivalent, with limits Oillot less than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000) per person and One
Million Dollars ($1,000,000) per occurrence ofbodily iIUury and property damage oombined.
Tho policy Ot'polici~ shan also blSute against liability arlsingout oithe use, occupancy or
maintenance ofthePrcmiscs and the Real Property. Said policy or l'olicies shall designate
Landlord as an additional insured. and shall speclfieaJly insure the perfomumee by Teoant of the
indemnity agreement(s) contained in Section 16.S of this Lease.

Tenant's Leasehold Improvements and Personal Property.
Insurance covering an of the items comprising Tenanfs leasehold improvements. trade fixtures.
equipment and persooal property from time 10 time, in, on or upon the Real Property and the
Premises in an amount not less than ninety percent (90%) of their full replacement cost from time
to time; providing protection against my peril included within the classification "fire and
extended coverage," together with insurance against sprinkler damage, vandalism and malicious
(0)

,

<

,,

mischief and earthquakes. Any policy proceeds shall be used fur the repair or lq'lacemcnt of tho

property damaged or destroyed. Landlord shall have no obligation to provide any insurance with
respect to the Real Property or the Premises. Bxcept as provided herein. each of Landlord and
Tenant (a.) is not obligated to obtain, (b) is not obligated. to be named in, (e) shall have no right to
any proceeds ot: and (d) waives all claims
insurance purchased by Qr for the benefit of the

on.

other party.

.
9.2
Policy Form. All policies required to be provided by Tenant shall be
issued in the names of Landlord and Tenant and evidence thereof shall be delivered to Landlord
within ten (10) days after the date of this Lease and thereafter within thirty (30) days prior to the
expiration of the term of each policy. All policies sball be with an insurer 'With a Best'$ rating of
13+ ot' higher, and shall contain a provision that the insurer shall give Landlord twenty (20) days
notice in writing in advance of any cancellation or bpsc or the effective date of any .reduction in
the amounts oltho insurance. All public liability, property damage and other casualty policies
required to be provided by Tenant shall be written as primary policies, not contributing with and
not in excess of coverage wmch Landlord may carry.

9..1
Adjustment of Coverage. Not more frequently than every five (5)'years
during the tenn of this Lease it; in the opinion of Landlord based on industry and local standards
and Tenant's use of the plemises, the amount of public liability and property damage insurance
required to be provided by Tenant is at that time not adequate, Tenant shall increase the
insurance coverage as reasonably determined by Landlord to be adequate.
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9,4 Waiver of Subrogation. To tht extent permitted by their respective
insurers, Landlord and Tcuant (and each person claiming an interest in the Property through
Landlord or Tenant, including all subtenants ofTenmtt) release aad waive their entire right of
recovery against the other for direct. incidental or consequential or other 10s1 or damage arising
out o( or incident to, the perils covered by insurance carried by each party, whether due to the
negligence olLandlord or Tenant Ifneccssary, all insurancepolieies shall be endorsed to
evidence this waiver.

.j

;

9.5
Failure to Insure. lfTcnmt shall fail to pUJ'Chase and keep in force the
insurance required by this Lease, (a) Tenant shal1 be in de1im1t hereunder, shall be deemed to be
self..insured and shall bear all risk of loss or damage, and (b) Landlord may, but shall not be
requlred to, pmchase and keep in f~ the required insurance, or any portion thcroo~ in which
event Tenant sbal1 reimburse Landlord the full amount of Landlord's cost with respect thereto
within fi~ (S) days aftc:r~ demand therefor i$ delivered to Tenant.
Section 10.

.,

Damage or Destruction.

10.1 Terminatton or Repair. If aU or any portion of the Premises or Real
Property are damaged or destroyed by tire or other casualty, Landlord shall deliver to Tenant
written notice within thirty (30) days of the damage OT destruction stating wbether the Premises
arui Real Property eaa be restored within one hundrOO and eighty (180) days of'thedamage or
destruction. Landlonf shalt have no obligation to expend more in Tepairln" restoring or .
rebuild:ing than the proceeds of insurance available for such purposes. If,.in Landlord's
reasonable judgme~the insurance settlemen~ permit and construction worle for repairing and
rebuilding the damaged or destroyed portion of the Premises or Real Property can be completed
within the 18()..day period with the available insuran~ proceeds, Landlord shall promptly
proceed to repair or rebuild Chc damaged or destroyed portion of the Premises or Real Property.
It: in Landlord' $ reasonabJe judgment, the insurartee settlement, permit and oonstruetion work for
repairing and rebuilding the damaged or destt'Oyed portion of the Premises or Real Prope:ty
cannot be completed within the 180-day period with the available insurance proceeds, either
Landlord or Teoant may temrlnate this Lease upon thirty (30) days' written notice to the other
party.

Abatement or Apportionment of ReaL If the Lease is not terrninat~
and if the damage or destruction to the Premises or Real Property is not caused by the act or
. 10.2

iailnre to act ofTenanl. its partners, officers, employees, agents; guests, oustomers, clients or

invitees, then ajust portion of the rent shall abate as of the date of the damage or destruction until

the Premises and Real Property are repaired or rebuUt lfthe Lease is tenninated. the rent shall
be apportioned as of the date oftbe damage or destruction.
A1terations, Improvements and Additions. With respect to any damage
or destruction of Tenant's alterationi, improvements or additions made to the Premises, (a) this
10.3
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Section 10 shall be inapplicable, ('0) no abatement or rent sball occur, and (0) Landlord shalt not
be obligated to repair or rebuild Tenant's alterations, improvements, or additions.
Section 11. Coadcmnatioll. If aU of the Premises and/or Real Property are taken or
eondcmncd by an authority for any usc or pmposc, 1h1s Lease shall terminate upon, and the rent
shall be apportioned as o~ the date when actual possession of the Premises and/or Real Property
is required for the eondcmned use or PlU'pOBe. lflcss.than aU of the Premises are taken or
condemned by any authority !Or any use or purpose, then (a) if the remainder of the Property is
not reasonably sufficient for Tcnmt's business purposes, then either Landlord or Tenant may
tenninate this Lease upon thirty (30) days' written notice of termination, or (b) the partl es may
con1inue the Lease and a just portion of the rent will abate as of the date when actual possession
of e(J11demned porti011 otthe Premises and/or Real Property is ~ for the eondemned use or
purpose. All compensation and damages awarded for the taldng of all or any portion of the
Property shall be apportioned. betwecn Landlord and Tenant on the following basis: (a) if
awarded separately and not as part of the general award to Landlord, Tenant shall be entitled to
rcocivc a sum equal to the excess rtf any) of the rental market value of the Property for the
remainder of the Lease tetm over the present value (as of the date oftakins) of the rent which is
then payable for the remainder ofthe Lease tetm, plus compensation for the loss ofTenantYs
trade fixtures. removable personal property, loss ofbuslness and good will, and relocation
expenses, and (b) Landlord sball be entitled to the balance of the award.
Sectloll 12.

Lalldlord's Entry 011 Property.

12.1 Right orEntry. Landlord, and Landlord's authorized repreSentatives,
shall have the right to enter the Property at all reasonable times at Landlord's discretion only for
either of the following pu1pOses:

(a)
To determine whether the Property is in good condition and
whether Tenant is complying with this Lease;
(b)
To serve, post and keep posted any notices required or allowed
under the provisions of this Lease.

::

12.2 No LlabDity. Landlord shall not be liable in any manner for any
inconvenience, disturbance, loss ofbusiness, nuismlce or other damage arising out of Landlord's
ontI:y on the Property as set forth herein; provided, however, Landlord shall conduot its activities
on the Property as allowed herein in a manner that will cause the least possible inconvenience,
annoyance or disturbance to Tenant.
f'

Section 13.

Covenant Against Liens. '

Liens Prohibited. Tcruult agrees not to suffer or permit any lien
(mcluding, but Dot limited to, tax liens and liens of mechanics or materialmen) to be placed
13.1

, I

.

COMMERCIAL LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT ~ 9

:

..a

000616
RD THOMAS 000084

"

.-. VL I

(

UC'::f

,,

against thePremlses or R.ea1 Property. if a lien is placed agamst tha Premises or Real Property
that is directly or indirectly related to an act or failure to act of Tenant. Tenant agrees to payoff
and remove suoh Jien within ten (10) days ofrecelpt by Tenant of1lOticc oftbc lien. regardless
whether Tenant contests the validity of the lien. Tenant bas no authority or power to cause or
pcm'1it any lien or other cncumbraDce created by act of Tenant, operation onaws, or otherwise to
aiUch to or be placed upon Landlord's title or intetest in die Premises or Real Property. Any lien
or encumbrance shall attach only to Tcomt's leasehold interest in the Property. .

13.2 'allure to Pay LicD.. If Tenant shall default in the paying of a prohibited
lien and a suit to foreclose the same is .flIed, and if Tenant has not given Landlord acceptable
security to pro1eCt Lan410rd against any loss. damage alJd expense with respect to such lien,
Landlord may, but shall not be rcqnirc:d to, pay the liet1 and any related costs, and the amount so
paid, together with reasonable attorneys' fees ineutted in connection therewith, shall be
immediately paid by Tenant to Landlord, together with.intt:.rest thereon at the prime rate of
interest as announced ftom time to time by Fit:st SeCurity Bank ofJdaho, N.A.
SCCti()D

14.

Dt:fa.ult.

14.1 Defa.uIt by Tenant. Tenant shAll be in default under this Lease if any of
the following shall occur (any one or more of the following herein eoristituting an ''Event of
Default"):
Tenant fails to pay wh~ due any monthly rent or other pa.yment
required to be paid by Tenant under this Lease within ten (10) days of its due date; provided.
however. that before declaring any defuult in the making of any payment required under this
Lease, LaJ1dlo.rd shall provide to Tenant a written notice specifyii1g that there has been a default
(a)

in the making of a required payment, and Tenant shan have three (3) business days after receipt
of that notice: within which to pay the delinquent amotmt arid prevent a default hereunder, or
(b)
Tenant shall default in the ObServ31lce ot' performance of allY of
Tenant's other coverumts hereundez (other than the covenant to pay rent or any other sum berein
specified to be paid by Tenant) and such default shall not have been eured within thirty (30) days
after Landlord shall have given to Tenmt written notice specifying such default; provided,
however, that if the deflmlt complained of shall be of such a nature that the same cannot be
completely remedied or CUTed within such thirty.oday period, th¢T1 such default shall not be a
default against Tenant for the purposes oftbis paca.graph so long as Tenant shall have promptly

commenCed during such default and shall proceed with all due diligence and in good faith to

remedy the default complained of; or
Tenant shall (1) file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, or (2) be
adjudicated bankrupt or insolvent, or (3) have a receiver or trustee appointed fur all or
substantially all orits business or assets on the ground ofTenanfs insolvency, or (4) suffer an
order to be entered approving a petition filed against Tenant seeking reorganization of Tenant
(c.)
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under the fcdcra1 bsnlaup1cy laws or any other applicable law or statute afthe United states or
any state thereof; or (5) Tenant sball make a gcncm1 assignment or general mangcmcnt for the
boneflt oflts credito1'8. 01' (6) bankruptcy proceedings shall have been instituted against Tenant
which arc not witbdrawn or dismissed within sixty (60) days after the institu.ti9n of said
procced.ings;or
(d)
Tenant shall remove or attempt to remove, without the pri01'
authorization oiLandlord, any of Tenant's fixtures, equipment, appliances or pcrsonail'roperty
from. the Premises for any reason other than in the DOnna! and usual operation of Tenant' s
business; or

, 1

(e)

Tenant shall abandon the Premises.

14.2 Remedies of Landlord. .In the event that Tenant commits, or allows to
occur, an Bvent ofDefau14 Landlord shall have the following remedies:
(a)

~aI

and Equitable Remedies. Landlord shall bavc all remedies

available at law or in equity•
. (b)
Termination. Landlord shall have the immediaterigh~ but not the
obUgatio~.to terminate Tenant's right of possession of the hoperty andlor, at Landlord's

election, this Lease and all rights ofTcnan1 hereunder. by giving Tenant written notice of
Landlord's election to tetminate. In the event that Landlord shall elect to so terminate this Lease,
said election by Landlord shall. without being so expressly stated, be deemed an election by
Landlord to accelerate all future rents payable Ulldcr this Lease for the Initial TertrI Ol' then~
applicable Renewal Tenn to be immediately due and payable. if such acceleration shall be
required to permit Landlord to enforce any of the rights and remedies heteafter provided. In the
cven.t of sueh termination (and acceleration), Tenant agrees to pay to Landlord and Landlord
shall have the right to recover from Tenant the fbllowing:
.
(1)

The worth at the time of award of any unpaid rent which

has been earned at the time of SUt;h hmninatiQn; plus

(2)
The worth at the timo of award of the amount by which the
unpaid rent which would have been earned after tennination until the time of award exceeds the
amoUlIt of such rental loss Tenant proves could have been reasonably avoided; ~

(3)
Thcworth at the time of award of the amount by which the
unpaid rent for the balance ofllie Initial Term or Renewal Term (as appHcable)'after the time of
award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that Tenant proves could be reasonably avoided;
plus
,

I
IJ
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(4)
Any other amount necessaxy to compensat~ Landlord for all
detriment, expense, JO$i 01' damage, including, but Dot Hmited to~ all costs and expenses to re-

lease or sublet the property, including 1he cost of alterations and remodeUns required by a new
tenant, attorneys' fees and real estate eommiaiOlU paid or payable for this Lease or to re-lease or
sublet the Property, proximately caused by Tenant's fidlure to perf'onn its obligations under this
Leue;nlYi
(5)
Any other amount nec:essary to compensate Landlord for all
other detriment, expense, loss or damage, proximately caused by tenant's failure to perform its
obligations under this Lease (mcJuding, without limitation, the payment of taxes, insurance, and
operatin,g costs to the extent provided by this Lease); lilim

(6)
Anyo1hcr amounts owed to Landlord by Tenant, including,
. without limitation, any sums ofmoncyor damages provided in Sections 15.3, 15.4 Of 21 of this

Lease.

.

As used in this Section 14.2(b), thotcrm "rent' shall be deemed to be and to mean the mont111y
Base Rent and all other sums reqtrired to be paid by Tenant pursuant to the terms of this Lease.
.A3 used in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of this Section, the '~ortb at the time of award" is
computed by allowing interest or discoun1ing. as 1hc ease may be, at 1bc rate cqll8l to the
discount rate of the Federal R.eserve Bank of San Francisco at the time of award. All rental
amounts received from any reletting of the Property during the balance ofthe then-applicable
tenn of this Lease (had tetmina.tion not oeeUlTed) shan be the property of Landlord, and 'tenant
shall have no right or claim to such rental Bttlounts. The rentaJamounts received by Landlord
prior to the time of the award of damages as provided above shall constitute rcntBlloss avoided
by Landlorll

r'

(e)
Advances. lnthe'event of'Tcnant'1 breach heteof, Landlord may
remedy the breach for the account and at the expense of Tenant. IfLandlord at any time, by
reason of suen bteac11, is compelled to pay, or elects to pay, any moneys or do any act which will
rcqu1re the payment of any moneys, or is compelled to incur any expense, including reasonable
attomeys- fees anel eo$ts, in instituting or prosecuting any action or proeeeding to enforce
Landlord's rights under this Lease, the moneys so paid by Landlord, with interest from the date
ofpaYD:lGnt, shall be addition rent and shall be due from Tenant to Landlord as provided in

!
\

Section 3 hereof.

14.3 Re-En.try on Termination•. In the event ofthe termination of Tenant's
right of possession and/or this Lease by Landlord heretmder, Landlord shall have the right to re-C1l.ter the Propc:rty and remove therefrom all persons and property.

~, ,I
, ,

14.4 Re-Entry on Non-Termination. In addition to the other tights of
Lan.dlord herein provided, Landlord shall have the right without terminating this Lease, to reenter and retake possession of the Property and collect rents from any subtemu1ts and/or sublet in
the name of Landford or Tenant the whole or any part otthe Property for the account of Tenant,
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upon any tems f1t conditions cfmmUnc4 by Landlord. In the overat of such tubleasing, Landlord
sball havo tho right to collect any tcl1t which may become payable under any sublease. and apply
the .mo 11rst to tho payment of expenses incurred. by laDdlord in dispossessing 1he Tenant and
i.II sublctt1ng the Property, including attom~t fccs, real estate commissions and repairs andt
thereafter, to the payment of the rent herein requinxl to be paid by Tenant. in mlfiJlment of
Tenant's covenants hercu.ndcr, and Tenant shall be liable to Landlord for the rent herein required
to be paid, less any amount actua.lly received by Landlord from a sublease and. after p&Yl11cnt of
~enscs incUJ.'l'Cd, applied on acwunt of the ~t d.u.c hereunder. 11'1 the ~ent of $uoh election,
Landlord sballnot be deemed to have terminated this Lease by taking possession of the Property
unless notice ofterrnination, in writing, bas been giv~ by Landlord to Tenant.
14.5 RIght of Entry-Lieu. ror Performance. In. addition to any other rights of
Landlord as provided in this Section 14. upon thc default of Tenant, Landlord shall have the right
10 enter the Property, change the locks on doors to the Premises and exclude Tenant therefrom
and, in addition, take and rctai.a possession of any property on the Premises or Real Property
owned by or in the possession of Tenant as and for seeurlty for Tenant's performance. Tenant
hereby grants to Landlord a lien under applicable Idaho law on aU of said property, whieb lien
shall sCCUtC the future performance by Tenant oftbis Lease. No property subjoct to said lien
shall be removed by Tenant from the Property so lOllS 8$ T~ant is in default of any monetary
obUgatiou under this !.esse. No action taken by Landlord in connection with the enforcement of
its eights as provided in this Section 14 shall co.nsd.tutc a trespass or convorsion except as to
per$0t1S holding prior security tntt;r"e$f:$ iT! md ~t and Tenant shall indemnify, $aVe and
hold Landlord harmless from and agai.pst any such claim or demand on account thereof.

, 1

14.6 Enrorcement. In the event of a defiw.lt by Tenant under this Lease,
Landlord may &tany time, and from time 10 time, without terminating this Lease, enforce all of
its rights and remedies under this ~ 01' allowed by law or equity. including the right to
recover aU rent as it becomea due. The enforcement by Landlord of any rights or remedies
Pt'ovid&i in this SeetiOfi 14, or allowed. by law or equity. shall not constitute the election by
Landlord to terminate this Lease unless such election is in a writing signed by Landlord (or
Landlord', autbcnized. agent)
and delivmd to Tenant.
,
14.7 SeeurityDeposfts. If Landlord terminates this Lease because of the
default of Tenant as provided in this Section 14,'or if Landlord exercises its tight ofpossession
under Scction 14.4 above. without terminating this Lease, then Tenant shall immediately transfer
to Umdlot'd aU security deposif.$ pteviously p~d to Tenant by subtenants having a right to
bccupy the Property at the date of said tetmination:
14.8 Additional Security. As additional security for Tenant's penonnance of
this Lease, Tenant hereby assigns and sets over to Landlord as security for the performance of
Tenant's obligations under this Lease, all subleases entered into by Tenant with respect to the
Property, and all rents due or to become due under said subleases, subject to the right of Tenant,
I!
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by license granted to Tenant by Landlord, to collect and retain said rents, so long as Tenant i. not
in default under this Lease.

,

14.9 MItIgaUoR. Nothing h«ein contained shall relieve Landlord from the
obligation to make reasonable eiiorts to mitigate the loss or damage oceasioned by a default of
Tenant, provided that said obligation to mitigate shall not relieve Tenant of the burden of proof
as required in this Section 14 or othetwise alfect the riihts and remedies available to Landlord in
the cvcmt of a. default by TenUlt as provided in this Section, 01' otherwise allowed by law 01'
equity.
'

.

14.10 Default by Landlord. Landlord sball be in default under this Lease if
Landlord fails to perform or observe any covenant, agreement or condition which Landlord is
required to perform or observe and the failure shall not be cured within thirty (30) days after
delivery of written. notice to Landlord by Tenant of the failure.

14.11 ReMedIes ofTenot. In the event of Landlord's default as set forth in
Seotion 14.10, Tenant shalt havo all rights pTOvided at law or in equity, except Tenant expressly
waives any right to the abatement or withholding of rent payable to Landlord 1Ulder this Lease.
Tenant's obligation to pay rent is ind~dent of all other rights, and Tenant may not withhold
rent pa.yments to Landlotd or pay rent to other parties or into any escrow or holding account
because oCthe deCau1t or alleged default of Landlord.

SeetionlS.

Termination.

15.1 Events of Termination. This Lease shall terminal'e upon the occurrence
of one or more of the following events: (a) by mutual written agreement oC Landlord, Tenant and
General Manager; (b) by Landlord pursuant to this Lease; (e) by Tenant pursuant to this Lease;
(d) upon lapse of the Initial Term., (e) by reason ofScctiollS 10 or 11 relating to destruction or
oo11dcmnatiol1 oithe Ptoperty, or (l) upon. General Manager's purehase (lfPateel$ 1 and 3 ofthe
Real Property pursuant to SectiOl122.1 and Bxhibit B oltbis Lease.
:

SUlTender ofPossessi{jD. Upon tenninatiol1 of this Lease. other than a
termination b~e the General Manager shall have purchased Parcels 1 and 3 oCtbe Real
Property as provided inBxbibit B attached to this Lease" and il1corporated as if set forth in full,
Tenant wilJ immediately StDTender possession oftbe Property to Landlord. Upon. termination of
this Lease for My reason, Tenant will immediately surrender possession ofPareel2 t(l Landlord.
If possession is not immediately surrendered, Landlord may re-enter and repossess the Property
and rtmovc aU persons or property using such force as may be necessary without being deemed
guilty of, or liable for. any trespass, forctolc entry, doWner, breach of the peace, or damage to

15.2

I

!

per$on$ or properly.
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15.3 Condition of Property Upon TerminafloG or Abandonment. Tenant,
upon termina1ion or aban4omneot of this Lease or tennination ofTcnamt 8 right of possession,
agrees as fbllows:

(a)
Remove Alteradons. Tenant shall not remove any alterations,
improvements or additions mAde to the Property by Tenant or others without the prior written

,

i,

I
!

'

consent of Landlord. which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Tecant shall
immediately remove, in a good and workmanlike manner (a) all personal property of'Tcnant, and
(b) the alterations, improvements IU1d additions made to the Property by Tenant as Landlord may
request in writing to be removed. All damage occasioned by fhe removal shall be promptly
repaired. by Tenant in a. good and worlonanlikc man1let. If Tenant falls to remove any Pl'Operty.
Landlord may (a).accept the title to the property without credit or compensation to Tenant, or (b)
remove and store the property, at Tcns.nf S ClC.pense. in any reasonable manner that Landlord may
choose.
(b)
Restore Premises.. Tenant shall restore tho Property to tho
condition existing on the commencement of this Lease. with the exception of (a) ordinuy wear
and tear, and (b) alterations, improvements and additions which Landlord has 110t directed to
Tenant in writing to remove. lfTenant fails to properly restore the Property, Landlord. at
Tettafit·s expense, may restore the Property in. any reasonable manner that Landlord may ehoose.

15.4 Holding Over. Should Tenant continue to occupy the Property. or any
part thereof; after the expiration or earlier termination of this Lease, whether with or agahlst the
consent of Landlord, suoh tenancy shall be from month to month. In the everst of such a bolding
over" the obligations of Tenant shall be the same as were in effect at the date of said expiration or
termination and the monthly rent to be paid by Tenant to Landlord shall be equal to one hundred
twenty-five percent (12S%) oftlie monthly rent in force and effect for the last month of the tcnn
expired or terminateci
Section 16.

•r
I

Oalms and Disputes.

16.1 Rights and Remedies Cllmulative. Except as expressly provided in this
Lease. each party's rights and remedies described in this Lease are cumulative and not alternative
remedies.

16.2 Nonwaiver ofRcmcdics. A waiver of any condition stated in this Lease
shall not be implied by the neglect of e. party to enforce any remedy available by reason oithe
failu:re to observe or perform the condition. A Waiver by a party shall not affect any condition
other than the one specified in the waiver and a'waiver shall waive a specified condition only for
the time and in the manner specifically stated in the waiver. The acceptance by Landlord of rent
or other money from Tenant after tennination of the Lease, after tennination of Tenant' s right of
possession. after the occurrence of a default., or after institution of any remedy by Landlord shall

COMMERCIAL LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT· 15
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not alter, diminish,aft'ect or waiver the Lease termination, termination of possession" default or
remedy.
l6.3 Walv~r ofNotlce. Bxeept as provided in Section 14.1(a), Tenatrt
expressly waives the service of any demand for payment of rent or for possession.

I

I

II
,
,I

i

'

16.4 WBlver of Claims. Exclusive of direct damages caused by the negligence
or wi11fu1 misconduct of Landlord, Landlord and Laridlordt s p~ directors, officers, agents,
setVan~ and employees sha.ll not be liablo for any direct or consequential damages (including
damages claimed for actual or constructive eviction) either to the person or property sustmned by
TCI.l811t or Tenant's partnCl'St officers, dircctorBt emplo~ invitees, guests, customers, clients or
licensees due to (a) any part of the 'Premises 01' Real Property not being inrcpair, or (b) the
happeriing of any incident on the Prcmlscs or Real Property. This waivc:r shall include, but not
be limited to. damage caused by col~ heat, water, snow, frost, sewage, ps, or the malf\mcliOl1. of
any plumbing, fire control, fire detectiol1t fire sprlnkler, electrical, electronic, computer, security.
telecommunication, heating, cooling or ventilation systems, facilities or installations on the
Premises or Real Property.

f '

1605 lndemnJfJeatioD.. To the extent caused by an lOt or fidlure to act of
Tenant or Tenant's partners, officers, employees, invitees, guests, customers, clients or licensees,
and regardless whether the act or failure to act is negligent Tenant sbal1 defend, indemnify and
hold haimless Landlord and Land1ord's partners, officers, directors, agents and eJlltl10yccs from
any liabilities, damages and expenses (mcluding attorneys' fees and costs) arising out of or
relating to (a) the PremIses or Real Property, or (b) Tenant's use or occupancy of the Property.
16.6 Huardous Material Indemnificatioll. Tenant shall indemnify. defend
and hold Landlord harmless "from any and all claims, ,illdgmcnts, damages, 'penalties, fines-. costs,

iI

,"
f

I
I

liabili1ies or losses (including, without limitation, dimlnutIon in value of the Premises or Rea]
Property, damages for the loss or .restriction on use of rcc.table or useable space or any amenity of
the Ptemtses or Real Property, damages arising nom any adverse impact on marketing of space,
8nd sums paid in settlement of claims. attorneys' fees. consultant fees and expert fees) which
arise during or after the Term as a result ofTenai'lt's breaeh of the obligations stated it) this Lease
tegard.ing Hazardous Mtteiial. This indemnification ofLandlOrd by Tenant includes, without
JimitatiOl1t costs incu:rred in connection with any investigation of site conditions or any cleanup,
remedial. removal, or restoration 'Work required by any federal. state~ or local governmental
agoney ot po1itioal subdivision because of Hazardous Matodal ititroduccd during the Lease term
into the soil or ground water on 01' 1.U1der the Premises or Real Property. Withollt limiting the
preceding. if the presence of any liazardous Material on the Premises or Real Property caused or
permitted by Tenant results in any eontamination of the Premises or Real Property, Tenant shan
promptly take all actions at Tenant's sole expense as are necessary to return the Premises or Real
Property to the condition existing prior to the introduction of any Hazardous Material to the
Premises or Real Property.
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(a)
Notwithstanding any other provislon of this Lease or BlIY contrary
provision of law, the obliptions ofTerumt pursuant to this Section 16.6 ~rcmain in full force
and eftect until the expiration of the latest period stated in any applicable statute oflimitadons
durin, which a claim, cause of action or prosecution rola.tinv to the matters dcscn'bcd herein may
be brought, and until payment in full or satisfaction ofany and aU losses, claims, causes of
aotion. datnapst liabilities, charges, costs and expenses tor which Tenant is liable hereunder
shall have been accomplished.
(b)
If any claim, demand, action orprocceding is brought against
Landlord which is or may be subject to Tenant's obligation to indemnify Landlord as set fbrth
u.a.dcr this Section 16.6, Landlord shall provide to Tenant immediate notice of that claim
demand, actian orproeeeding, and Tenant thereafter shall derend Landlord at Tenant's expenso
using attorneys and other counsel selected by Tenant and reasonably acceptable to Landlord.
y

, 1

16.7 Effect of Landlord Insurnee OD Tenant ObUgatlonSo From me to
time and without obligation to do so, Landlord may purchase insuran~ against damage or
liability arising out ot or related to thePremisos or Real Property. The purchase or failure to
purchase insurance snaJl notretease or waiver the obligation ofTenan1 set f'Orth in this Lease.
TCD8l1t waives aU claims 011 insurance purchased. by Landlord.
16..8 Disputes. This Lease shall be SO"erneci by the laws oftbe State of Idaho,
without regard to conflicts oflaws principles. The Idaho courts have exclusive jurisdiction and
Gem County is the proper venue.
16..9 Tenant's RespOBSibftity for Prior COlltaminatioll by Hazardous
Substances. Tenant agrees to indenmify, defen~ protect and hold bannless Landlord from and
against any and all mminat and cjvil claims and causes of action (including, but not limited to,
c1a1ms resulting fro~ or causes of action incuacd in connection with. the death of or injury to
any PetSOtlt or damage to any property), HabiHties Qncludfng, not Umited to, UabUities atising by
reason of actions taken by any govcm.mcntal agency), penaltics, forfci~ prosecutions, losses
and expenses (including reasonable attorneys'· fees) which directly or indirectly arise ftom or are
caused by the presence, prior to and/or alter the comme:neemcmt of the Lease, in. on, under or
about the Real Property or the Premises, of any Hazardous Materials. Tenant's obligations under
this Section 16.9 shall include, but not be limited to, the obligation to bear the expense of any
and aU costs, whether foreseeable oc unforeseeable;ofany necessary (as required by the Laws)
repair. cleanup. detoxitlcation or decontamination of all or my portion oftbe Property (or any
improvemcnts located thercon), and the preparation and implementation of any closure, remedial
action or other required plan or plans in connection therewith.

Section 17.

Assignment and Subletting.

Restrictions on Assignment and Subletting. Except as expressly
provided in Section 17.2 below, Tenant shall not transfer, assign, subJet, enter into license or
17.1
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concession agreements. change owncabip Of hypothecate this Lease
to the Real Proporty or the Premises (hereinafter "trawter'') withoUi
consent of Landlord, 'Which consent may not be ~ly witbhc
Any transfer oftbis Lease, the leasehold estate created hereby,. tho RI
any portion therco~ eithervo1untarily or involuntarily, whether by 01
without the prior written consent ofLmdlord, sball be null an..d void,
Landlord. constitute a material detault under this Lease. Tenant agre
reasonable attorneys' fees and oth« necessary costs incurred in connl
and documentation of any such requested transfer of this Lease or Te
Property. The:: transfer ofa maJority of the issued and. outstan.ding Cat
however, accomplished, shall be deemed ~ assignment oftbis Lease,
17.2

Permitted Assignment Notwithstan<Jing the 1

above, Tenant may and shall assign this Lease to the General Manage
directly or indirectly controned by the GCliertl Uanager concurrently
Agreement; and the term "controlH ('mcluding the term. "controlled. b
directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the dir~tion of tI
policies ofa business entity, whethcrtlu:ough 1110 ownership of'voting

-----..

J7.3 Consent to Modifications. The assiglttllento
the consent ofLandlOtd ~ without being specifically so stated or 8
exprt!':ss agreement by Tenant that sub~t mod1.fications of this ~
assignee shall not (a) rcqulre any prior consent 01' approval ofTcnant
reliavc Tenant (assignor) from liability hereunder, providcd~ liowever
increase the tent or other obligations of Tenant bereunder, Tenant's (a
limited'to the tenns of this Lease as the same existed on the date of as

Section 18. Waiver. Tho waiver by Landlord of any breach of any
eonditions oftbis Lease shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any'pas
of the same OT any other tenn, cov~ or condition of this Lease. Th
Landlord hereunder shall not be conStrued. to be a waiver of any tcnn
by Tenant of a lesser amQunt than shall be due according to the terms
deemed or construed to be other than a part payment on account of the
shall any endorsement or statement on any cheek or letter accompanyi
to create an accord (II'Id satisfaction.
Secdon 19.

Relationship of Parties. Nothing contained in this ~l

creating the relationship ofprlncipal or agent, partnership or joint ven

Tenant. Neither the method of COtllputation afrent nor any other prov
act of the parties, shall be deemed to create any relationsmp other than
Tenant
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Soetloa %0. Notlees. Any notiee or demand given under the tet'm4 oftbis Lease shall be in
wtitinS and shall be dccm.cd to be delivered on the date ot delivery if delivered in person or by
facsimile, or on the date of receipt it delivered by U.S. Postal Servieo or express courier. Pf()of
ofd.eJivery shall be by affidavit ofpenonaJ delivery, maoJililc.gcnerated confirmation of
facsimile transmission, or return receipt issued by the U.S. Postal Service or express courier.
Untll changed by notice in writing, notices, demands and communioationi shall be addressed as
follows:

t

LANDLORD:

TENANT:

GENBRALMANAGBR

Ronald O. Thomas
Blaine K.. Thomas
1550 S. Washington
Emmett. Idaho 83617

Thomas Motors, Inc.

R. Drew Thomas

2121 Service Avenue
Emmett, l&ho 83611
Attn: Drew Thcmias

2121 Service Avenue
Emmett, Idaho 83617

Any party shall have th~ right to change its above address by n~tice in writing deUvered to the
other party in accordance withtb.e provisions of this Section 20.

Seetion 21.

AttomCYJ' Fees and Costs.

21.1 General Default. If either party shall default in the payment to the other
party of any sum of money specified in this Lease to be paid, or if ei1her party shall default with
respect to tJrrf other obligations in this Lease, all attorneys' fees incurred by the other party shall
be paid by the defaulting party, and if said sum is collected or the default is cured before the
Co.mttlencement of a suitihereon, asa part of coring said default, reasonable attorneys' fees
incurred by the o1hcr party shall be added to the balance due and payabJe or, in the case of a nonmonr:tary defis.ult. shall be reimbursed to the other party upon demand.
Litigation. In the event either party to this Lease shall interpret or enforce
any ottho provisions heteOfby any action at law or in equity, the non-prevailing party to such
litigation agrees to pay to the prevailing party all costs and expenses, includini reasonable
attomcYs~. accountants' and appraisers' fees incw:red therein by tho prevailing party,including
all such costs and expenses incurred with respect to an appeal and such may be included in the
judgment entered in such action.
11.2

Scctlon 12.

Miscenaneous.

22.1

Sale and Purchase of PlU'eels 1 and 3. General Manager shall purchase

Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property, including aU improvements located on those parcels, on the
terms and conditions set forth on Exhibit B attached to this Lease and incoporated by this
n::ference as if set forth in full.
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Estoppel Certificate. .Bitb~ party shan, at any time, upon not less than
ten (10) days' prior written notice :from the other party (lhc "requesdna party"), execute,
acla\owlqe and deliver to the other party a statement in writing (a) certifying that this Lease is
unmodified and in full force and effect (01', if modified, stating the nature of such modification
and certifyinl that this Lease, as so modilicd, is in Ml force and effect) and the date to which the
rent and other charges arc paid in adYa1lcc. (b) aekl'lowledgmg that there arc not. to the other
party1s knowledge. any uncured defaults on the part of the requestins party hereunder, or
spe~ such defaults iithey are claimed, and (c) containing any other certifications,
acknowledgments and representadons as may be reasonably requested by the requesting party or
the party for whose benefit such cs10ppel ecrtiticatc is requested. Any such statemetU may be
coneluslvely relied upon by any prospective purchase: or encumbrances of1he Ilroperty or
Tenant's leasehold estate therein.. A party's failure to deliver suell statement within said timc
shall be conclusive upon the said party (a) that this Lease is in full force and effect, without
modificatio.n. except as may be represented by the requesting party. (b) that there are no uncured
defaults in the requesting p3J:'1Ys performance. (e) that not morc: than an amount equal to one (1)
month's rent has been paid in advance. and (d) that such additional certifications,
acknowledgments and representations as are requested under elause (c) ofthe p~ng sentence
arc valid, trUe and correct as shaJl be represented by the requesting party. Ift.andlord desires to
finance or refinance the Property. Tenant hereby agrees to deliver to any lender designated by
Landlord such financial statements of Tenant as may be reasonably required by such lender, and
all such financial statemoots shall be received by Landlord in confidence and shall be used only
for the purpose herein set forth.
22.2

; J

22.3 Transfer of Landlord '5 Interest. In the event of a sale or conveyailce by
Landlord of the Property, other than a transfer:for seeurity purposes only, Laltdlord shall be
relieved from all obligations and liabilities accruing thereafter 011 the part of Landlord (with the
e:c:eeption of the obligations imposed on Landlord under Section 16.9, whi,cb. shall be
coIrtinuing). provided that any funds in the hands of Landlord at the thno oftrallsfer in which
Tenant has an interest sbaJl be dclivc:red to the successor of Landlord. This Lease shall not be
affected by any such sale and Tenant agrees to attorn to the purchaser or assignee, provided all
Landlord obligations hereunder arc assumed in writing by Landlord successor.
22.4 . SeverabUity. Ifanyteml or provision'oftbis Lease shall be determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder oC this Uasc
shall 'DDt be affected thereby and each term and provision ofthis Lease shall be valid and be
enforCeable to the fullest extent pc::r:tilittcd by law; and it is the intention of the parties that if any
provision of this Lease is capable of tw'o (2) constructionSt one of which would render the
provision void and the other of which would render the provision valid, then'the provision shall
be i11terprctcd to have the meaning which renders it valid.
22.5 Fo~o Majeure. Any prevention, d.eJay or stoppage due to'strikes,
lockouts, labor disputes, court orders, acts of God. inability to obtain labor or mnterials or
reasonable substitutes therefor, governmental restrictions, governmental regulations, government
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controls, enemy or hostile govcmment action. civil commotion, tire or other casualty and other
causes beyond che roasonable control of the party obHptcd to pcrf'orm shall cxCUSO the
performance by sUch party for a period equal to any such prevention, delay or stoppaae, provided
that tbls Section 22.5 shall not be applicable to the obligations imposed with regard to rent and
other ehargos to be paid by Tenant 'Pursuant to this Lcaso.
22:6····CpDStruction. All parties hereto have either (a) been represented by
--.J!C?P.aratc lep'!.£9)mS~ (b) have had the opportunity to be so represented. Thus, in all cases,
_--"no-l~cIit this Lease shalt be construed simply and in IlCCQrdanee with its fair mca.ning and
not strictly for or against Ii party, regardless of which party prepared or caused the pr~atation of
this Lease.
22.7 SuccessIon. This Lease and all obligations contained herein shall be
binding upon and shalt inure to the benefit of the respective hclrs, personal ceprc:sentatives,
successors and assigns ofthcpartics hereto; provided, however. that any assignment of this
Lease or. any part hereof shall be subj.ect to the provisions of Section 17, above'.
%1.8 Recording. Landlord shal~ promptly upon request by Tenaot, execute a
memorandum oflease which may be recorded by Tcn~t in Oem County, Idaho.

,

ll.9 General. The defined tenD ('LandJonf' as used in this Lease, shall include
the plural. as well as the singular. Words used in the neuter gender include the mascUline and
feminine, and words in the masculine or feminine gender include the neuter. The term
"Landlord" shall mean only the owner or owners at the time in question of the fee title to the
Property (exCept for purposes of Section 16.9, which applies to those persons initially executing
this Lease as Landlord). With the exoeption of the obligations impo$ed under Seetil)n 16.9
(which shall continue to be binding on the perSons initially executing this Lease as
Landlord). the obligations t:antained in this Lease to be perfmmed by Landlord shall be binding
only during Landlord's respective period of ownership.

22.10 Section Headings. The Section headings, titles and captions used in this
Lease are for conveDienoe only an4 are not part of this Lease.
!

22.11 Entire Agreement. This Lease, including the Exhibits attached hereto,
and the Contract of even date herewith, contain the entire agreement between the parties as of
this date concerning the subject matter hereof and supersede any and all prior agreements, oral or
·written. between the parties concerning the subject matter hereof. Tho execution hercofhas not
been induced by either party, or any agent of either party, by representations, promises or
undertakings Dot expressed herein or in the Contract and., further. there are no conateral
agreements, stipulations. covenants, promises, inducements or undertaking$ whauoever between
the respective parties coneeming the subject matter of this Lease or the Property which are not
expressly contained herein or in the Contract.
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22.lZ Time Is oIthe Essence. Time is oltho ossencc with respect to the
obligations to be perfotmed under this Lease.

IN WITNBSS WHERBOP, the parties hereunto executed this Commercial Lease
Agreement the day and year first above written.
LANDLORD: RONALD O. THOMAS and BLAINE K. THOMAS

TENANT: THOMAS MOTORS, INC.
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DESCRIPTION OF REAL PROPERTY
Parcell;

Parcel %:

..
Parcel 3:

t·" , ,
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ExhibitS

SALE AND PURCHASE OF PARCELS 1 AND 3
IN CONSIDERATION ofthe asreement by Tenant to lease from Landlord the
Property covered by the foregoing Leaso, and for other good and val'Uable oonsideration. THE

.

v

7

PARTIES AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

j

(:)

\

1.
Right and Ohligadon to Purchase. Landlord and General~
? ~~
borcby agree that Landlord shallsel1, and General Manager shall purchase Paroels 1 d 0
.-~'J "
Real Property (the «PUrchased Real Property"). including all improvements 10
on those
~ :;:>
parcels, pllmWlt to the tenns set fortt in this Bxhibit B.
2.
Exercise of RIght and ObUgatlon to Purchase. At any time effCdive no
earlier than September 1. 2005 and no later than Sq>tember 1,2007, upon at least
(90)
days ad'?U1ce notice to Landlord, and provided thai Tenant is not in default under the Lease,
Oenera1 Manager shall exercise his rigbt and obligation to purcbase the Purchased.1teaJ Property.
but r;dthcr parcel alone. by delivering to Landlord a written notice to that effect (the "Notlce of
Purchase").

mnety

3.
Purchase Price. Genetal Mana.get shall pa.y Landlord the total putehase
price ofNine Hundred Thousand and Nolloo Dollars ($900,000.00) for the Purchased Real
Property.

4.
Commitment for Title Insurance. Within ten (10) business days after
Gcnoral Manager delivers to Landlord tho Notice ofPurcbase pursuant to Paragraph 2, Landlord
shall obtain, at Landlord's cost and expense. and deliver to General Manager a current
commitment for title insurance ("Commitment') issued by a title company selected by Landlord
doing business in Gem CoWity, Idaho (tho 'Tide Company"). Such Commibnent shall
evidence that the Purchased Real Property is free and clear of alllieIis, encumbrances or

exoeptions. excepting CUlTeD.t general taxes. asSessments, cascmonts ofrceord, covenants and
restrictions of record, zoning reguIations, and such other exceptions to title as ~ usual and
nonnal on property of the type and in the vicinity of the Purchased Real Property and whioh have
beet) speeifieally approved by General Manager in writing. No exception that shall have been
created by Tenant through the aaion or omission of the General Manager or that shall have been
created by General Manager during the t¢11ll of the Contract shan be the basis for objection by
Gene:ra1 Manager to the condition or title of the Purchased Real Property. Said Commitment
may also evidenoe an encumbnmce or encumbrances which will be paid in. fuJ I by Landlord at
the closing of the purchase.

S.
ConditioD of Property. The parties acknowledge that General Manager,
having been responsible for the actions of Tenant as a party in possession of the property
pursuant to the Lease, is fully famiHarwith and knowledgeable of the physical condition of the
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land and improvements comprising the Purchased Real Property and sba1l purchase same in an
"AS IS" condition, with aU faults and without representation or warranty ormy kind from
Landlord conccming condition, suitability or otherwise.
I

6.

1

ao~iaa of dJc Purchase.

(a)
The closing of the purchase by General Manager shall occur not
earli er than and not later than the dates speclfled in Paragraph 2 above.
At the closing, which shall be conducted by the Title Compan.y
issuing the Commitment described in Paragraph 4 above, Landlord shall denver a good and
sufficient. executed and acknowledged Warranty Deed in favor of General Manager, and General
Manager shall deliver to the TItle Company as escrow/olosing agent the purchase price, plus all
rent and other amounts payable by Tenant or General Manager. Each party shall pay one-half
(112) ofthc fcc charged by the Title Company tot closing the transaction.
(b)

I

f \

I

(c)
Real estate taxes and 8.S$CSSD1cnts fur the then current year shall be
paid by Tenant (as required under 111a Lease) and Landlord shall pW"Chase 8lld provide to General
Manaser a Standard Coverage Owner's Policy ofTrtle Insurance (the "Title Poliey"). which
shall be in an amount equal to the purchase price, insuring General Manager's title to the
Purchased Real Property, subject only to usual printed exoepti.ons. and the exceptions to title as
set forth in the Commitment (excluding any encumbrance which is to be paid by Landlord at
closing), which exceptions have been specifically approved by General Manager in writing, and
any encumbrance or other exception cansed by or attributable to Tenant through the action or
omission of the General Manager Ot' caused Or attll'butable to Gene:ral Manager. In tho event the
Title Policy as provided by this Paragraph 6(0) cannot, following the closing, be issued by the
Title Company in the funn required in this Exhibit D, the right and obligation to purchase and
any subsequent agreement between landlord and General Manager obligating Landlord to sell
and General Manager to putCbase the Purchased Real Property shall be null and void, at Genetal
Manager's option.
(d)
lfthe transaction falls to c10so because of the default ofa party. in
addition to any other remedies at law Ot in equity available to the other party~ the dGfimlting party
shall relmburse the other party for all costs and expenses incurred by the other party in
connection with the transaction, including. but not limited to, reasonable at1omeys' fees,
appraisal fees and Title Company charges, and the Lease shall continue in full force and effect
for the remainder ofits tet'IIl, if any.

7.
Termination ofRigbt and Obligation to Purchase. The right and
obligation to sell and purchase the Purchased Real Property shall tenninate and be of no further
force or effect upon the' occurrence of the following:
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(a)

The tcrminanon of the Lease between Landlord and Tenant, as
desenDed above. COl' any reason. incJuding, but not limtted to, the default of Tenant thereunder.
(b)

,

The early termfnation oftbe Contract by Tenant.

Upon such termit1atlon, the right 8I)d obligation to sell and purchase the Purchased Real Property
shall end and the rights and obllgations of tho parties bcrcundcr shall terminate and be orno
furtherforee and cffcot. In the event the right and obligation to purehasc the Purehase Real
Property terminates as provided in this Bxb1"bit B, the ri,ght to purchase the Purchased Real
Property shall no longer be available to General Manager. and Landlord shalt have no obligation

,

to sell or convey the Purchased Real Property to General Manager. In the event the tight and
obligation to purchase the Purchased Real Property terminates as provided herein, Landlord may
teonillate this U:MO. which tcmninaUon shall be efi"ecti~ six (6) months following delivery of
Landlord"s written notice to Tenant and General Manager of such termination. unless this Lease
otherwise terminates earlier by the expiration of the Initial Term,

8.
Notices. Any notice required to be given hereunder shall be in writing and
shalJ be mailed OT deJivered in the manner provid~ in Section 20 of the Lease.

I
..

9.
Asslgbmebt. Generat Manager shall not have the right to assign the right
and obligation to purchase the Purchased Real Property or any interest herein. except as provided
in Section 17.2 oftbis Lease, without the prior written consent ofLand1ord, which consent may
not be UllI'eaSOIlably withheld.
10.
Time. Time is of the essence of the righ1 and obligation to purchase the
Purchased Real Property granted by Landlord to General Manager hereunder.

11.
Certificate OCNoD-Foreign Status. Landlord Is not a foreign person,
nonresident alien., foreign corporation, .fon::ign partnership, foreign trust or foreign estate,
those terms are defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the '·Codej and the
Income Tax Regulations promulgated thcrcander. At the close of escrow, Landlord shall deliver
to Genoral Manager a'certificate ot DOn-f'oteign status in a fonn satisfactory to General Manager
{"Non-Forelp CcrtiflcatJoaj. lnthe event Landlord shall not deliver such NOll-Foreign
Certiiieation to Genetal Manager at the close of escrow, General Manager may witbhoId ten
perCent (10%) of the purchase prlce and pay such ~tbholding to the Internal Revenue Service
PUrsuant to Section 1445 of the Code•.

as

12.
Escrow. On or before the date ofllie closing (as above provided), the
parties shall deposit the funds and documents hereafter descn"bed into escrow:

I

(a)

Landlor<l LandJOl'd shaH deposit the following;
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(1)

The duly executed and acknowledged Landlord's Warranty

(2)

The Non·Foreign C~cation d.uly executed y Landlord

Deed;
U11dcr penalty of perjury;
(3)
Evidence reasonably satisfactory to General Manager that
all necessary action 0.11 the part of Landlord has been 18kcn. with respect to the execution and
delivery of the Wamnty Deed and the other ancllJatj' documents and instruments $0 that all of
sald documents are or will be validly executed and dellvered and will be binding on Landlord;

and
(4)

Such other inst:ruments andlor documents as may be

required to effect the agreement herein made.
(b)
r1

General Manager. General Manager shall deposit the following:

(1)
The pu:rohase price of the Ptmihased Real Property; unless
the parties otherwise mutually agree upon the tcnns by which l.atJ.dlord shall receive instead
General Manager's promissory note for SOme portion of the purchase price. which promissory
note soall include a mutu3l1yagreed in,1erest rate and amortization schedule. and which
promissory note shall be secured by a thst deed of trust on the Purchased Real Property;

(2)
Additional cash in the smount necessary to pay all amounts
c:luc and payable under the Lease and General Manager's share of the closing costs and prorations.., as above set forth; and
(3)

Such other instruments and/or doeument$ as may be

req~ to effectthe agreement herein made.

13.

Oose of;Esuow. When the Title Company is in a position to issue the

Title PoliCYt and all documents and funds have been deposited with the Title Company as escrow
holder, the Title Company shaD immediately 'close the escrow as provided fcrr hereafter. the
failure of Landlord or General Manager to be in a position to close the escrow by the time set for
closing shall constitute a default bereundtt. The Title Company as escrow holder. and closing
agent shall close the escrow as follows:
(a)
Record Landlord's Warranty Deed with instructions for the Gem
County Recorder to deliver such' Deed to General Manager;
Pay the purchase price to be paid at the close of escrow. plus any
amounts due and payable under the Lease, to Landlord (reduced by any amount paid to release
all monetary encumbrances on the Property and by Landlord's share of the closing costs):
(b)
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(0)

Deliver the Titlo Polley to General Manager;

(d)

Deliver the Non-Foreign Certiflcation to General Mana.ger; and

(~)
Forward to Landlord and General Manager, in duplicate. a separate
accounting of all funds reeeivc::d and disbut$ed for each party and copies of all executed and
recorded or filed documents deposited into escrow, with sueh recording and file date endorsed

thereon.

14. Section 1031 Exchange. General Manager agrees to cooperate with
Landlord, if so requested by Landlord, to faclllta.tc tho close of tho Purchase Real Property in a
m.anner that will pennit Landlord to comply with the provisions of Section 1031 of the Internal
..Rcvenue Code of ~9S6. as amended; provided, howevl;e1', that such facilitation by General
Manager shall be at no additional cost to General Manager.

u

CO.MM:ERClAL LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT· 28

00063'1'
RD THOML\S 000103

..
~

•

'.

~U" IIJUIUHtR"

'~))

,

..

~

.,

AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF BUSINESS ASSETS

THIS AGREEMENT POR PURCHASB AND SALE OF BUSINESS ASSBTS
(uAlJ"eement'') dated this 1st de.y of September 2000, is entered into by and among THOMAS
MOTORS, INC., an Idaho cOrporation ("SeUer"), R. DREW THOMAS, a single person
r'Buycrj, and. RONALD O. THOMAS md ELAINE K. THOMAS. husband and wife
("Sharebolders").

I

I .

I

In consideration of and in reliance upon the mutual covenants contained ;n this
Agreement the parties hereby agree as follows.
Section 1.
Premises. This Agreement is made and entered into bytbe parties in part upon
the representations and warranties eontaine4. in this Section 1, wbioh representations and
warranties arc not mere recitals, but fundamental premises upon which the transaction descn'bed
in this Agreement is based.

1.1
Seller is an Idaho business corporntion engaged in the business of selling
and servicing Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep ~otor vehicles and related parts and
acCessories from premises located at 2121 Service AVemlc, Emmett. Idaho 83617 (the "Busln~s
Real 'Property''). under franchises issued by Daimler-Chrysler Corporation.

. j

1.2
Buyer wishes to purchase from Seller, and Seller is willing to sell to
Buyer, all assets relating to SeUer·s Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep franchise for Bmmet~
Idaho. conditioned upon the granting to Buyer of an exclusive franchise for the sale of new
Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in the same geographical area as· Seller's
franchise.

1.3

Buyer (or a business entity that Buyer shall own) also wishes to lease two

(2) of the three (3) parcels of the real property and ·improvements which constitute the Business
~-

Real PropertY, and wishes eventually to purehase one (1) of those parcels and another adjoining
parcel of real property. Consequently, the purchase of Sener's business assets shall be
conditioned upon the execution and delivery oftbe Commetcl8I Lease and·Purehase Agreement
among the parties and Ronald 0: Thomas and Elaine K. Thomas. husband and wife. dated
September 1, 2000 (the "Lease).
!

I

S~tiOD.

2.

Definitions. In this Agreement, the following words shall have the indicated

meanings:

2.1
"Closing" shall refer to the consummation of the transaction contemplated
under this Agreement in accordance with the timns hereof; and "Closing Date" shaH refer toSeptember 1,2001.
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2.2 ~etler'. Business" shall refer to any and aU activities conducted by Seller
in Emmett, Idaho, relatini to the marketing and salc of new Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep
motor vehicles Illd aslOCiated parts and accessodca, and the repair and servicing ofnew or used
Chrysler. Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles.

2.3 "Purcltased Assets" sha1l refer to those assets which are identified in
Section 3 as being purchased and sold by the parties under this A.grccment. The Purchased
Assets specifically shall not include Sellets accounts receivable and Franchisor holdbaelcs,
which shall be retained by Seller.

I
I

I

I

I

'

2.4
SeRer's "Equipment" shall rcfcrto aU non..inventory items oftangJble
personal p1')pcrty presently owned or used by Sener in oormection with Seller's Business,
including all ofSeUer's machinery. tools, signs, office equipment. computer equipment.
c:cnnputer programs, microfich~ parts lists, repair m8Ilua1~ sates CJt'servlce brochures, furniture
and fixtures. and all of Seller's leasehold improvements to the Business Real Property. Within
twenty (20) days after the Date oftrus Agreement, Scller shall provide to Buyer a list of the
"'Certain Excluded Equipment" being retained by Seller. which list shall be attached to this
Agreement as Bxluoit "A" and which list $haJl include, without limitation, a grinder and a brake
lathe. The parties recogtrl2c and agree that Seller's Bquipm.ent does NOT include any assets of
Thomas Auto Parts. Inc.. which also operates on the Business Real Property and whoso assets
include its lixturcs, equipment and inventozy ofmotor vehicle parts and aceessorles.

2.S SeDer's "Intangible Assets" shall refer to Scllcr's telc:phonc and fax
numbers.. serviCe oustomedists. sales oostomer tistst vehicle sales records, vehicle service
records, all rights of SeDer under contracts assigned to and assumed by Buyer pursuant to this
.Agreement, all goodwill associated with Sener~s Business, and all other intangible rights and
interests of any value relating toSeUer' s Business; provided. however. that Seller's Business
name ("Thomas Motors) is included within the Intangible Assets being sold by Seller
hereunder.

2.6' 4c:8usblcsS Reat Property" shall refer to all of Seiter's rights under the
LeUe, including, without limitation, the rights'1o lease certain of the: parcels descn'bed in the:
Lease and the rights and obligation to purchase certain of the parcels described in the Lease
pursuant to the terms ofExhtoit B to the Lease. '
2.7

"Fl'1lnchfsorttshall refer to Daimler-Chrysler Corporation..

2.8
"New Vehicle" shall refer to a Chrysler. Dodge. Plymouth and Jeep motor
vehicle which: (A) is unregistered and unused, (8) is frQm the 1999,2000 or 2001 model year,
(C) has been driven for tess than tiVo hundred (200) odometer Iniles, and (D) may be represented
or warranted 10 cotlSUmCl'S as "new" under Idaho law. ItRoDback Vehicle" shall mean an
unregistered vehicle from the 1999~ 2000 or 2001 mode! year which has been sold to a customer
by Sener but returned because of the customer's inability to obtain financing for the pttrchas~.
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HDemoadrator Vehicle" shall mean an U11tfJgistcrod 1ebicle £rom ~c 1999,2000 or ZOO 1model
year which bas been used and operated by ~eUer on dealer plates for salOl demonstration
purpoSeI. .cu.cd Vehlde" .hall mean any vebiele which is not a New Vchicle, a Demonstrator
Vehicle or a Rollback Vchicle u defined in the three preceding sentences.
2.9
"Date of this Agrccmcnf' shan refer to the 1irst date upon which this
Agreement has been signed by all ofthc parties.

SeedoD. 3.

Purcbued Assets. Sener agrees to sell to Buyer, and Buyer agrees to plU"Chase

from Sellet, those assets of Corporadon specifically identified in Sections 4, 5,6, 7, 8, 9, 10,11,
12 and 13 of this Agreement (the "Purchased Assets"). Corporation's accounts receivable and
Franchisor holdback! specifically arc excluded from this 1ransact1cm.

SeetiOD. 4..
IllVeJltory of New Vehicles, Demonstrator Vchicles and Rollback VekicJes.
Buyer shall pun;ha$e Seller's tJtltire inventory of new Chrysler. Plymouth, Dodge and Jeep motor
vehicles, as that mvemory exists on the Closing Date. Buyer also shall purchase Seller·s entire
inventoty ofDernott$ttator Vehicles and Rollback Vehic1cs. Immediately prior to ClosiD&
Buyer and Sener shaJ1 jointly review Seller's outstanding purchase orders for New Vehicles
ordered.1fom Seller by customers but I10t delivered prior to Closing..· At Closing, Seller shan
assign. to Buyer, and Buyer shall assume fiom SeDer, alI of Seller's rights (UlCludlng customer
deposits) and obligations (meluding sales commissions) under such purcnase orders. At ClosfnSt
Seller shall reimburse Buyer for all deposits made to Seller with respect to ordered but
undelivered New Vchicles.

I}

SectfOll S.
Inventory of Used VehJcles. Buyer shall purchase Seller's entire inventory of
Used VehicJt;~ u that inventety exis1$ at Closing, including Seller's parts frocks, service
vehicles and courtesy vehicles. Those Used Vebicles that are not financed through Seller's
flooring line of credit with F'ttst Security Bank: ofIdaho, N.A, however, sha.llnot be part of the
Fixed Purchase Price. but Buyer instead shall pay for those Used Vehicles pursuant to

Section 14.2.

I'

.

Sdo" 6.
Inventory of New Parts and Accessories. Buyer shall purchase Sellers entire
inventory ofvchicle parts and accc:ssorics manu:filctur.ed. by FtanehisO't atld/or third party
suppUm, as that inventory exists on the Closing Date. Buyer shall pm:t:hase that entire inventory
':"AS IS" as of the Closing Date. Prior to Closing, Seller shall maintain Sener's inventory of parts
and accessories at a level oonsistent with good business. practices and Seller's normal and regular
course ofbusincss.
Section 7.
Equipmont. Buyer shall purchase Seller's Equipment. Buyer acknowledges tnat
Seller is retai:oing,
is not selling to Buyer those excluded items ofScller's Equipment, as
contemplated in Section 2.4.

and
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Scotian 8.
Supplies. :Suyer shall purchase all of the PSt oil. nuts, bolts, lUld other
automotive and office supplies which arc held for use in Seller's Business.
Scetloll 9.
Contractu,1 Rigbts and Obligations. At Closing, Buyer shall assume all rights
and obUgations of Seller under all equipment leases and other contracts. Soller Wattants that all
of Seller's obligations under those contracts are current as of the Date ofthls'Agreement. Buyer
agrees to indemnify Seller against all obligations under those contracts, whether they relate \0
periods bofore or a.1ler Closing.

Section 10. Repair Work In Progress. Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's vehicle repair
work-in-pTOgress (In-hO\1$C and subc:ontracted).
Seetion 11.

Intangible Assets.

Buy~ shall

pUrchase a.U ofSelJer's Intangible Assets.

Seetlon 12. Seller's Cash, Bank AeeOUDUt atid Notes Reteivable. Buyer shall purchase aU
ofSener's cash, banking acco1JJlU and deposits. and notes receivable. BuyCf shalltakc such
actions as Buyer deems appropriate to oollect those notes rceclvablc, and Seller shall not be
liable to Buyet" to the extent that any of Seller's notes receivable are not collected. by B~.
Buyer shall retain for Buyer's own account any payment with respect to Seller's notes recclvable
wing out of the operation of Sellers Business pnorto Closing.
Section 13. . Franchisor Credits. Buyer shall purchase all ofSellcr's credits, deposits or other
amounts due it by FnmcrnsOl' as of the Date of this Agreement, except for Franchisor holdbacks
that shall be retained by Seller.
Section 14.

Purchase Price and Payment.

14.1 Fixed Purchase Price. Buyer shaH pay Seller, as the total purchase price
for the Purchased Assets (other than those Used Vehicles described in Sections Sand 14.2) the
amount ofEpt Hundred FHty Thousand and No/tOO Dollars ($850,000.00), as such amount
may be reduced by distributions made to Shareholders prior to the Closing Date pursuant to the
terms oftbat certain Management Contract dated September 1, 2000 between the parties ('4Jl'ixed
Parehase PrIce"); Buyer shall pay Seller the Fixed Purchase Price in monthly installments
amortized over a period of twenty (20) years from and after the Closing, in~luding interest at the
prime rate of interest charged by First SecurltyBank ofIdaho. NA. plus two hundred (200) basis
points. with the amorti.zationto be adjusted concurrently with each adjustment ofsucb prime rate
ofinteresl; provid~ however, that the interest in no event shall be less than ten percent (10%).
Notwithstanding such amortization schedule, Buyer shall pay Seller the entire unpaid balance of
the Fixed Purchase Price and all accrued interest on September I, 2008.

I'

142 Additional Pnrchase Price. In addition to the fixed Purchase Price
provided In Section 14.1, Buyer shall pay Seller, as the purchase pdce for each Used Vehicle that
is not financed through Seller's flooring line of credit with First Security Bank ofTdaho, N.A .•
,

I
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Seller'8 cost as reflected on its books and records for such Used Vebicle at the time Buyer sells
each such Used V chicle.
SecUOD 15. Assamed Llabnltles. In addition to the purchase oftb.c Purchased Assets, Buyer
.1$0 sball, in eonjunction with such purchase, assamo and take responsibility for any and'all
llabiliti~

debts or obligations of Seller (including Seller's trade payables. account payables,

notes payable to Shareholders and obligations to employees), ofclusive of any meome tax

liabilities of Shareholders.
Seet1oD16. Warranties of Seller. Seller and Shareholders make the foUowingwarranties to
~uyor, with the intent that Buyer rely thereon:
!

,

16.1 CorponteOrganlzation. Seller is a corporation organizedt validly
c::xistin& and in good standing U11der the laws of the State of Idaho. SeUer is qualified to do
business in the State ofIdabo. and has full power and authority to own, use, and sell its assetS.
\

,

16.2 Corporate Authority. Sellet s Board ofDireotors and Sharebolders have
authorized the execution and delivery of this Agreement to Buyer and the caaying out ofits
provisioas. This Agreement will not violate any judi~ governmental or administratiYe decree,
order. writ. injunction. or judgment, and will not conflict with or constitute a defi1ult under
Seller's bylaws, or any contract, agreement, or other instrument to which Seller is a party or by
which it may be bound.
16.3

Employee Issues. No employees of Seller are members of any union.

Within teD. (10) days aftcrtbc Date of this Agreement, Sener sball provide to Buyer the
following: (A) a census ofSeller·s employees, (8) a wrlttendisclosure ofall benefits made

available 10 Seller7 s employees (mcluding qualitiedand non-qualified retirement plans), and (C)
acceSs to a11 pc;:rsonncl files for Seller's tmployees. All employee benefit plans maintained by
Sener for ita employees sba11 be fully funded prior to Closing. Seller shall pay aU wages.
oommissions, accrued vaeation pay and other aecrued compensation earned by Sellers
i:mplo~ prior to Closing (together with all accrued FICA and withholding tnes). Seller shall
terminato the employment of aU of Sener's emploYees cff'ecti:vc as of the close ofbusiness on the
Closing Date. At Buyer's sole discretion, Buyetmay (but shan not be obligated to) hire any of
SeUer's employees.
16.4 Undisclosed Liabilities and Contractual Commitments. Except as
otherwise disclosed in this Agreement, the folloWing statements are true as of the Date of this

Agreement and shall be true at Closing! (A) Seller does not have any liabilities which might have
a material impact on Buyer's 1.LSe of the Putch~ Assets, (B) Seller is not a party to any
contracts or commitments'which might have a material impact Buyer's use of tho Purchased
Assets, (C) no law suit or actiOllt administrative proceeding, arbitration proceeding,
governmental investigation, or other legal or equitable proceeding of any kind is pending or
threatened against SGller whlch might adversely affect the value oftbe Purehased Assets, and (D)

on
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Se11cr has all licenses, pem:rlts and authorlza1ions required by any federal. state or local
sovemmentaJ or regulatory 8ica.cy in order to operate Scll~. Business, and knows of DO n::ason
why any such license or pennit might be subject to revocation. It any claim is asserted apinJt
Bilyet after Closi:n& withrcspect to any obllgation of Sener which Sener has failed to disclose to
Buyer in wtiting, or which Soner has disclosed but failed to pay, 1hen Buyer shall give prompt
written notice of that claim to Seller. Seller sball indemnify Buyer with respect to all such
obligatiot1$.
16.5 Condition of Equipment. Bach item ofSeller·s Equipment shall be sold
AS IS" as of the Closing Date. SeUer will continue to perform routine maintenance and repairs
with respect to Sener~s Equipment prior to Closing.

u

!
,

!

16.6 Good Title. Sener has, and shall transfer to Buyer at Closing, good and
marketable title to all of the PUrchased Assets, free and clear of all security interests, Uens,
equitable interests, leases, assessments, restrictions, reservations. or other burdens of any kind.
other than those existing in favor ofFim Seeurity Bank ofIdaho, N.A. and assumed by Buyer.
All eamnt and a.eerued taxes whiob. may beoome a lien against any of the Purchased Assets shall
have been paid by Seller prior to Closing (moluding property taxes, sales taxes and excise taxes).
16.7

FraudUsor's' Consent Seller sball1ake all actions whicb are reasonably

neee$S3ry on' Seller's part to obtain the consent of the Fr.mchisor to the issu.ance 10 Buyer of an

exclusive franchise for the sale of new Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in tho
same geograpbical area as Seller's CUl'I'eIlt franchise in Emmett, Idaho.
Section 17~

Conduct of Business Pending Oosing. Seller warrants that during the period
beginning on the Date ofthls Agreement and ending at Closing: (A) Seller'shan eontinue to

operate Sener's Business in the usual and ordinary course, and in substantial conformity with all
applicable laws, ordinances, regulatiOrtS, rules or orders; (B) Seller shall not allow any Hens to be
placed against any ofthePurchascd Assets unless those liens Ire discharged prlorto Closing; (e)
Seller shall not take any actiOTl which may cause a material adverse change in the operatiotl$ of
Sellet"s Business; (1) Sel1ec shall not conduct any sale which shall use the words or phrases
'4Qoin, Out of Business Sale" or other words or phrases having similar meanings; and (E) Seller
shall usc if.s best eff'orts to preserve the value of the Chtysicr, Dodge, Plymotrtb, and Jeep
fi:a:nehise in Emmett, Idaho. Notwidlstanding the warranties made by Seller in this Section 17,
Buyer acknowledges and agrees that Buyer shall be responsible for the performance of those
warranties pursuant to the ten:ns of that certain Management Contract dated September 1, 2000,

Section 18. Representations and Warranties of Buyer. Buyer hereby makes the following
representations and warranties to Sel1er, with the intent fuat Sener rely thereon: This Agreement
will not violate the proVision of any judicial, govemniental or administrative decree, order, writ,
injunction. or judgment, or conflict with or constitute a default under, any contract, agreement. or
other instrument to wlrleb Buyer is a party.
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SectlO1l 19. Addltioual COlldltiOIlJ Proeodont to BaYllt'. ObUgadou. The obligation of
Buyer to close this transaction is subject to each of the following conditions (each ofwhtch Is for
th. benefit otBuycr and may be waived by Buyor). and Buyer shall have the npt to rescind this
Agrccm.cnt if any of tho (otlowing conditiOt1G is uot satisfied in accordance with its terms:

.

'

~i

19.1 Buyer shall have obtained 1hml Franchisor. prior to the Closing Date, an
exclusive franchise to sell new Chrysler, Dodge. PJymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in the same
geographical area as SoUet'S CUIl'CD.t franchise in Emmett, Idaho (as evidenCed by the issuance to
Buyer by Franchisor of an appropriate Dealership Sales and Service Agreement, and the approval
of Buyer as the pubUcly-owned Dea1er-Opemor of the fi'anohise). and Buyer agrees to usc its
best reasonable: efforts to obtain that fnme1Use. .
19.2 Buyer shall ~ reasonably satisfied with any facility improvement
requirements which are imposed by Franchisor.

I,

19.3 ,All of Seller's agrcom.cnts and wmanties set forth in this Agreement shall
be true, eom:ct, complete and not misleading at Closing; provided that Buya's dccisi9n to close
this tm1$action shall not release Sener .&om Habillty to Buyer for any VIamUlty which is
subsequently determined to be incorrect. incomplete or misleading.
Section 20. Closing. The parties 'shall make all reaoonable efforts to close the purchase and
sale under this A.grcemcnt at or before 5:00 p.m., Mountain Da.ylight rune, (In or before the
Closing Date. at the offices ofSelJer, or at sucb other location as shall be selected by mutual
agreement of the parties.
20.1 Ifthis transaction closes as provided in this Agreement, then actual
possession and. all risk oftoss, damage or destruction. with respect to the Purchased Assets,. shall
be deemed to have been delivered to Buyer at 11:59 p.m.. Motmtaln Daylight Time, ott the '
Clo$mg Date.
20.2 'At Closing. and coincidentally with the perfonnanec of the obligatiOl1$ to
be performed by Buyer at Closing, SeDer shall deliver to Buyer the following: (A) all bills of
sale, assignmcms and other instruments of transfer, in fonn and substance reasonably satisfactory
to BUyer, which shaJJ be necessary to convey the Purchased Assets to Buyer; and (B) all other
documents required under this Agreement.

20.3 At Closing. and coincidentally with the performance of all obligations
required of Seller at Closing, Buyer sball deliver to ,Seller the following: (A) payment for the
PUrohased Assets; and (B)' all other'payments and documents ~uired under this Agreement.
Buyer shall be responsible for all sales tmccs payable in connection with the transaction,
20.4 If Closing does not take place on or before the Closing Date because there
has been a failure of any condition precedent set forth in Section 19, then: (A) all rights and
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obHptions of both parties under this Agreement .ball terminate, and (B) this Agreement and all
predecessor agreements shall thereafter be void and oCno oft'ect.

Both parties agree to make a good taith eftbrt to execute and deliver aU
documents and complete all actions necessary to consummato this transaction.
20.S

Seeti01l 21.· Sun1va1 olRepresoutatioas. All representations, wmantics, indemnification
obligations and ~venants made in this Apcment shall survive the ClOsing, and shall remain in
ettcet mill the expiration oltho latest period allowable in any applicable statute oftimttations;
Sudoa 22.. Asslgnmeat by Buyer. Buyer shall have 1he right to assign all of its rights and
obHsadons under this Agreement to a. business entity owned exclusively by Buyer.

J

Seetlo1l13. Lease p,dlor PlU'dlase of Buslaess Real Property. As a condition to the
Closing of the ~Ol1 contemp1ated undef this Agreement, SCllcr shall assign to Buyer (or a
related entity) the Lcasc.. including, without 1imitatio~ its terms regarding the lease of Parcels 1
and 2 of tho Business Rea1~, the filtUtc substitution ofPucel3 for Parcel 2 dwingtile
term otthe Lease, and the purcbase ofP81'Cels t and 3 of'the Business Real Property.
Scctioll24.

Miseellaneous.

There arc no oral agreements or representations between tho parties which
affect this Cransaction, and tbis Agreement supersedes all previous negotiations. warranties.
representations and understandings between the parties. Truc-eopies of all doewnen.ts referenced.
in this Agreement are attached to this Agreement. If any provision oftbis Agreement shall be
det:cmlin.ed to be void by any court of competent jurisdiction, then that determination shall not
affect any other provision ofthis Agreement, and other proVisions shall remain in tUn foree
and effect. If any provision of this Agreement is capable of two (2) constructions, only one (1)
ofwhich would render the provision valid, thcnthe provision shall have tho meaning which
renders it valid. The section beadings in this Agreement arc for convenience purposes only. and
do not in any way define or constrUe the conk:nts of this Agreement.
-'
24.1

au

24.2 This Agreement shall be governed and perfbImed in accordance with the
laws of the State ofIdsho. Bach of the parties hereby hTevocably submits to the jUrisd.iction of
the courts of Gem County, Idaho, and agrees that any legal proceedings with respect to this
Agreement shan be filed and heard in the appropclate court in Gem County, Idaho.
This .Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each ofwhioh
shall be an original. and all ofwbich shall constitute a single instrument, when signed by both of
the parties. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall bc bi.nd1ng upon the successors
24.3

and assigns of the respective parties.
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24.4 Waiver by either party of strict porf'ormanee of any provision oftbis
Agreement sban not be a waiver o( and shall not prejudice the partyfs right to subsequently
require strict perfonnance ot the same provision or any other provisio.D. Th4; consent or approval
of either party to any act by the other party of a nature requhin, CODSeftt or approval shall not
render unneoeasary the consent to or approval of any subsequent similar act.

24.S All notices provided for berein shall be in writing and shall be deemed to
be duly given when maned. by United States certified mail, postage prepaid, to the last known
address of tho party entitled to receive the notice, or when personally delivered to tl1a.t party.
24.6

Time is of the essence of this Agreement

Should any party hereto institute any action or proceedings to enforce or
interpret any provision hereof: or for damages by reason of any alleged b~h of any provision
of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the losing party or
parties sllCh amount as tho court may adjudge to be reasonable attomey fees for services rendered
to the prevailing party in sw::h action or proceeding. The term "prevailing· party" as usod in this
$eeticn shall include, without limitatiOl1, any party who is made a defendaDt in litigation in which
damages and/or other reHefmay besought against such party and a. final judgment or dismissal
24.7

[

I

or decree is c:nteredin such litigation in favor of such party defendant

r

IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the parties have executed this Agreement on the dates
indicated below.

SELLER:

THOMAS MOTORS. INC.

Dated:

.,.j

0¥r~1rA
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SHAR.BHOLDW:
I

l.
,
i

(

.

~~
RONALD O.

_-..t:..L_/._.,-._CZ/_d_

Dated!,_'f:;...·

OMAS

. Dated:

,--------------------

I

I

AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF BUSINESS ASSETS .. 10

0006,-1,
RD THOMAS 000113

••

.

CBRTAIN' EXCLUDED EQUIPMENT
1.
2.

j

Grinder
Brake lathe

.
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The plaintiff has filed a Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of Ron Thomas. There
are several brief points to make in response to this Motion, each of which serve to establish the
Motion is without merit and should be denied.
1. As a matter of substance, the plaintiff repeatedly argues that only business or
property evaluation experts can address questions of valuation. It is on that legal basis the plaintiff
argues the Second Affidavit of the defendant Mr. Thomas should be stricken since it addresses
subjects that at least relate to questions of business or property valuation. There are two points to
make in response to this legal argument.
First, most of the statements made in the Second Affidavit of Ron Thomas are pure
statements of fact. That is to say, Mr. Thomas simply explains what actually happened, and what
was actually sold. Almost all of the Affidavit, in other words, boils down to statements of
undisputed fact, not opinion type testimony.
Second, and more to the substantive legal point, the plaintiffs Motion is based upon
a faulty misstatement or misunderstanding of Idaho law. The repeated theme of the plaintiffs
Motion, as stated on behalf of the plaintiff, is: "Clearly, the questions of business and property
valuation must be left to the experts ... " See Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Second Affidavit of Ron
Thomas at p. 3, N 1. There is no citation of any authority to what the plaintiff otherwise indicates

is "clearly" the rule of law in Idaho. On this basis, the plaintiff argues the defendant Ron Thomas,
who was the undisputed owner of the Thomas Motors business and the real property that was sold
to the investment group, is not legally permitted to address issues of valuation for his own property
or business. This is simply wrong, and directly contradicted by long-standing Idaho law. As the
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Idaho Supreme Court has point-blank stated:
For more than eighty-five years, this Court has followed the rule that
the owner of property is a competent witness concerning its value.
An owner is competent to testify to the value of a going business
without further qualification.
Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 43. 896 P.2d 949 (l995}{citations
omitted). It has basically always been the evidentiary rule of law in Idaho that an owner of property

or a business is per se qualified to testify regarding the valuation of either. The plaintiff's entire
Motion is thus based upon asserting a rule oflaw that is squarely contradicted by almost a century's
worth oflegal precedent in Idaho that has repeatedly, consistently, and without exception held to be
not the rule of law in Idaho.
2. It is also worth noting the primary reason the Second Affidavit of Ron Thomas
as filed to begin with, was to clarify a misstatement of fact made by the plaintiff in opposing the
deiense Motion for Summary Judgment. In opposing the defense Motion, plaintiffs counsel
represented that the defendant "sold Thomas Motors to an investment group ... for nearly $3 million
dollars." See, e.g.. Plaintiff's Opposition Briefat pp. 10-11. In so doing, the plaintiff also cited the
Court to a number of Affidavits, thereby advising or at least suggesting to the Court there are a
number of witness/affiants supporting the proposition that the Thomas Motors business alone
generated a sales price of close to $3 million dollars. Id While the question of how much money
was received by the defendants for the sale of the Thomas Motors business has little or nothing to
ith the issues presented on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiff made a point of
presenting this to the Court as a facf. when in reality it was so far removed from the indisputable
truth that it deserved to be corrected.
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As the defendants' Reply Brief addressed, the Affidavits cited by the plaintiff as
supposedly supporting the factual proposition offered, did not even address the question of the sale
price received for the sale of the Thomas Motors business. As the Reply Brief also addressed, and
more importantly, the representation that the Thomas Motors business alone commanded a sales
price of close to $3 million dollars was not even close to being correct. See Defendants' Reply Brief
at pp. 19-21. The defendants' Reply Brief also explained the primary purpose of the Second

Affidavit of Ron Thomas was to explain some of the actual facts regarding what was sold to the
investment group. Id.

This included the undisputed fact that the sale to the investment group

included a substantial amount of surrounding or adjacent real property that had very significant value
all by itself, which real property was completely aside from the "business" of Thomas Motors. Since
the plaintiff has otherwise made it clear in this case that his claim is based only on alleged
agreements to sell the business alone, not any real property, this is a point of some potential
significance. See, Defendants' Opposition Briefat p. 16. In any event, the Second Affidavit of Ron
Thomas simply attempted to shed some light on this and established the otherwise undisputed fact
th?ll the Thomas Motors business was not sold for anything that even remotely resembled "nearly $3
million dollars," contrary to the statements made by or on behalf of the plaintiff.
In short, the defendants respectfully submit it was entirely fair for them to submit this
second affidavit establishing that the plaintiffs representation that the Thomas Motors business sold
for nearly $3 million dollars was undeniably incorrect, and that the Court should be aware of that.
There is certainly nothing in the applicable rules of procedure precluding an affidavit being
submitted for this purpose. There are also no legitimate timing issues involved here - in fact, with
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the Court having moved the hearing to September 24th , the Affidavit in question was filed more than
a month in advance of the actual hearing date.
The defendants respectfully submit that the plaintiff s Motion to Strike the Second
Affidavit of Mr. Thomas should be summarily denied.
DATED this

E it:.day of September, 2007.
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
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H. Ronald Bjorkman
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

---------------------------------

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE

)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his
attorneys of record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., pursuant to Rules 56 and 7(b)(3) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby files his Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike.

ARGUMENT & ANALYSIS
The Defendants have moved to strike certain portions of the Plaintiffs affidavit in
opposition to summary judgment, Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas In Opposition to Summary

0006G'~
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Judgment ("Drew Affidavit"), under the judicially created rule known in both Idaho and the 9th

Circuit as the "sham affidavit rule."
The sham affidavit rule permits a court to disregard an affidavit filed in opposition to
summary judgment when the affidavit directly contradicts prior sworn testimony. See Estate of
Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298,882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994); Kennedy v. Allied Afutual, 952

F.2d 262, 266-67 (9 th Cir. 1991) (holding the sham affidavit rule does not automatically dispose
of every case in which a contradictory affidavit is introduced to explain portions of earlier
deposition testimony, but applies to affidavit testimony that flatly contradicts earlier testimony in
an attempt to create an issue of fact and avoid summary judgment). Thus, the threshold question
is whether the affidavit testimony at issue directly contradicts earlier sworn testimony. If not,
then the sham affidavit rule is inapplicable. See for e.g. Frazier v. Simpiot, 136 Idaho 100, 10304, 29 P.3d 936, 939-40 (2001) (holding the court must determine whether an affidavit
contradicts prior deposition testimony by assessing the allegedly contradicted deposition
testimony in context of all related testimony given during the deposition, the specific questions
to which the witness was responding when providing the testimony, and the way in which the
witness may have interpreted the question).
Furthermore, under 9th Circuit authority, even when an affidavit in opposition to
summary judgment contains testimony which contradicts the affiant's prior sworn testimony, the
court must consider whether the affiant's statements were the result of an "honest discrepancy,"
a "mistake," or "newly discovered evidence." See Kennedy, supra. For this reason, when the
court determines affidavit testimony directly contradicts prior sworn testimony, the trial court
must make a factual determination that the contradiction(s) in the affidavit is actually a sham.
See Kennedy, supra; Fraizer, supra.
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The Defendants assert the court should strike the Plaintiffs statements that his and the
Defendant Ron Thomas's agreement whereby Thomas Motors, Inc. would be transferred to the
Plaintiff upon Ron Thomas's retirement did not involve any term for a purchase price. The
Defendants also ask the court to strike portions of the Plaintiff s affidavit in which he states "he
was supposed to get the business pursuant to the alleged oral agreement oL'1er than the specific
time when his father turned 63 years old." The Defendants argue these portions of the Plaintiffs
affidavit "are squarely contradicted by his prior deposition testimony and the Plaintiffs Verified
Complaint" and have been submitted for no purpose other than to create an issue of fact in order
to avoid an adverse decision on summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, however,
the Plaintiffs affidavit testimony is not subject to being stricken under the sham affidavit rule.

A.

The Plaintiff's Affidavit Testimony Concerning Defendant Ron Thomas's
Retirement Does Not Contradict His Prior Deposition Testimony

In Paragraph 8 of the Drew Affidavit, the Plaintiff states: "During our conversations,
which occurred before Ron bought Johannesen Motors and throughout the years until Ron sold
Thomas Motors in March of 2006, he repeatedly stated to me, or in my presence, that Thomas
Motors would be mine whenever he retired." In Paragraph 9, the Plaintiff testifies concerning
his assumption Thomas Motors, Inc. would belong to him "whenever Ron retired." Finally, in
Paragraph 10 the Plaintiff states the age of sixty-three was just Ron Thomas's estimated time for
retirement. As the following deposition excerpts demonstrate, these statements are not at all
contradictory to, or in any way inconsistent with, the Plaintiffs prior deposition testimony:
Q:

Okay. So before you made the commitment to come over,
can you remember anything else about the discussion you
had with your dad ...
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A:

Other than that he [Ron Thomas] said - he told me if I
would commit to coming over, that upon his retirement, it
would be my dealership ...

Q:

Was there any discussion along the lines of when it would
be that he would anticipate retiring?

A:

The time frames he talked to me about was when he turned
63.

Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drew Thomas, p. 38,11. 12-p. 39,1. 1 (emphasis added).
Q:

So you were anticipating that he would be retiring seven or
eight years from the time youjoined?

A:

Per him, yes.

Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drew Thomas, p. 39, 11.6-8 (emphasis added).
Q:

By my question I was trying to get at earlier when we got
offthis subject is from the time you joined Thomas Motors,
did the deal change? Was there new agreements reached?
Or was it the same agreement you felt like was already in
place?

A:

... I mean, as far as I knew, throughout the duration of the
time, that however he - and it was his verbiage and his
terminology and his wording, that when he retired, that the
dealership business would be mine. And then if 1 wanted to
pass it down to my kids, I could.

Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drew Thomas, p. 63, 11.4-16 (emphasis added)~
A:

Monte, Jan, Penny, yes, all the ones I spoke to. I didn't
speak to every single one of them, but they did confirm
they had a meeting in the showroom on that day, which
again, was to resell to me to believe in the dream again that
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at the end of - when he retired, that the place would be
mine, that I would have the dealership and then I would
take it on. And if I wanted to pass it on to my kids and so
forth.

Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drew Thomas, p. 86, ll. 7-14 (emphasis added).
A:

But when he retired, I took it as I would have the dealership

Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drew Thomas, p. 88, ll. 6-7 (emphasis added).
A:

Before this got started, when he initially brought me over to
[sic] Lanny Berg ... He always said he had it worked out,
that it would be mine when he retired.

Q:

And that was going to happen at 63, you understood?

A:

That was the number he always told me.

AjJidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drew Thomas, p. 180, II. 16- 23 (emphasis added).
In Paragraph 8 of his Verified Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges as follows:

Defendant Ronald O. Thomas was inexperienced in operating a
new car operation and sought the advice and assistance of Plaintiff,
proposing that if Plaintiff would leave Lanny Berg Chevrolet and
manage and operate the new dealership, at a greatly reduced salary,
he would give the proposed dealership to Plaintiff when he turned
age 62 or 63.
The above-cited excerpts from the Plaintiffs deposition and Verified Complaint, show the
Plaintiff has consistently maintained his father, Defendant Ron Thomas, promised to give the
Plainuif Thomas Motors, Inc. when Ron Thomas retired and that age 63 was simply the time
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Ron Thomas stated he anticipated retiring. In other words, in both the Plaintiffs affidavit and
deposition he has testified his receiving Thomas Motors, Inc. would occur upon the event of his
father's retirement, not specifically upon his father's turning age 63. Clearly, the Plaintiffs
affidavit testimony concerning the time at which his father had agreed to give him Thomas
Motors, Inc. does not directly contradict his prior deposition testimony and allegations in the
verified complaint. Therefore, the Plaintiffs affidavit testimony is not subject to being stricken
under the sham affidavit rule.

B.

The Plaintiff's Affidavit Testimony Concerning the Parties' Agreement as to
Payment for Thomas Motors, Inc. Does Not Contradict His Prior Deposition
Testimony

In the Drew Affidavit, the Plaintiff explains the parties' agreement was that in exchange
for the Plaintiffs leaving his position with Lanny Berg Chevrolet and providing his efforts and
experience in operating Thomas Motors, Ron Thomas would give the Plaintiff Thomas Motors,
Inc. when he retired. In Paragraph 12, the Plaintiff further states that throughout the nearly nine
and a half year period, from 1997, when Ron Thomas proposed the Plaintiff leave his
employment and come work to establish Thomas Motors, Inc., up until March 2006, when Ron
Thomas sold the business, Ron Thomas did not tell the Plaintiff he would have to pay a purchase
price for the business. The Plaintiff then clarifies his deposition testimony concerning a monthly
retirement payment in the amount of $3,000 to $5,000, which he agreed to provide to his parents
after he had received the business from his father.

As the Plaintiff explains, his receiving

Thomas Motors, Inc. upon his father's retirement was not contingent upon his paying his parents
the retirement income.
The Defendants argue that in his deposition, the Plaintiff clearly and an un-equivocally
testified his agreement with his father concerning the transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. included a
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term whereby the Plaintiff would pay a purchase price for the business. However, a reading of
all relevant portions of the deposition transcript establishes the Plaintiff s testimony concerning
monthly payments to his parents after taking over Thomas Motors, Inc. is, at most, ambiguous as
to whether the monthly retirement payments were actually a term of the parties' agreement for
transferring the business. See Estate of Keeven, supra (holding because the plaintiffs deposition
responses to questions regarding when he and the decedent began living together were vague and
expressed uncertainty, the plaintiffs deposition statements were not directly contradicted by his
subsequent specific affidavit statements and, therefore, could not properly be disregarded under
the sham affidavit rule).
In his deposition, the Plaintiff provided the following testimony with respect to the
parties' agreement for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. and with respect to the parties'
discussions concerning retirement payments after the Plaintiff had obtained Thomas Motors, Inc.
from his father:
Q:

So somewhere in the July or August time frame of 1997 is
when you made the commitment; and sometime in the end
of August, early September, or even August time frame is
when you actually joined; is that fair to say?

A:

Correct. Yeah. I would think that's fair to say.

Q:

Okay. So before you made the commitment to come over,
can you remember anything else about the discussions you
had with your dad, again, that we haven't talked about so
far?

A:

Other than that he said - he told me if I would commit to
coming over, that upon his retirement, it would be my
dealership. But that he would not- he was not going to
buy it unless I committed that I was coming over ...

Q:

So you were anticipating that he would be retiring seven or
eight years from the time you joined?
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A:

Per him, yes.

Q:

And at that point, you were anticipating that if you would
commit to go there, that the dealership would be yours?

A:

Yes, per Ron.

Q:

I'm sorry?

A:

PerRon.

Q:

What do you mean "per Ron"?

A:

That is correct, yes. He said that is how it would happen ..

Q:

Now, you have filed a lawsuit here against your mom and
dad alleging, in essence, that he had made a promise to you
to give you the dealership, right?

A:

He had made a promise to me that upon his retirement, that
the dealership would Be mine ...

Q:

... What I'm hearing you say is your dad, you can
specifically recall words to the Effect of, "Drew, if you
come over, when I retire, the business will be yours," right?

A:

The dealership will be yours ...

A:

I believe we've talked about anything he has said through
the years up to the date he sold it, that hang in there, stay in
there, it's your place. I don't want the place. It's your
place.

Q:

Okay. That's after you joined?

A:

Right.

Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drcl1 Thomas, p. 38, n. 6-20, p. 39, II. 6-17, p. 41, II. 11-15, p. 43, n. 1-5 (emphasis added).
Q:

By my question I was trying to get at earlier when we got
off this subject is from the time you joined Thomas Motors,
did the deal change? Was there new agreements reached?
Or was it the same agreement you felt like was already in
place?
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... I mean, as far as I knew, throughout the duration of the
time, that however he - and it was his verbiage and his
terminology and his wording, that when he retired, that the
dealership business would be mine. And then if I wanted to
pass it down to my kids, I could.

Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drew Thomas, p. 63,11.4-16 (emphasis added).
A:

Now, you've got to remember, too, I never thought that I
was going to get this place for free. That never crossed my
mind that I'd ever get it for free. This place was - we came
in together, him and I. He had the money. I had the - I
believe the talent and the time and the tenacity to get in
there and do whatever it took to make this place work.
When and up to the time that he retires, I expected to cut
him and her a check - and we talked about that too, that all
I want is a modest check out of the place when mom and I
retire. It don't take me much to live. I don't have to have a
lot to live on, but I do want something out of the business.
I had no problem with that. I expected to cut them f!
retirement check. In fact, I would have been proud of and
they could go do the traveling that she always talked about.
I had no problem with that.

Q:

Any discussion relative to what the modest check would
consist of, how much?

A:

The conversations I had - and it never was with my mom,
but Ron and I - was between 3 and 5,000 bucks a month. It
was never written in stone; it wasn't written down. But he
said it doesn't take me much to live.

Q:

For how long?

A:

Until he died, and then until mom passed away.

Q:

So your expectation was that you would take over the
dealership at or about the time he retired at 63, and you
would in turn write a check for somewhere in the
neighborhood of three to five a month for as log as they
lived?
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A:

Yes. And again, when I say or someone says that oh, yeah
when he retires he's going to give it to me, all I took that
was it that's when I took all the reins, the financials, the
checkbook, hiring and firing of people, the payroll, who
gets paid what, how much, full control, and transferring the
dealership to me. Not that they're, like, out of the picture
gone, see you later, don't ever come by, don't stop by,
don't call, don't write, no. That day would come when
they both passed away. And then it would be completely
done. But when he retired, I took it as I would have the
dealership. I would cut them a retirement check, I would
support my family, my brothers, and then move it on to the
next generation in a logical manner.

Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drew Thomas, p.86, l. 15 - p. 88,1. 9 (emphasis added).
A:

Before this got started, when he initially brought me over
from Lanny Berg, we never discussed buying. But I never
assumed I was going to get it for free. He always said he
had it worked out, that it would be mine when he retired.

Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R.
Drew Thomas, p. 180,11. 16-20 (emphasis added).
The above-cited deposition excerpts clearly establish at the time the parties formed their
agreement in 1997, the terms of the agreement were that the Plaintiff would leave his position
with Lanny Berg Chevrolet and devote his time and efforts to operating Thomas Motors, Inc.
and, in exchange, the Plaintiff would be given Thomas Motors, Inc. when Ron Thomas retired.
No where in his deposition does the Plaintiff specifically testifY that the parties' agreement for
transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. included a term whereby the Plaintiff would contribute his time
and efforts to operate Thomas Motors, Inc. and pay a purchase price in exchange for receiving
the business when Ron Thomas retired. Instead, the deposition testimony clearly establishes Ron
Thomas offered to give the Plaintiff Thomas Motors, Inc. upon his retirement in exchange for the
Plaintiff leaving his position at Lanny Berg and devoting his time and efforts to operating
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Thomas Motors, Inc., and that was the offer the Plaintiff accepted. Therefore, for these reasons
alone, the Plaintiff s deposition and affidavit testimony are consistent with respect to his
statements that the parties' agreement did not include a term whereby the Plaintiff would be
required to pay a purchase price for Thomas Motors, Inc.
In the excerpts from page 86 at lines 15-21, the Plaintiff testified he never expected to get
Thomas Motors, Inc. "for free" and then goes on to reiterate that when he and his father "came in
together" the Plaintiff had "the talent and the time and the tenacity to get in there and do
whatever it took to make this place work .. " This testimony was not given in response to a
specific question asking the Plaintiff to list the terms of the parties' agreement or whether those
terms included the Plaintiff s paying a purchase price. Thus, the Plaintiff s statement that he did
not expect to get Thomas Motors, Inc. for free does not clearly refer to a purchase price. The
statement could reasonably be read to mean pursuant to the parties' agreement, he expected to
contribute his time and efforts in exchange for receiving the business, rather than simply
expecting to receive the business as a gift. Furthermore, in the excerpts on page 87, line 21 page 88, line 1 and page 88, lines 6-7, of his deposition, the Plaintiff re-iterates his understanding
that he would receive Thomas Motors, Inc. upon the event of his father's retirement.
In the excerpts on page 86 at lines 22-24, the Plaintiff testifies that after his father retired,
he expected to cut his parents a retirement check and that the subject he and Ron Thomas had
discussed the payment of a retirement check "too." Notably, during the discussion concerning
the retirement check, the Plaintiff does not refer to the check as a purchase price, but simply as a
means to support his family. Moreover. on page 88 at lines 7-8, the Plaintiff speaks of the
payment of the retirement as something occurring separate from and subsequent to the events
upon which his receiving Thomas Motors, Inc. would be contingent. Therefore, when read in the
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context of all the Plaintiffs deposition testimony concerning fonnation of the parties' agreement
and the entire discussion involving the retirement check on pages 86-88, the Plaintiffs
statements concerning payment of the retirement check can reasonably be understood to mean
the parties' discussions relating to the check were subsequent and unrelated to the discussions in
which the parties fonned their oral agreement whereby the Plaintiff was to receive Thomas
Motors, Inc. after Ron Thomas retired.

At most, the Plaintiff s deposition testimony is

ambiguous as to whether he considered the parties' agreement for transfer of Thomas Motors,
Inc. to include his agreement to pay his parents a monthly retirement check.
For these reasons, the Plaintiffs affidavit testimony stating the parties' agreement did not
include a purchase price and his receiving Thomas Motors, Inc. was not contingent upon his
agreeing to pay his parents a retirement check is consistent with his prior deposition testimony
and, therefore, Paragraph 12 of the Plaintiffs affidavit does not directly contradict his deposition
testimony and is not subject to being stricken under the sham affidavit rule.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of R.
Drew Thomas In Opposition to Summary Judgment should be denied.

DA TED this

0< I:J day of September, 2007.
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

BY:~
tfI·~
Sarah H. Arnett
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE - 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this ;;2/9-- day of September, 2007, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, ID 83617-0188
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US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-342-2927
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US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
Sarah H. Arnett
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone:
(208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.:
2451,6023,6545
wam@whitepeterson.com
dwilkinson@whitepeterson.com
sarnett@whitepeterson. com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
REPLY RE: PLAINTIFF'S I.R.C.P.
56(1) MOTION

)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his
attorneys of record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby files his Reply Re: Plaintiff's IR.CP. 56(/) Motion.

00068
REPL Y RE: PLAINTIFF'S LR.C.P. 56(t) MOTION - I

INTRODUCTION

The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in this case on July 19,2007, and
the hearing on the motion was originally set for September 27, 2007. On August 13, 2007, the
Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) asking the court to continue the hearing on
Plaintiff s motion for summary judgment for ninety days in order to pennit the Plaintiff
additional time to complete discovery as to matters which relate directly to issues raised by the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

On August 20, 2007, the Defendants filed

Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiff's J.R.C.P. 56(/) Motion.

The hearing on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment has been continued twice,
once by the court and a second time pursuant to the parties' stipulation, and is presently set for
October 11, 2007. Continuation of the hearing on summary judgment has allowed the Plaintiff
additional time to take the deposition of Shirley Youngstrom and to submit excerpts of
Mrs. Youngstrom's deposition to the court in response to the motion.

Consequently, the

opportunity to take Mrs. Youngstrom's deposition is no longer being offered as one of the basis
for the Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion. As discussed below, however, the Plaintiff continues to
seek a continuance of the summary judgment hearing on other basis cited in the Plaintiff s Rule
56(f) Motion.
ARGUMENT

1.

Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of Defendant Ron Thomas and
Acquisition of Requested Documents from the Defendants

The Plaintiff has asked the court for additional time to respond to summary judgment in
order to obtain and review documents sought in the Notice of Taking Audio-Visual Deposition of
Ronald 0. Thomas--Duces Tecum Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4) and, if

REPL Y RE: PLAINTIFF'S f.R.C.P. 56(f) MOTION - 2
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necessary, to continue the deposition of Defendant Ron Thomas with respect to documents
obtained. The Defendants object to the court's granting an extension on this basis for two
reasons:

1) the Defendants objected to providing the documents sought in the notice of

deposition duces tecum, and 2) the documents sought are not relevant to the issues addressed on
summary judgment. Both of the Defendants' reasons should be disregarded.
First, the Defendants' objections to the notice of deposition duces tecum are not well
founded. Contrary to the Defendants' assertions the Plaintiff had not previously requested many
of the documents requested in the notice duces tecum, and, under the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Plaintiff was entitled to obtain the requested documents from Defendant Ronald
O. Thomas pursuant to a notice of deposition duces tecum. Moreover, the Defendants failed to
state specifically their objections to each of the items requested. Instead, they simply stated
generally that all of the documents requested were "overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." See Defendants} Memorandum In

Opposition to Plaintiff's [R.CP. 56(/) Motion, Exhibit A.
Secondly, the Defendants argue "at least most" of the documents sought by the Plaintiff
from the Defendants are unrelated to the issues being addressed in the summary judgment
proceedings. That determination is, however, for the Plaintiff to make after he has had an
opportunity to review the requested documents and, if necessary, to depose Defendant Ron
Thomas concerning the documents. Additionally, the documents requested are necessary to the
Plaintiffs retained expert's evaluations of the Plaintiffs economic damages under his breach of
cuntract claims and of the equitable relief the Plaintiff is requesting under his quasi contract
claim. The Defendants have argued they are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs
claim for equitable relief because the Plaintiff has not established he conferred a benefit upon the

REPL Y RE: PLAINTIFF'S LR.C.P. 56(f) MOTION - 3

()006S

Defendants. See Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 23.
Therefore, any documents pertaining to the valuation of benefit(s) conferred upon the
Defendants, including the value of the Plaintiff s services and the value of Thomas Motors, Inc,
itself, are unquestionably relevant to the issues being addressed on summary judgment.
Recognizing there are an exceptionally large number of documents in the Defendants'·
possession pertaining to the issues in this case, the Plaintiff is attempting to narrow the scope of
their document requests in order to make production less cumbersome for the Defendants and to
ensure the Plaintiff will be able to obtain and review the documents more efficiently. See Notice
of Service ------, which has been filed contemporaneously herewith.

Nevertheless, even

assuming the parties are able to resolve their disputes regarding the Defendants' production of
documents without court involvement, the Plaintiff and his expert will still require sufficient time
to receive the documents pursuant to the Plaintiff s discovery requests, review the documents,
and, if necessary, continue Ron Thomas's deposition in order to question him concerning the
documents.

2.

The Plaintiff Should be Permitted An Opportunity to Submit An Expert
Report In Opposition to Summary Judgment

The Plaintiff has asked the court for additional time to respond to summary judgment in
order to obtain and file a report to be provided by his retained expert from the GEC Group. The
GEC Group has assigned Mr. Craig Clarke, CPA, CFE Consultant, to this case, and the Plaintiff
has now formally disclosed Mr. Clarke as an expert. The Defendants object to the court's
granting an extension to allow filing of an expert report based upon "lack of timeliness or
diligence" and their assertion the analysis the Plaintiff s expert is expected to perform will "have
absolutely nothing to do with any issue presented on summary judgment." Once again, the court
should disregard the Defendants' objections.
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As explained in the Plaintiffs expert disclosure, Mr. Clarke's analysis will address both
the amount of the Plaintiff s breach of contract damages and the amount of equitable relief the
Plaintiff is seeking for his quasi contract claim, including the market value of services provided
by the Plaintiff while he was operating Thomas Motors, Inc. compared to the amount of
compensation received and a valuation of the business the Plaintiff worked to establish. In their
summary judgment motion, the Defendants are seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff's quasi contract
claim based upon an argument the Plaintiff did not confer any benefit upon the Defendants for
which he was not compensated. Therefore, it is unclear why the Defendants are now attempting
to assert the Plaintiff's expert's analysis will not be relevant to the issues being addressed on
summary judgment. Clearly, Mr. Clarke's analysis will be relevant to the issues being addressed
on summary judgment.
The Defendants' assertion as to "lack of timeliness and diligence" is unwarranted. A trial
date has not been set in this case and, therefore, the court has not set discovery cut-off and expert
;~lsclosures

deadlines. Thus, there will be absolutely no prejudice, or "sanction," imposed upon

the Defendants by allowing the Plaintiff additional time to respond to summary judgment so that
his expert can complete a report. The Defendants' assertion as to lack of diligence is also unfair
because this case has not progressed at an unusually slow pace for a case of this nature.

3.

Testing of the Written Contract Documents

As the court is well aware, the legal effect of documents containing written contracts
between the parties has been a hotly contested issue in this case. Primarily, the parties dispute
whether the Defendants executed the contracts in September of 2000~ when the documents were
presented to both parties for signature, and if so, whether the Plaintiff knew the documents had
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been signed by the Defendants, or whether the Defendants actually signed the documents after
the Plaintiff filed suit in this case.
The Defendants have been arguing vigorously that there was no contract between the
parties or, alternatively, if the written contracts were in effect as of September 2000, the Plaintiff
cannot possibly sustain a breach of contract claim based upon those written agreements because
he himself took no steps to perform under the agreements. In their response to the Plaintiffs
Rule 56(f) motion, the Defendants for the first time clearly announce they concede there is an
issue of fact as to when the Defendants executed the written contracts (contrary to the
Defendants' accusation, up to this point, they have not clearly articulated their concession that a
factual issue exists).
The Defendants persist, however, in arguing that the question as to whether or not the
Defendants signed the written agreements in September of 2000 is irrelevant to any of the issues
raised on summary judgment.

In response to this argument, the Plaintiff now asserts the

Defendants are missing the point. Given the Defendants have presented evidence that they did in

fact sign the written agreements during September of 2000, as consistently claimed by Ron
Thomas, and the Plaintiffs have presented evidence the Defendants informed the Plaintiff they
declined to sign the contract, there are material questions as to whether the written contracts
constitute the agreement between the parties and as to whether the Defendants prevented the
Plaintiff s performance by leading him to believe they had declined to enter the written
agreements and then breached those agreements by selling Thomas Motors, Inc. without giving
the Plaintiff a chance to perform.
Obviously, for these reasons, and contrary to the Defendants' assertions, the question as
to whether the Plaintiff s alternative claim for breach of contract should be dismissed does not

REPL Y RE: PLAINTIFF'S I.R.C.P. 56(t) MOTION - 6

OOOG85

turn solely upon whether the Plaintiff took steps to perfonn tenns contained in the written
agreements, which his father led him to believe had been rejected and left unsigned by the
Defendants. Therefore, the question as to when the Defendants executed the written contracts is
relevant to the issues being addressed on summary judgment, and the Plaintiff should be
pennitted to obtain forensic test results concerning the Defendants' signatures before the court
decides the Defendants' motion as to the Plaintiffs claim for breach of written contract.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously set forth in the Plaintiff's IR.CP. 56(/) Motion, and those set
forth herein, the Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion should be granted.

DATEDthis~ day of September, 2007.
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

By:

~ d1-~rJ

Sa'rah H. Arnett
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
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US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
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H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,

VS.

)
)
)
)
)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
J. ROBIN WILDE IN OPPOSITION
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)

SlATE OF IDAHO )
: 5S.

COUhty

of Gem

)

J. ROBIN WILDE, being duly swom upon oath, deposes and says:

000
SECOND AFFlf)/\ VIT OF J. ROBIN WILDE IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I

1.

I make this affidavit based upon personal knowledge of the matters sd Limh
herein.

2.

I have reviewed the Second Ajjidavit of Ronald 0. Thomas, which was filed in the
above-entitled matter, and the exhibits thereto.

3.

As I explained in my first affidavit filed in the above-entitled matter in opposition
to summary judgment, from about 1994 until 2004, I performed accounting and
tax services for the above-named Defendant, Ron Thomas and all of his business
entities including Lot-of-Cars, Inc. and Thomas Motors, Inc.

These two

businesses were separate at their inception but were subsequently consolidated
under Thomas Motors, Inc.
4.

In his second affidavit, Ron Thomas states he made "loans" to Thomas Motors,
Inc. totaling $469,778.92, and that the checks attached as Exhibit "E" to the
second affidavit are "examples" of said loans. The checks contained in Exhibit E
arc dated from 2001 through 2006. While these checks were notated "loans" by
Thomas, they were never fOlmaHzed with promissory notes nor were they treated
as loans [or accounting purposes. In order to account for a loan to a corporation
there must be a promissory note evidencing the loan and specifically setting fonh
the principal amount of the loan, the interest rate, and the terms for repayment. I
was never provided with any promissory notes for loans made to Thomas Motors,
Inc. by Ron Thomas. Absent the required documents, they were treated as capitar
transactions. While the total of these capital infusions are substantial, the LOtal
capital extracted over the same time period would, in all likelihood, offset that
amount. From my observation, monies Ron Thomas placed into the

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 1. ROBIN WILDE IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

businc~s's

account f)'om his personal checking account, or from the Ronald O. Thomas
Renials checking account, were monies he had previously taken out of Thomas
Motors, [nco as "rent" and "profit distributions." Ron Thomas regularly paid
himself $12,000 to $15,000 per month from the business which generally was
split equally between "rent" and "profit distribution." These monies were used
for a variety of purposes unrelated to the operational needs of Thomas Motors,
Inc. Mr. Thomas rarely put money back into Thomas Motors unless forced to do
so in order to satisfy banking requirements.
5.

Throughout the years I performed accounting services for Thomas Motors, Inc.,
the business had sufficient monthly income to cover its expenses. The reason
Thomas Motors, Inc. fell behind on paying its flooring lines and experienced
"cash flow" problems was because Ron Thomas insisted on taking money from
the business even when payments needed to be made.

6.

With regard to the Defendants' sale of real properties and the Thomas Motors,
Inc. business to the Bill Buckner investment group, the allocations of the portions
of the total purchase price attributable to the real properties and to the business
should be reflected in the tux returns and related documents prepared for 2006.
The sales price is required to be allocated between business assets including real
property, fixed assets, and intangibles. There are a variety of methods used to
accomplish this but it typically involves negotiation between the buyer 2nd seller
so as to maximize tax benefits to each party. TIle seller would typically want a
sales price allocation skewed in favor of real and intangible property in order to
receive preferential "capital gain" tax treatment while the buyer would prefer an
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allocation weighted in favor of fixed assets so as to maximize depreciation
deductions.

Both of these considerations operate within the bounds oj' "fair

value" which is a subjective in nature but required by the IRS.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT.
DATED this _ _ day of September, 2007.

J. Robin Wilde

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by J. Robin Wilde this
September, 2007.

.!.Lei day

of

(SEAL)

IEVERlYJ. HANEY
Notary Public
State of Idaho

t
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Y

I hereby certify that on this,?()
day of September, 2007, I caused Lo be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Second Affidavit of J. Rob Wilde In Opposition to Summary
Judgment by the method indicated below to the following:

John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-342-2927

P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attomey at Law
109 N.llays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, lD 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Faesimi Ie No. 208-365-4196
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Willdnson
Sarah H. Arnett
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.:
2451.6023.6545
wam@whilepelerson.com
dwillc:inson@whitepeterson.com
sarnett@Whitepelerson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIlIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

}
)

R. DREW THOMAS,

RONALD O. mOMAs. ELAINE K.

}
)
)
)
)
)

mOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC•• an
Idaho Corporation.

)
}

Plaintiff.

VS.

Defendants.

-----------------------------

CASE NO. CV 1006-492
AFFIDAVIT OF SARAH H.
ARNETT IN SUPPORT OF
MOnON TO COMPEL

)
)

ST ATE OF IDAHO )
: ss..

County of Canyon

)

SARAH H. ARNElT, being first duly swom, deposes and says as follows:
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1. I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and make
this affidavit based upon personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2. The Plaintiff has made a good faith effort to obtain the following original documents
from the Defendants without court involvement: 1) Agreement for Purchase and Sale of

Business Assets. 2) Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement, and 3) Management
Contract.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A'" and incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct
copy of my letter to Defendants' counsel, which is dated September 20. 2007~ and in

which I request the Defendants provide the original documents referenced in paragraph 2
above.
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "8" and incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct
copy of the Defendants' counsel's response to my September 20, 2001 letter, which is

dated September 21.2001.

S. The Plaintiff bas provided the Defendants with the name and business address of the
Plaintiff's document expert, Mr. Speckin, who is a preeminent expert in his field. See
Exhibit A attached hereto. What tests and analysis will be conducted by Mr. Speckin is a
matter for him. to decide. He and his staff will need to examine the documents before he

determines what tests he will pcrfo~ and he may decide to perfonn additional tests after
analyzing the results of initial tests. The Plaintiff can, however. assure the Defendants
and the court that the testing will be strictly non-destructive and Mr. Specking will use
the utmost care to preserve the documents. Obviously) testing of the original documents
will have to be conducted at Mr. Specldn's laboratory facilities.

FURTIIER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
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~}\.day of September, 2007.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Sarah H. Arnett this
September,2oo7.

.1:1

actUAL- rh

,t+~D

Notary Public for Idaho
My Commission Expires:

(SEAL)

day of

0/- iq..,J.oI?

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of September, 2007. I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following;
John 1. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ &, JANIS
537 W. .Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, 10 83701-2582

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett. ID 83617"()188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-342~2927

US Mail
Overnight Mail

Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-365-4196
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September 20, 2007

VIA FA.CSIMILE TRANSMISSION (2'8) 342-2'11.

John 1. Janis
HEPWOaTIJ, LEZAMIZ &. JANIS, CHID.
537 W_ Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Re:

ThollUlS v.

Thomas

Dear Mr. Janis:

The purpose of this letter is to renew our request that your client provide us with the
original Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets. Commercial Lease and Purchase
Agreement, and Management Contract so those documents can be submitted to OUT document
expert. Speckin Forensic Laboratories, in Okemos~ Micbi~ for non-destructive forensic testing
and/or examination.
Rules 26(b) and 34(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide a party may obtain
from another party for purposes of testing a tangible things~ which constitute or contain
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b). In the context of Rule 34(a). "any tangible things"
obviously includes docwnents. Thus, when the. time at which a document w~ created or at
which text, handwriting. or a signature was placed on a document is relevant to a claim or
defense involved in a pending action, a party may test the document in order to discover when
the document was created. or when a signature was placed on the document. etc. I.R.C.P.26(b),
34(a); see Clark v. Vega Wholesale. 181 F.R.O. 470, 471-72 (1998) (citing SA C. Wright & A.
Aliller Federal Practice and Procedure § 2202); (" 'The purpose of Rule 34 [F.R.C.P.) is to
make relevant and nonprivileged documents and objects in the posSession of one party available
to the otherh'); Diepenhorsl v. City of Battle Creek, F. Supp_ 2d. 2006 WL 1851243 *1-*2
(W.O. Mich. 2006) (applying Rules 26 and 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
allowing defendant in an employment discrimination case to obtain plaintiffs original joumals,
notes. calendars. and other documents for non-destructive forensic testing without requiring the
plaintiff's expert be allowed to be present during resting); Rom v. RON, 118 Idaho 689,692.800

Exhibit "A"
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John Janis
September 20, 2007
Page 2

P.2d 85, 88 (1990) ("It is well established that our adoption of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure is presumably with the interpretation placed upon similar language in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by the federal courtsj; Johnson v. Toler, 485 So. 2d 1098 (Ala. 1986)
(applying Rules 26{a),(b) and 34(a) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Proced~ which are identical
to Rules 26(a),(b) and 34(a} of the Idaho Rules of Civil ~ and holding plaintiff was
entitled to obtain an original medical record from defendant physician for examination by
plaintitrs documents expert to det.enniJle the date on which an entry critical to the physician's
defense was written in the record).
F1.Ilthennore, the purpose of discovery procedures provided under the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure is to ensure a trial is an exercise in ascertaining the truth, a "~fair contest with the
basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest possible extent.'" See Johnson, sup1'a (citing u.s. v.
Procter and Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 6n. 78 8. Ct.. 983 (1958) and Hickman v. Taylor. 329 U.S.
495> 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947»; &Be aUo 23 Am. Jur. Depositions and Discovery § 1 C'The purpose of
discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation and enable the parties to obtain evidence
necessaJY to evaluate and resolve their dispute").
Throughout the proceedinp in our client's lawsuit, a critical issue bas been whether the
Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets, Commercial Lease and Purchase
Agreemeot" and Management Conttact were ill fact the controlling agreements between the
parties, which superseded any of the parties' print oral agreements. As the reoord now before the
court on your clients' pending motion for sum.mary judgment clearly establishes, the question as
to the effect of the written agreements exists because there is a material issue of fact as to
wbether your clients executed the agreements in September of 2000, at the time Drew Thomas
sigMd the agreements.. or whether your clients' signatures were written sometime long after
September of 2000. In other wordss the date on which your clients executed the written
agn:ements is critical in this lawsuit. (It is also im.pottant: to consider that because factual issues
exist as to when the Defendants executed the agreements and whether they misled the Plaintiff
into believing they had declined to sign the ~ the Defendants are not entitled to
su.nmuu:y judgment on the Plaintiff's breoach of contract claim concerning the written
agreements). Therefore, the results from ink datin& or other forensic tests perfonned to
determine the date of the Defendants' signatures are undeniably relevant to the issues in this
case. Non-destruetive forensic testing will be the most effective means, and maybe the only
means, of determining when the Defendants signed the written documents.

Mr. Speckin of Speckin Forensic Laboratories is a pre-eminent document expert in the
nation which I am sure you will be able to veritY through your own inquiries. White Peterson
has employed Mr. Specldn to perfonn non-dest:ructive document testing in other cases, and our
attorneys have visited his facilities. In this case, we can assure you. wben Mr. S~kin examines
the original written agreements he will apply strictly non-destructive testing methods and will
ca.refuUy preserve the integrity of the documents.
Of. course. we are willing to work with you and your clients in order to resolve any
reasonable concerns regarding transmitting the original documents to our expert. However, aside
from any minor logistical concerns, which the parties can easily resolve, there is simpJy no
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reason which would warrant the court's precluding our client from conducting full discovery
with respect to the written agreements. Your clients ate simply IlDt entitled to preclude discovery
of the truth concerning the effect of the written agreements.
If the parties are unable to reach a stipulation concerning testing of the original written
agreements by Wednesday. September 27. 2007~ we ~ill tile a second. motion to compel to
compel production of the original documents. which will be heard and decided in conjunction
with the Plaintiff's Rule 56(1) motion and your clients' summary judgment motion.

I look forward to discussing this matter with you in order to arrive at a satisfactory
resolution without court involvement.
Best regards.

DPWIImh
c:
H. Ronald Bjorkman (via facsimile)
R Drew Thomas

ImbIW:\Woa'k\1\ThoanlIIl, R Om¥ 2197l\Thomas Motors, 1JIc.~/IRi$.1tr09-204l.doc
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Sarah H. Amett
WHITE PETERSON
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 200
Nampa. Idaho 83687-76901
Re:

Thom.as v. Thomas
HL&J File No. 06-2-023

Dear Ms. Arnett:
We are in receipt of your letter dated September 20,2007. In your letter, you indicate
you want Mr. Speckin to test the document, and ensure us that the testing win be non-destructive.
I appreciate that you have now identified who the expert will be, but J think I am understandably
concerned what the testin& will entail. Please explain, with specificity, what testing Mr. Speckin
intends to conduct on this original document.

Your letter also seems to presume that the document will have to be delivered to Mr.
Speckin. We have previously invjted you to inspect the document at Ron Bjorkman's office, and
have invited you to brin& an expert to inspect the document at Mr. Bjorkman's office. As long as
you identify the testing which will be conducted, and agree if the document's condition is altered in
any way the expert's opinion will be excluded, we continue to extend that open invitation to have
your expel1 inspect and test the document at !vir. Bjorkman's oftice. You have not explained why
the document must be delivered to Mr. Speckin, wherever he may be. Please explain, in detail, why
you believe this original document must leave our control.
Last, you assert that this document and the day it was signed has a bearing on the
summary judgment motion. Jdisagree. Your client claims the document was never signed and was
not in full force and affect. For the purpose of the summary judgment motion, and the arguments
made in the summary judgment motion, we accept your client's position to be true. Therefore, I do
not have any idea how testing of the document has a bearing on the summary judgment motion.
Please explain this thought process.

Reply to Boise office

Exhbit "B"O 0 0 G

Sarah H. Arnett
WHITE PETERSON
September 21. 2007

Page 2
Thank you tor your attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,

HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ &. JANIS

JWKJb~
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William A. Morrow
Sarah 11. Arnett
Dennis P. Wilkinson
WHlTE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone:
(208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.:
2451,6023,6545
wam@whitepelerscm,com
sarnett@whitepelerson.com
dl.vilkimwn@whilepeler,wm.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,

)

PJaintitl:

)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492

)

PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED
MOTION TO COMPEL
ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR
TESTING

)
)
)

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

--------------~--~-----------

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, pursuant to Rules 26,
34, and 37 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby Jiles Plainl(f}"s Renewed MoJion 10
('ompel Original Documenl.\· .fiJr In:;peclion. This motion is suppurted by the A.ffidavil
H. Arnell In Support of Molion

10

Compel ("Arnett Ate'),

th~

record

befor~ th~

(?i Sarah

court on the-

Defendants' pending motion for summary judgment, and the arguments submitted by the

PI.AINTlFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING - I
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Plaintiff in support of Plaintitl"s pending Plaintiff's IRC.P. 56(/) Motion and in the Reply Re:

Plaintiff's I. R. c.P. 56(j) Molion.

MOTION
INTRODUCTION

In this case, the Plainlitr has brought two breach of contract claims against the
Defendants. The first breach of contract claim concerns an oral agreement betweon the Plaintiff

and the Defendants whereby the Defendants agreed to transfer Thomas Motors, Inc. to the
Plainlilr upon Ron Thomas's retirement in exchange tbr the PlaintitT leaving a sales manager
position with Lanny Berg Chevrolet and devoting his time, otiorts, and experience to building
and operating Thomas Motors, Inc.
The Plaintiff has also brought an alternative breach of contract claim based upon three
written agreements involving the Defendants' transfer of the Thomas Motors, Inc business and
property to the Plaintiff. These written agreements, which were prepared sometime during the
period from late August to early September of 2000, are entitled "Agreement for Purchase and
Sale of Business Assets," "Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement," and "Management
Contract." See Affidavit of Ronald 0. Thomas In Support

(~f Defendant's

Motion lor Summary

Judgment, Exhibits A, S, C. As the record on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment
clearly establishes, the legal effect of these documents is a material issue with respect to the
Plaintitl"s breach of contract claims.
The principal question is whether the written agreements were executed by both parties
during September of 2000 and, as the Defendants have continuously asserted, thereafter be.came
the controlling agreements between the parties concerning transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. to the
Plaintiff. It is undisputed that the documents were presented to and signed by the Plaintiff on

PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOnON TO COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING· 2
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However, the record on summary judgment clearly shows there are

material factual disputes as to 1) whether the Defendants executed the agreements in September
of 2000, at the time the documents were presented to both parties for signature, and 2) if so,
whether the PlajntitI was unaware the Defendants had signed the agreements in September 2000
because the Defendants mislead the Plaintiff into believing (hey had declined to enter the written
agreements, thereby preventing the Plaintiff's performance of the agreements, or 3) whether the
Defendants actually signed the documents after the Plaintiff filed suit in this case in an attempt to
strengthen their position in this litigation. Therefore, evidence concerning when the Defendants
signed the contracts is clearly relevant to the Plaintiffs breac.:h of contract claims.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff has also brought a fraud claim in this case. Evidence showing
the Defendants signed the written agreements in September of 2000 and then led the Plaintiff to
helieve they had declined to do so because they were going to proceed with honoring the oral
agreement for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. is certainly relevant

t()

the Plaintiff's fraud claim.

Such evidence is circumstantial evidence that the Defendants intentjonally induced the Plaintiff
to continue expending time and efforts in operating Thomas Motors, Inc. by re-assuring him they
would honor their oral promises to give him Thomas Motors, Inc. upon Ron Thomas's
retirement, when, in fact, they did not intend to honor their oral promises and intended to use the
written contract against the Plaintiff if he ever attempted tu recover on the oral contract. On the
other hand, evidence showing the Defendants did not in fact sign the agreement until at or near
the time the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit would undeniably be relevant to the question of the
Defendants' credibility in this case.
For these reasons, the results of non-destructive torensic testing of the original contract
documents conducted in order to determine the date of the Defendants' signalllfes will be

PLAINTiff'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS fOR TESTING· 3
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relevant evidence in this lawsuit. Tn fact, non-destructive torensic testing is likely the only
independent evidence which can corroborate the testimony of the parties and non-party witnesses
concerning when the Detendants signed the documents. Therefore, as discussed below, under the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff is clearly entitled to obtain the original contract
documents for such testing.
The Plaintiff has renewed his efforts to obtain the original contract documents from the
Defendants in order to submit the documents to a document expert fbr non-destructive forensic
testing and analysis to determine the date of the Defendants' signatures. See Arnett All, Exhibit
A. The Defendants, however, continue to insist that 1) the Plaintiff provides details as to what
tests his document expert will conduct and 2) the testing be conducted in the Emmet, Idaho,
offices of the Defendants' attorney, Mr. Bjorkman. See Arnett Atl, Exhibit B. For the reasons
discussed below, however. there is no basis whatsoever either to preclude the Plaintiff from
conducting non-destructive forensic testing on the original contract documents or to dictate what
non-destructive testing can be performed.

ARGUMENT
A. Tbe Plaintiff'is Entitled to Obtain the Original Agreements for Non-Destructive

Forensic Testing

It is important to remember that the purpose of discovery procedures provided under the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is to ensure litigation is an exercise in ascertaining the truth, a
'" tair contest with the basic issues and Jacts disclosed to the fullest possible extent. '" See US, v.
f'iocler and Gamb/e Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683, 78 S. Ct. 983 (1958) and Hickman v. Tay/or, 329
U.s. 495. S07 67 S. C't. 38S (t 947); see also 23 Am.

JUT.

Depositions and Discovery § 1 ("The

purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation and enable the parties to obtain

PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING - 4
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To further this purpose, Rule

26(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides parties "may obtain discovery on W
matter, not privileged. which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,

whether it relates to the claim or defense of any other party . . . " I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l) (emphasis
added). Under Rule 34(a) a party may test "any tangible things... which constitute matters
within the scope of Rule 26(b)" and which are in possession or control of another party. I.R.C.P.
34(a).

As used in Rule 34(a) the unqualified teml '>any tangible things" clearly includes

documents.
Thus, when the time at which a document was created nr at which text. handwriting, or a
signature was placed on a document is relevant to a claim or defense involved in a pending
lawsuit, a party may test the document in order to discover when the document was created, or
when a sjgnature was placed on the document, etc. I.R.C.P. 26(b), 34(a); see C'!ark v. Vega

Wholesale, 181 F.R.D. 470,471-72 (1998) (citing 8A C. Wright & A. Miller Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2202); (" 'The purpose of Rule 34 IF.R.C.P.] is to make relevant and nonprivileged documents and objects in the possession of one party available to the other"');

Diepenhorst v. City t?f Bailie Creek, F. Supp. 2d, 2006 WI, 1851243 *1-*2 (W.O.Mich. 2006)
(applying Rules 26 and 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and allowing defendant in
an employment discrimination case to obtain plaintiff's original journals, notes, calendars, and
other documents for non-destructive forensic testing without requiring the plaintiffs expert be
I As the U.S. Supreme Court explained concerning the discovery process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and state discovery rules modeled upon the Federal Rules:

. . . the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying
his opponent's case. Mytual knowledge of all the relevant facts gAthered by both PaDies is essential to
pmp@r litigation. To that end, ~iJher party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he: has in his
possession.

Hickman. supra at 392 (emphasis added).
PLAINTIfF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL ORJGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING· 5
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allowed to be present during testing); Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 692, 800 P.2d 85, 88 (1990)
("It is well established that our adoption of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is presumably
with the interpretation placed upon similar language in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
thtdederal courts"); Johnson v. Toler. 485 So. 2d 1098 (Ala. J 986) (applying Rules 26(a),(b) and
34{a) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which are identical to Rules 26(a),(b) and 34(a)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and holding plaintiff was entitled to obtain an original
medical record from detendant physician for examination by plaintiff's documents expert to
determine the date on which an entry critical to the physician's defense was written in the
record).
As discussed above in the Introduction. the atlidavits submitted in support of and in
opposition to the Defendants' motion tor summary judgment clearJy establish there is a material
factual dispute as to whether the Defendants executed the written agreements at issue in this case
during September 2000 or whether they executed the documents after the PlaintitT HIed suit in
order to advance fraudulently the Defendants' position in this litigation. Therefore, any evidence
tending

(0

establish the date of the Defendants' signatures is relevant to the Plaintiff's breach of

contract and fraud claims and to the question of the Defendants' credibility generally.
For these reasons, under Rules 26(b) and 34(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the
PlaintiJT is entitled to obtain the original documents containing the "Agreement for Purchase and
Sale of Business Assets," the "Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement," and the
"Management Contract" from the Defendants for purposes of conducting non-destructive
forensic testing and expert analysis of the documents in order to determine the date of
Detendants' signatures.

PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOT10N 'f0 COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING - 6

00070b

·

.~....

,w. ;)00

v':;;/f!J

'07 16: 50

ID : WH ITE PETERSON

FAX:

PAGE

8/ 20

B. There is No Basis Upon Which to Preclude the Plaintiff From Obtaining the
Original Doeuments

Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may limit discovery by one party
only when the party opposing the discovery establishes the party conducting discovery is either
1) attempting to obtain intbnnation not reasonably calculated

to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence or 2) the infonnation sought is privileged or 3) there is good cause to limit
discovery in order to protect the opposing party from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense." See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4),26(c).
In this case, the Defendants have neither asserted any of the three bases for precluding the
Plaintiff from conducting tull discovery concerning the original contract documents nor will they
be able to establish the Plaintiff must be precluded from obtaining the documents for testing. See

Arnett Aff., Exhibit B. The Defendants are simply unreasonably resisting turning over the
original documents and attempting to complicate the issues in order to avoid discovery of the
truth (unfortUnately, "embarrassment" as it is used in Rule 26(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure does not apply to instances where a party is simply afraid of being exposed as a
fraud). This is exactly the kind of obstructive conduct during discovery which the Idaho Rules

of Civil Procedure are intended to prohibit. For these reasons, there is no reason warranting the
court's denying the Plaintiff an opportunity to have the original contract documents tested and
analyzed.
C. The Defendants Cannot Dictate the Plaintiff's Methods of Discovery

As discussed above, Rule 34(a) of the Idaho Ruks of Civil Procedure permits a party
conducting discovery to test documents. Under the rules governing discovery and authority

PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING· 7
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interpreting those rules, the party's discovery may proceed unfettered by the court unless a basis
for limiting discovery is established under Rule 26.
In this case, the Plaintiff wants to submit the original contract documents to his document
expert for testing and analysis to determine the date of the Defendants' signatures. The Plaintiff
has provided the name and address of the expert to the De1tmdants. &e Arnett Aft', The Plaintiff
can assure the Defendants and the court that the testing will be non-destructive. See Arnett AfT.
Otherwise, the manner in which the tests and analysis will be conducted is a matter for the
Plaintiffs expert to decide. The expert will need to examine the documents before he detern1ines
whal tests he will perform, and he may decide to perform additional tests after analyzing the
results of initial tests. See Arnett Aff There is simply no basis under the Rules of Civil
Procedure for requiring the Plaintiff to detail the exact methods of testing which wiU be
conducted on the documents or lO limit the non-destructive testing in any way.
Another point which should be obvious to the Defendants, despite their attempts to feign
ignorance, is that forensic testing in the twenty-tirst century generally takes place in laboratories
at experts' facilities, where the tosting equipment is located and necessary environmental
conditions for testing can be created. This case is no exception. Testing of the original
documents will have to be conducted at the Plaintitl"s expert's laboratory facilities. Again, there
is simply no basis under the Rules of Civil Procedure which would warrant the court's
prohibiting the Plaintiff from placing the original documents in the custody of his expert witness.

CONCLUSION
for the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffrespcctfully requests the court enter an order.
compelling the Defendants to provide the original documents entitled "Agreement for Purchase

PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL ORlGlNAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING· 8
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and Sale of Business Assets," "Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement," and "Management
Contract" to the Plaintiff for non-destructive forensic testing.

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED
DATED thi~i- day of September, 2007.

WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

BY:~J~
~ett
Attorneys faT Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on thi~ day of September, 2007, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-342-2927

John J. Janis

HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, ID 83617yO 188

US Mail
Overnight Mail

Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-365-4)96
.-

WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
w. \W()~\")\Th()mas. R Drew 21 ~ I\Thomas MOlol'S. Jnc.OOO\J>leitdinsslRenc:wc:d MIlIJ/)IlIO Comp.:1 noe

PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL ORIGINAl. DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING· 9
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
Sarah H. Arnett
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.:
2451,6023,6545
wam@whitepeterson.com
dwilkinson@whitepeterson.com
sarnel1@whilepeterson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,

Plaintiff.

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

RONALD 0. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

------------------------------

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
SECOND MEMORANDUM OF
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY &,
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
)

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintift: R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his
~.--.--~-

- - --

attorneys of record, the Jaw tirm of White Peterson, and hereoy f()dgeslilsSeco~Memorandum
ofSupplemental AUThority & Argument in Support o/Opposition /0 Summary Judgment.

SECOND MEMORANDUM Of' SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT Of
OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY ruOOMENT - I
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Clarification Concerning the Party's Agreement as to TraBsfe:r of Real Propertt

In their Defendants' Reply Brief on Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants take
the position the Plaintiff has conceded the parties did not have an agreement for transfer of the
real property on which Thomas Motors, Inc. was located. This interpretation of the Plaintiffs
position is inaccurate and, theretore, it is necessary to clarify the Plaintiff's position with respect

to the parties' agreement for transfer of the real property. The Plaintiff also submits additional
authority in support of his position that the statute of frauds does not bar the parties' oral contract
for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. to the Plaintiff'.
•

There is a Material Issue of Fact As to Whether the Parties Had an
Agreement Whereby the Defendants Would Transfer the Thomas Motors,
Inc. Premises to the Plaintiff

The record before the court on summary judgment clearly establishes there is an issue of
material fact as to whether the parties reached an oral agreement whereby the Defendants would
give the Plaintiff the Thomas Motors Inc. premises in addition to the Thomas Motors. Inc.
business upon Ron Thomas's retirement.
Throughout the time the parties began discussing and ultimately agreed to Ron Thomas's
proposal that he would purchase an existing auto dealership, Johanessen Motors, and convert the
dealership to a family business, Thomas Motors, Inc.. if the Plaintiff would lea.ve his
employment to operate the dealership, the parties mutually understood their agreement included
the premises upon which the business was located. Indeed, Ron Thomas was not going to
purchase either Johannesen Motors or the property on which it was located unless the Plaintiff
agl<.:ed

to operate an auto dealership on the premises, which would become the Plaintiff's.

dealership upon Ron Thomas's retirement. The parties' understanding that the Plaintiff would
receive the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises as well as the business is further demonstrated by the

SECONP MEMORANOUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 2

00071i.

fact they continuously discussed Thomas Motors, Inc. in tenus of its being a family business,
which would be passed on to future generations. See Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas In Opposition
/0

Summary Judgment ("Drew Aff. ").

~

3, g, 9; Affidavit of Monte Thomas In Opposition

10

Summary Judgment ("Monte Aff."), " 3, 4. 5; Affidavit of Rick Thomas In Opposition to
Summary JudgmenT ("Rick AfC'). " 3, 4. 5; Affidavit of 1 Robin Wilde In Opposilion to
Summary Judgment, 14; Affidavit of Janis Flowers In Opposition to Summary Judgment.

~

, 9,

10; Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment ("Arnett Aff.") Exhibit A.
June 26, 2007, Video Taped Deposition ofR. Drew Thomas, p. 106.1. 23 ~ p. 108,1. 21. The fact
that a written agreement for sale of the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises was drafted during August
of 2000, at the parties' direction. is aJso circumstantial evidence of the parties' understanding the
Plaintiff would receive the real property on which Thomas Motors, Inc. was located in addition
to the business itself. See Affidavit of Ronald O. Thomas In Support of Deftndants . MOlion for

Summary Judgment ("Ron Afr. ") Exhibits A, B, and C.
Furthermore, throughout the period from 1997. when the Plaintiff began operating and
managing Thomas Motors, Inc., until 2006, when the Defendants soJd the business and the
premises, Thomas Motors, Inc. paid the Defendants $12,000 to $15,000 each month for "rent."
Detendant Ron Thomas represented he was applying the rent payments to mortgages on the
Thomas Motors, Inc. premises in order to ensure the Plaintiff would own the premises free of
liens when Ron Thomas retired. See Amett Aff., Exhibit A, June 26, 2007, Video Taped

Deposition of R. Drew Thomas, p. 184, 11. 7-18; Arnett Aff., Exhibit B. June 20, 2007, Video
t:/ped Deposition of Ronald 0. Thomas. p. 131, I. 20· p. 132,1. 20; Second Affidavit ofJ Robin

Wilde In Opposilion to Summary Judgment, , 4. In other words, Thomas Motors, Inc. revenues
generated as a result of the Plaintiffs operation and management were to be used to pay off the

SECOND MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT Of
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mortgage for the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises. which would ultimately be transferred to the
Plaintiff. This is additional evidence of the parties' understanding that the Defendants would
transfer the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises to the Plaintiff in addition to giving him the business.
Finally, the fact the parties eventually drafted a written agreement whereby the Plaintiff
would acquire the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises in conjunction with acquiring the business is
circumstantial evidence that the parties had always intended and understood their ora) agreement
to include a transfer of the premises in addition to the business itself. See AffidaVit of Ronald 0.

Thomas In Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Ron Aff. "), Exhibits A, B,
andC.
For these reasons, there are clearly factual issues as to whether the parties' oral
agreement included transfer of the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises to the Plaintiff upon Ron
Thomas's retirement.

•

The Parties' Agreement Whereby the Plaintiff was to Receive the Thomas
Motors~ Ine. Business Is Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds Provisions
Pertaining to Agreements to Transfer Interests In Real Property

The Defendants have argued they are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff's
breach of oral contract claim because that claim is barred by the statue of frauds provisions

pertaining to agreements for the transfer of interests in real property and to agreements which
cannot be perfonned within one year. In thls case, however, the parties' agreement whereby the
Plaintiff was to receive the Thomas Motors, Inc. business is not barred by either of those
provisions.
As the Plaintiff has argued at length in the Plaintiffs Response inOppositiontD

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgmenr ("Memo In Opposition"), the parties' oral agreement
transfer of the Thomas Motors, Inc. business to the Plaintiff upon Ron Thomas's retirement is

SECOND MEMORANDUM Of SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
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not barred by the statute of frauds provisions barring oral agreements which cannot be performed
within one year. For the reasons discussed below, the oral agreement for transfer of Thomas
Motors, Inc. is likewise not rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds provisions barring
oral agreements for the transfer of real property.
First, as previously explained in the Memo In Opposition (though perhaps not as clearly
as it ought to have been), the agreement to transfer property in this case was incidental to, not
essential to, the parties' agreement for transfer of the Thomas Motors. Inc. business, Secondly,
the parties' agreements for transfer of the business and for transfer of the real property are
divisible and, consequently, the agreement for transfer of the business cannot be rendered
unenforceable because the parties' agreement for transfer of the premises was not in writing.
In Idaho, whether a contract is entire or divisible depends principally upon the intention
of the parties. See Boesiger v. DeModena, 88 Idaho 337, 347-48. 399 P.2d 635, 641 (1965).
Thus, if it appears the parties' purpose when forming the contract "was to take the whole or
none," then the contract is entire; otherwise, it is severable. See id. C·We think that perhaps the
best test is whether aU of the things, as a whole, are of the essence of the contract.") The
divisibility of a contract's subject matter and the apportionment of the consideration may also be
considered, but neither of these factors is conclusive. See id Whether a contract is entire or
divisible is a question of fact, "to be determined from the structure of the contract combined with
evidence of the intentions of the parties." Woodger v. AMR Corporation, 106 Idaho 199, 203,
677 P.2d 512, 516(Ct. App. 1984).

When an oral contract relates in part to an interest in land and in part to' a subject not
within the scope of the statute of frauds and the contract is divisible as to the two parts, the
contract is enforceable as to the parr not within the statue of frauds. See 73 Am Jur. 2d Statute of

SECOND MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY &. ARCUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
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Frauds § 437 (When the part of the contract relating to the personalty is not so interdependent
upon the part relating to the realty but that a distinct engagement as to one may be fairly and
reasonably ex.tracted from the whole. the different parts of such contracts may be deemed so far
severable and apportionable, or so distinct from and independent of each other, as to be
enforceable as to the part not within the statute); see for e.g. Landes Construclton Co" Inc, v.

Royal Bank o/Canada, 833 F,2d 1365. 1370-71 (9 th Cir. 1987) (holding the tenus of the parties'
oral agreement as to a loan the defendant was to make to the plaintiff were divisible from the
terms pertaining to the plaintiff's agreement to provide security for the loan); Godefroy v. Hupp,
93 Wash. 371. 375-76 160 P. 1056, 1059-60 (1916) (holding the portion of the parties' oral
agreement whereby the plaintiff was to receive a commission for sale of the defendants' stock
was divisible from the portion whereby the plaintiff was to receive a commission for the sale of
the defendants' real estate).
In this case, there is, at a minimum, an issue of material tact as to whether the parties'
oral agreement for the transfers of the Thomas Motors, Inc. business and premises was divisible.
While the transfers of the business and property were unquestionably related, they were not
interdependent. The Plaintiff could receive and operate the business even without receiving the
real property in addition to the business. Thomas Motors, Inc. could have continued to pay rent
to the Defendants and to operate on the premises, or the business could have been moved to a
different premises. That is, the essential purpose of the parties' agreement, the transfer of
Thomas Motors, Inc. to the Plaintiff, would not have been defeated without the provision to
transfer the real property on which Thomas Motors, Inc. was located. Furthenuore. the fact the
written agreements prepared by the parties include separate contracts for transfer of the business

SECOND MEMORANDUM Of' SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY &:. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
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and the premises is circumstantial evidence the parties intended that their agreement for transfer
of Thomas Motors, Inc. to the Plaintiff could be divisible.
Because there are factual issues as to the terms of the parties' oral agreement, the
questions as to what. if any, portion of the parties' agreement is within the statute of frauds and
as to whether the parties intended their agreement to be divisible are also factual issues, which
must be presented to the trier of fact. Therefore. the Plaintiffs allegation that the parties'
agreement included transfer of real property does not provide a basis for granting the
Defendants' summary judgment motion as to the Plaintiffs breach of oral contract claim.
•

The Defendants are Estopped from Barring the Plaintiff's Breach of Oral
Contract Claim by Asserting tbe Statute of Frauds

Finally, as previously explained in the Plaintiffs Memo In Opposition and Supplemental
Authority In Opposition to Summary Judgmenf, even if the court determines the parties' oral

agreement is within the statute of frauds, the agreement is not barred by the statute of frauds
because. under the circumstances in this case, the Defendants are estopped from asserting the
statute of frauds as a defense. At a minimum, there are material issues of fact as to whether the
Defendants' statute of frauds defense should be defeated under the doctrines of quasi estoppel
and equitable estoppel. Therefore, the Defendants should not be granted summary judgment on
the Plaintiffs breach of oral contract claim even if the court determines the agreement is within
the statue of frauds.
8.

The Defendants' Prevenpon of Plaintiffs Performance under the Written Contracts

As demonstrated by the record on summary judgment and argued at length by the
Plaintiff, there are issues of material fact as to whether the Defendants executed the written
contracts at issue in this case during September of 2000, when the documents were presented to
both parties for signature, and. if so, whether the Defendants then misled the Plaintiff into
SECOND MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7
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believing they had declined to execute the written agreements. If in fact the Defendants led the
Plaintiff to believe he was not obligated to perform under the terms of the written contract, such

an act essentially amounted to a wrongful prevention of the Plaintiffs performance through
misrepresentation.
Obviously. the Defendants' entering the written contracts was a precondition to the
Plaintiffs duty to perform under those contracts. By misrepresenting their position as to their
entering the written contracts, the Defendants wrongfully interfered with a precondition to the
Plaintiff's performance. In this respect, the Defendants' conduct amounted to, or at least was
analogous to, a prevention of contract perfonnance, which is prohibited under Idaho law. See
Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, 742-43, 864 P. 2d 184, 187-88 ("there is generally in a

contract subject to either an express or an implied condition an implied promise not to prevent or
hinder perfonnance of the condition") In such cases, when the conduct of the party preventing
performance is '''wrongful' and

~in

excess of their legal rights'" under the contract, the other

party's performance may be excused. See id.
If the Defendants executed the written contracts at issue in this case in September of
2000, as they allege they did, then their right to disregard their contractual obligations was
governed by those contracts. The Defendants did not pursue termination of the contracts
according to any procedures set forth therein. The terms of the contracts did not pennit the
Defendants to employ deception in order to divert the Plaintiff from proceeding according to the
contractual tenns and then breach the contracts by seIJing Thomas Motors, Inc. and the real
property on which the business was located to a third party.'

I The Defendants have been taking the position the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover under the wrincn contracts
because he did not take any steps to petfonn under those contracts. Of course, the Defendants cannot escape
liability OIl that basis if they led !'he Plaintiff to believe they had declined to execute the contracts. The relevant
point is the Plaintiff executed the contrncts and was prepared to perfonn his legal obligations under the contract, but
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For these reasons, there are factual and legal questions concerning the parties' conduct
and rights with respect to the written contracts at issue in this case and those matters must be
presented to the trier of fact for resolution.
DATED this 3Td day of October. 2007.

WHITE PETERSON, PA
lsI Sarah H. Arnett

Sarah H. Arnett
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of October, 2007. I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John 1. Janis

HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett.ID 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-342-2927

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-365-4196

for WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
ImhIW:\Wotk\nThom~,

R Drew 21971\Thomas Mo(ors,lndlOO\Pleadlngs\Supp Aulhorily 2 Supporting SJ Opp.OOC

was then informed by Ron Thomas the Defendants did not want to enter the written agreements after all. Moreover,
the record On summary judgment establishes requirements under the contracts were already being performed. The
Plaintiffwas perfonning all management functions for Thomas Motors, Jne., except to the extent Ron Thomas was
interfering with effective management and insisting upon retaining control of the Thomas Motors, lne. finances. As
discussed ~bovc, Thomas Motors Was 4lready paying the Defendants a monthly rent. This rent was in excess ofthe
monthly amount to be paid under the "Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement" See Ron Aff., Exhibit S, pp.
1.2.
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
Sarah H. Arnett

WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-790 t
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
ISB No.:

(208) 466-4405
2451> 6023, 6545

wam@whilepeterson.com
dwilkinson@whttepeterson.com
surnelt@whilepeterson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS.

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

)
)
)

VS.

RONALD O. THOMAS. ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS. INC., an
Idaho Corporation.
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
REPI.. Y RE: PLAINTIFF'S
RENEWED MOTION TO
COMPEL ORIGINAL
DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING

)
)
)
)
)

--------~--------------------

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, pursuant to Rules 20s

34, and 37 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby tiles Reply Re: Plaintiff's Renewed
Motion to

Compel Original Documents for InspeCIion.
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On September 27, 2007, the Plaintiff tiled Plaintiff's Renewed

9/ 14

MOlion 10 Compel

Original Documents for Testing (,'Motion to Compel"), and on October 2, 2007, the Defendants
tiled Defendants' Memorandum Response to Plainl!ffs Rmewed Molion

10

Compel Original

Documents .Ii)r Testing ("Response"). In their response, the Defendants' primary contention
appears to be that they should not be compelled to turn over the original contract documents at
issue in this case without the Plaintiff first being required to set forth precisely what types of
testing is going to be performed on those documents.
As previously explained in the Plaintiffs communications with counsel and in the

Motion to Compel, the testing which will be performed on the documents will be non~destructive
forensic testing. The specitic testing methods will have to be determined by the PlaintiU's
document expert. Erich Speck in. when he has had an opportunity tu examine the documents. As
also discussed in the Motion to Compel. under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the fact that
the testing will be non-destructive is all the information the Plaintiff is required to provide.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff is entitled to have the documents tested by
whatever non-destructive methods his expert ultimately determines are best to employ,l The
Defendants cannot dictate what discovery methods the Plaintiff may employ and preclude the
Plaintiff frum developing his case. Nevertheless, in an effbrt to assist counsel and the court so a
satisfactory resolution might be achieved through a stipulation between counsel, or with the
court's assistance, counsel is able to provide the following information concerning the types of
non-forensic testing the Plaintiff's document expert performed in another case in order to
estahlish the dates on which Signatures were placed on certain documents.

I In tact, under the Federal Rules lIf Civil Procedure and, likewi~e, under the Id~ho Rulc$ ofCivi/ Procedure, even
destructive forensic testing is pc:mlissible under certaill circumstances in some cases such as tho~ invulving
products liability.
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Plaintiffs counsel has previously employed Mr. Speckin as an expert in a Canyon
County case entitled Callahan v. Harold and Simineo Farms, 1m:., CV -04-11676, Judge James
Maditt presiding. White Peterson represented the Plaintiff' in that case. The case involved
issues concerning propriety of the transfer of certain assets held in a family fann corporation to
two individual family members, who were named as Defendants in the case. The authenticity of
a number of corporate documents as well as documents related to estate planning was a major
issue in the case. Opposing counsel, the Nampa law tlnn of Hamilton, Michelson, and Hilty
turned over original documents, which White Peterson attorneys then personally delivered to Mr.

Speckin at Speckin Forensic Laboratories is located in Okemos, Michigan. 2 A copy of Mr.
Speckin's curriculum vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Mr. Speckin specializes in forensic
analysis of questioned documents and ink dating. In the Callahan v. Harrold, Mr. Speckin
provided an affidavit setting forth the methods and results of his testing and analysis. The
affidavit was filed by the Plaintiffs in opposition to the Defendants' motion tor summary
judgment. Mr. Speckin's delenninations were pivotal to resolution ot' the case, which was
settled through mediation.
In Callahan v. Harold, Mr. Speckin performed four ditlerent procedures to determine the
dates of signatures and text on the original documents provided to him by White Peterson. He
described the tests he performed as follows; 1) the TLC test (Thin Layer Chromatography test).
which was used to determine which manufacturer's ink formulation was used for signatures on
the documents and thereby to determine the dates when the ink was manufactured; 2) the VSL
2000 (est (infrared test). which was used for ink dating and to determine whether various

fktore White Peterson transported the original d~umenls to Michigan, copies were made for each pat1y, and the
parties agreed that during the testing proc~ss, Mr. Spcckin would take an ad<iiti()olll microscopic ink sample from
each tested document in order for the Defendants to have a sllmple available for testing in the unlikely evem the
original documents were 10SI before they could be returned to the Defendants.
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writings were changed or altered (e.g. whether two different ink formulations, which were
produced during two different time periods, were present in the area of the document allegedly
altered); 3) the ESDA test (Electrostatic Detection Apparatus test), which was used to determine
whether writing impressions from one document were impressed on other documents. which
were purportedly created at later dates; and 4) microscopic analysis of text, which was used to
determine whether typed printing on a document was created by a typewriter or a computer
printer and/or what type of computer printer was used.
Once again, in this case, the Plaintiff is neither in a position to state definitely which
testing methods Mr. Speckin will employ to determine the dates of the Defendants' signatures on
the original contract documents at issue nor is the Plaintiff required to do so. However, the
Defendants can rest assured Mr. Speckin will apply non-destructive testing methods, which may
include those discussed herein or other similar tests (new technologies may also be available
which were not available when Mr. Speckin performed the testing in Callahan v. Harold). The
Plaintiff h()pes this infonnation concerning his counsel's prior experience with forensic
document testing will alleviate the Defendants' concerns regarding the nature of testing which
will be performed on the original contract documents.

DATED this ~ day of October. 2007.
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

By:~$.~
S ah H. Arnett
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
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Erich l. Speckin

Forensic Chemist

Education:
·Purdue University at age 15 to study engineering
-Albion College at age 17 to study biology and

pre~medical

-Michigan State University graduated with a degree in Chemistry

Forensic Training:
-Two year residency with Leonard A. Speckin in the examination of questioned
documents
-One year residency with Brunelle Forensic Laboratories in the identification and

dating of inks

Over 10 scientific papers authored or co-authored Including:
-The Obverse-Reverse Intersection of Lines
-Chemical Removal of Magic Marker on Photocopied Documents
·An Independent Assessment of Ink Age determination by a Private Examiner

-The Detection of Mastic on Plastic
-Interpretation of Ink Age Testing Using Rate and Percent of Extraction
-Case Study of Accelerated Ink Age Determir'lation

Invited Speaker:
-Michigan State University
-American Trial Lawyers Association
. i nternational Association of Questioned Document Examiners
""_

... " ..

_" ..

-Medical . ~e9~1 Ccmsultants..- . ..-- - ---------National Association of Document Examiners
-Canadian Society of Forensic Sciences
-American Academy of Forensic Sciences
·American Society of Questioned Document Examiners
-Midwestern Association of Forensic Scientists
-Southwestern Association of Forensic Document Examiners

EXBIBITA
r, .-.. . f )
( ;l() U
I G

http://www.4n6.com/eSpecldn.php

10/8/2007

riLl::: 1\I0.lU()

ID:WHITE PETERSON

10/09 '07 14:

FAX

PAGE 14/

1~

Page 2 of2

!5peCkin t'orensic

-Medical Defense Attorneys Meetings

-Wayne County Nursing Consultants
,·Various Insurance and Private Investigators Associations
-Nevada State Bar Association
-Geseilschaft fur Foreosische Schriftuntersl.lchung E.V. (GFS) in Hamburg, Germany
Testified in cases in federal

licensing mattersl

Cou~,

Circuit Court, District Court, Union Arbitrations,

depositions, and the State 80ard of CanvasserS in Michigan,

Pennsylvania, Delaware, Missouri, Georgia, Louisiana, North CarOlina, Oregon, New
York, Illinois, Indiana, OhiO, New Jersey, Oklahoma, California, Kansas, Washington

D.C., Virginia, west Virginia, South Carolina, Florida, Arizona and Washington. Also
in Vancouver, British Columbia Supreme Court, Mexico, and Hong Kong.

I have been appointed by judges in Michigan, California, Maine, florida and
Australia to pt;rform examinations at the request of the court.
I have also been retained by the Embassy of Uruguay, Florida Department of Law
Enforcement; M,chigan Attorney Generals Office, Department of Natural Resources,
The State Board of Canvassers, Health Care Fraud Division, Federal Defenders
Office, National Labor Relations Board as well as many local, county, state, and
federal offices,
Other clients include General Motors, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler, Honda,
NationsBank,
National
Collegiate Athletic Association,
National
Basketball
Association, National Hockey League Players Association, as well as many others.
I have performed examinations in over 1500 cases and presented sworn testimony
in several states on severa! levels over 100 times; also worked cases from four
continents and many countries.
National Media Appearances Including:

- WaH Street Joumal (front page)
- America's Most Wanted
- The Learning Channel {Medical Detectives}

Professional Memberships:
-Society of Forensic Ink Analysts (Board of Directors & President)

-Midwestern ASSOciation of Forensic SCiences
-American Society of Testing and Materials

Peer reviewed scientific publications including:
Technical Report with Case Studies on the Accelerated Aging of Writing Inks,
1998 International Journal of Forensic Document Examination,
. Chapter in EncyClopedia of Crime & Punishment,. 2001 Te)(toook

- Impression by Traced Forgery, 2001 American SocIety of Questioned Document
Examiners (co-author)

http://www.4n6.com/eSpeckin.php
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
Sarah H. Arnett

WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200

Nampa, Idaho 83687·7901
(208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.:
2451, 6023, 6545
wam@whitepeterson.com
dwilkinson@whitepeterson.com
sarnell@whiJepeler.wn.com
Telephone:

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI IE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)

Plainti ti,

)
)
)
}

vs.

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

-------------------------------

CASE NO. CV 2006-492

)

REPL \' RE: PLAINTIFFtS
MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND
AFFIDAVIT OF RON THOMAS

)
)
)
)

)

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintitl: R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his
atlnmeys of record, the law tirm of White Peterson, P.A., pursuant to Rule 56 oithe Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and hereby t'iles his Reply Re: Plaintfff's
\:IDtian /0

Strike Second Affidavit ~lRon Thomas.

REPLY RE: PLAINTWF'S MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AFFlDA VIT OF RON THOMAS - I
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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 10, 2007, the Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Alotion to Strike the Second

Affidavit of Ron Thomas ("Motion to Strike"), and on September 2\ , 2007, the Defendants filed

Defendants Memorandum In OpposiJion to PlaintiO's Motion fo Strike Se,:ond Affid(lVil (~l Ron
I

Thomas.

The Plaintiff is tiling this Reply in order to address the Defendants' arguments

concerning admissibility of lay witness opinions of business and real property values.

In the Second Affidavit of Ronald 0. Thomas ("Second Affidavit"), the Defendant Ronald

Thomas goes beyond simply clarifying what properties the Bill Buckner investment group
purchased from the Defendants in March of 2006 and the pflrtion

or the purchase price attributed

to each of those properties (in/<.mnation which is not actually set ti,lrth in the Second Allidavit).

Instead, Ronald Thomas makes statements concerning the amount of property the Bill Buckner

grouped wanted to purchase from the Defendants, the amount paid for a piece of property, which

was not part of the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises, and the Defendants' application of the sale
proceeds.

By his statements, Ronald Thomas attempts to suggest the Thomas Motors. Inc.

business had no appreciable value at the time it was sold.
As argued by the Plaintiff in the Motion to Strike, the STaTements contained in the Second
Affidavit are inadmissible on the basis of either lack of foundation, relevance, and/or hearsay.
The Plaintiff has also argued the Defendant is not qualified to render an opinion as to the fair

market value of the Thomas Motors, Inc. business at the time it was sold. In response. theDefendants argue a judicial rule concerning

admiss~bility of a- prop~rty owner' s opinion of

..

~.

."

his/her property's valu.e trumps air foundation and relevancy reqUirements set forth in the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. For the reasons discussed below, the Plaintitf respectfully disagrees with the
Defendants' interpretation and overly broad application of the judicial rule.
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Tbe Idabo Rules of Evidence Require Opinions On Property Values
To Be Provided By Experts

According to the Idaho Supreme Court's 1908 decision Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho
625,99 P. 108 (1908), and its progeny, an owner of a business or real property is competent to
testify at trial concerning the value of his/her property wirhout qualification beyond the fact of
his or her being an owner. See Rankin. supra; see also Pocatello AulO C%r V. Auo Coatings.

Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 896 P.Zd 949 (1995) (citing other appellate decisions applying the judicial
rule set out in Caldwell). Obviously, this judicial rule originated very early in the last century,
before business and real property valuations became matters generally dealt with by persons with
special qualifications. Today, however, business and property valuations are undisputedly the
provinces of experts. Business and real property values are detennined by application of various
valuation methods, which are generally accepted methods applied by trained, qualified appraisers
of real properties and businesses. Therefure, under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, which prohibit
unqualitied lay witnesses trom testifying to opinions based upon ;;scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge," only qualified experts may testify as to the appraised market value of
real property or a business. See Idaho Rules of Evidence 402, 701, 702.
While under Caldwell a property O'Wller may be permitted to give hislher lay opinion as
to the value of his/her property, under the 1daho Rules of Evidence, a property owner cannot,
without first establishing his/her quaJit1cations as an expert, give an opinion which purports to be
an appraisal of a business or real property. For the same reason, an unqualified lay property
owner is not quaHtied to testify to the relevance ot'various factors, such as the purchase price a
buyer is willing to pay, to the determination of the market value ofhis/her property. The question
of what factors are properly considered when valuing property must be addressed by qualified
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In other words, to the extent Caldwell permits a property owner to testify to his/her lay

opinion of value at trial, under the Idaho Rules of Ev;dence, lay property owners are nevertheless
unqualified to value properties. A Jay witnesses' testimony as to the value of hislher property is
still nothing more than a lay opinion.
For these reasons, the Caldwell decision and its progeny does not trump the requirements
of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and on summary judgment, the court cannot consider a lay

property owner's opinion as ro the value ofhislher property as a proper appraisal, or valuation.

•

The Judicial Rule Cited by the Defendants Applies Only To Admissibility of
Testimony at Trial Proceedings

Regardless of an owner's automatic qualification under Caldwell to opine as to the value
of hislher property during trial testimony, the trier of fact must still detennine what weight, or
value, is to be given an owner's testimony by assessing the basis for hislher opinion. See Ak.zo,
supra. Therefore, while the Caldwell rule allows a property owner to testify concerning his/her

property's value without first providing foundational testimony as to his/her qualit1carion, other
than the fact slhe is an owner, the weight to be given the testimony is ultimately determined by
the owner's testimony regarding the basis of hislher opinion. Absent an owner's testimony
serting forth the basis for hislher opinion of property value, the opinion is nothing more than a
conclusory statement.
It lS important to consider that Caldwell, A/czo, and other decisions in which the Caldwell
rule has been applied concern property owners' testimony provided at tria!. Of course, in that
context, the opposing party has an opportunity to cross examine the owner as to the basis of
his/her opinion; When an Owner provides an opinion of value in an affidavit on summary
judgment, however, the opposing party has no oppurtunity to require the owner to provide the
basis of his/her opinion. The owner might Simply state his/her opinion of value in the affidavit
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without also discussing the basis tor the opinion. Without providing testimony establishing the
basis for his/her opinion. the owner fails to show hislher opinion can be given any weight at all

and simply makes a conclusory statement. Thus, an owner's statement of opinion as to property
value in an affidavit. without additional testimony providing the basis for the opinion, cannot
properly be considered on summary judgment. For these reasons. the judicial rule discussed in
Caldwell and Aha is inapplicable to the determination as to whether an owner's opinion may be

considered by the court on summary judgment.

liT. CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously set forth in the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and those set forth
herein, except for his testimony staling the items of property the Bill Buckner group purchased

Il'om the Defendants and the total purchase price paid by the group, Ronald Thomas's testimony
in his Second Affidavit should be stricken as inadmissible, M, at a minimum. disregarded by the
court in deciding the Defendants' motion tor summary judgment.

DATED this ~ day of October, 2007.

WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
By:

~4ti J!'~

Sarah H. Arnett
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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*****
INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff has filed a Renewed Motion to Compel the defendants to produce the
original contract documents for unspecified testing, which Motion was denied by the Court a year
ago. While doing so, plaintiff goes to the unfortunate length of making some very accusatory and
inflammatory statements aimed at the defendants and/or their counsel that are unnecessary and hardly
deserved. As addressed further below, the questions raised by the defendants regarding the still
unidentified "testing" of the original written contracts at issue are entirely legitimate and fair
questions, that deserve answers before such testing is allowed. The questions and concerns raised
by the plaintitf are also completely consistent with the prior rulings of this Court on the very same

Motion.
ARGUMENT

The plaintiffs Motion again seeks to require the defendants to just give them the
actual originals of the three agreements in question, so they can send them off to someone
proclaimed to be pre-eminent in his field, for some kind of testing regarding the dating of the
signatures in these originals. When the Motion was first presented to the Court about a year ago, the
plaintiff was unwilling to even identify who this expert was, or what he was going to do with the
originals. The defendants resisted the Motion on these grounds, and the Court agreed with the
defense and denied the Motion.
It was not until recently, specifically by letter of September 20, 2007; the plaintiff

initiated efforts to revisit this same issue. This time around, the plaintiff does identify their chosen
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expert, and provides written assurance by counsel that the otherwise unidentified testing to be done
by the expert would be non-destructive in nature, but again does not indicate what specific "testing"
will be donc. As the letter by counsel indicates, the plaintiff self-imposed a one-week deadline for
the defendants to respond under threat of a motion to compel. See Affidavit ofSarah Arnett, Exhibit

"A ".

Defense counsel responded that same day with some questions and concerns about the

unidentified testing to be done by the expert, that were along the very same lines as the questions and
concerns raised on the first motion to compel a year earlier. More specifically, defense counsel
raised two basic questions and/or concerns about this requested testing, summarily stated as follows:
(1) while expressing appreciation for the plaintiff now identifying the expert for the first time, and
counsel's indicating the testing would be non-destructive in nature, a request for more specificity on
the actual testing to be done, "including what testing Mr. Speckin intends to conduct on these
original agreements;" and (2) whether or not it was practical to have such testing conducted where
the originals are located in Emmett, and, if not, why not. The plaintiff responded to these requests
with this Motion to Compel.
On the first subject concerning what actual testing would be done, the brief
supporting the Motion does not answer the question but instead indicates that the expert will have
to detennine what test - or tests - will be necessary once he gets the documents. No other
information is provided on this subject at all. In response, the defendants submit this is not a fair or
satisfactory answer to a legitimate request and concern. If the plaintiff does not know what kind of
testing will actually be done, how can the plaintiff assure the testing will be non-destructive? If the
plaintiff does know, what is the big secret about it and why will they not simply answer the questions

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL
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asked?
One of the primary points raised by the defendants in response to the first motion was
along these very same lines - that is, they should not have to lose complete custody and control of
original documents that may have significant evidentiary value without being told precisely what was
going to be done to these documents. The Court agreed, and this same point is every bit as
legitimate and true today as it was a year ago.
Before moving on to the second question raised by the defense here, the defendants
must tirst pause to respond to the completely unjustified accusation by the plaintiff that they are
resisting producing these original documents for "embarrassment" reasons of having the supposed
fraudulent truth revealed. This is frankly offensive, and completely untrue. There is enough
information in the record at this point to create a factual issue over when the originals were signed,
hut a factual issue is all it is at the moment. There is witness testimony on both sides of this issue.
The Court should be aware this includes a non-party witness who has testified under oath that the
original contracts were delivered to her shortly after they were signed by all parties in September of
2000, and she specifically looked to see that they were signed before filing them away, and observed
that all three signatures were on the documents at that time. To be fair, the plaintiff admittedly has
his own witnesses on this same subject, that again create a factual issue about it. However, the point
here is there is no good cause under such circumstances as presented here for counsel to accuse the
defendants or defense counsel of resisting discovery efforts to hide a fraud or subvert the truth. That
is simply not what is going on here, nor is it even close. Legitimate questions are being raised as to~
what kind of "testing" is intended to be done on these original pieces of evidence. There is nothing

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL
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more to it than that. In fact, the Court in this case has in essence already agreed with the legitimacy
of the questions being raised by the defendants regarding this otherwise unidentified "testing." There
is simply no good cause to make such inflammatory accusations that are untrue.
On the second question raised about whether the testing can be performed at the
present location of the original contracts in Emmett, the plaintiff once again resorts to the overly
intlammatory and accusatory, which is entirely unnecessary and hardly deserved. Specifically, the
plaintiff argues it "should be obvious to the defendant, despite their attempts to feign ignorance, that
forensic testing in the 21 st century generally takes place in laboratories ... ". (See Plaintiff's Brief

in Support ofRenewed Motion at p. 8). At the risk of sounding trite, the undersigned cannot possibly
"f~ign"

Dl1y ignorance on this subject, the undersigned actually is ignorant on this subject. Defense

counsel frankly knows nothing whatsoever about experts doing some testing to determine the date
when signatures were purportedly put on an original document, the now stated purpose ofthe testing
~;lved

here. After 21 years of practicing law, the undersigned has simply never had to deal with

any such kind of expert testing. In this state of ignorance, defense counsel thought it might at least
be a possibili ty that

Vv hatever

is involved may not require a lot of equipment, which would perhaps

make it practical for the expert to come here for the testing (e.g. a microscope). If the plaintiff would
simply respond to the inquiry about what is specifically involved in the type oftesting proposed or
contemplated, instead of slinging pot-shot type accusations at counsel, then we could know the
answers. If the type of testing involved here would require the use oflots of equipment that is not
available here in Idaho, or even one piece of heavy equipment impractical to transport, then this
particular concern or question is answered and addressed. Here again, it is simply uncalled for the
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plaintiff to accuse defense counsel of "feigning" ignorance on a subject that is supposedly obvious
to everyone else living in the 21 st century. It is simply a fact that defense counsel has never
encountered a request for this type of testing and know absolutely nothing about what is involved.
If plaintiff s counsel has enough knowledge to assure everyone involved that the testing in question
is "non-destructive" in nature, then it would seem only fair for plaintiffs counsel to simply respond
to the inquiry about what is actually involved in this testing, so that everyone involved can make a
fair ami reasonable evaluation of the issue.

(
').N(.

RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this ~ay of October, 2007.
HEPWORTH. LEZAMIZ & JANIS
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*****
R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)

vs.

)
)
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

ORIGINAL.
(Hllii ~i~

COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, and pursuant to Rule 56
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby respectfully move this Honorable Court for an order
granting partial summary judgment which dismisses any claim by the plaintiff that his alleged oral
agreement with the defendants includes any real property or land. This Motion is made on the
grounds and for the reasons that there are no genuine issues of material fact in establishing that any
claim involving land is barred by Idaho's Statute of Frauds.

/ ult-.

DATED this _1_ day of March, 2008.
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS

is
ys for Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

)

R. DREW THOMAS,

)
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vs.

)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'

)
)
)

MOTION FOR

)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS,
and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CV-2006-492

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

------------------------------~)

INTRODUCTION
In this action for damages for damages based upon Defendants' alleged breach of an oral
and/Qr written contract and thecovenanfofgooaTiiilli and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and
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fraud, Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In addition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court also has before it: (1) Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for
an Order Compelling Discovery; (2) Plaintiffs Motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f); (3)
Defendants' Motion for an Order Striking portions of Plaintiffs Affidavit in Opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment; and (4) Plaintiffs Motion for an Order Striking the Second
Affidavit of Ronald O. Thomas.
The motions came before the Court for argument on October 11, 2007 in Canyon County
based upon the consent of the parties and the court. Plaintiff was represented by Ms. Sarah
Arnett and Defendants were represented by Mr. John Janis. The Court made determinations on
the record with respect to Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to Compel Discovery and Rule 56(f)
Motion. Due to the volume of papers submitted on the motions, the fact that the Court permitted
the parties to argue the motions based upon all papers submitted, and the fact that the Second
Affidavit of Ronald O. Thomas does not bear significantly on the Court's determination of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion for an Order Striking the Second
Affidavit of Ronald O. Thomas is denied.
The motions remaining to be determined are:

(1) Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment dismissing the complaint and (2) Defendants' Motion for an Order striking certain
portions of the Affidavit of Drew Thomas submitted in opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Based upon the file and record in this proceeding, the affidavits, evidence, memoranda,
and arguments submitted on the present m()tiofis~ fogether with the applicable law, Defendants'

Motion for an Order striking certain portions of the Affidavit of Drew Thomas in opposition to

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' lV{OTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND
In this action, Plaintiff Drew Thomas alleges that Defendants, his parents, breached a
1997 oral contract to transfer Thomas Motors, Inc. to Plaintiff by the time Ronald Thomas
turned age sixty-three (63). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts in his Verified Complaint that Ronald
Thomas agreed to purchase Johannesen Motors (subsequently renamed Thomas Motors, Inc.) in
Emmett, Idaho, and to transfer the business to Plaintiff by the time Ronald Thomas turned age
sixty-three (63) in consideration of Plaintiff agreeing to leave his job as manager of the new and
used car department at Lanny Berg Chevrolet in Caldwell, Idaho, and managing Thomas Motors
"at a greatly reduced salary." As Plaintiffs counsel phrased the alleged agreement at the
hearing on the motions, Plaintiff agreed to contribute both his labor and deferred compensation,
in the form of the difference between the market value of his services and what he actually
received in salary, in consideration of Defendants' promise to transfer the business at a later
date. l

I While Plaintiff's counsel referred to the agreement as a "joint venture" at the hearing, the Court takes that
reference as a rhetorical device and not an actual assertion that the issue here is whether there was, in fact, a joint
venture, since there has been no allegation of a joint venture in the pleadings or any other papers, as far as the Court
can find. In addition, if Plaintiff were asserting that the dealership was, in fact, a joint venture, it would contradict
virtually all of the allegations made up to this point: That Plaintiff had a right to the business when Ronald Thomas
turned 63 or retired by virtue of their oral contract.
If this had, in fact, been ajoint venture, Plaintiff would have an interest in the business from the outset.
Under Idaho law, a joint venture is "analogous to a partnership and is defmed as an association of two or more
persons to carry ()ut(i single enterprise forpmfrt." Saint Alphonsrt9 Regional Melitcllt Cehfer,liic.v.Krueger,
Idan05()T, 507 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Rhodes v. Sunshine Mining Co., 113 Idaho 162, 166 (1978». A joint venture
includes: a contribution of assets, a common undertaking, joint interest, right of mutual control, an expectation of
profits, a right to participate in profits, and a limitation of the objective to a single enterprise. Id It may be express
or implied by conduct, but the intent of the parties controls. Id Sharing of profits and losses is an important
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The parties agreed that Plaintiff would receive an initial salary of $2,500 per month,
which was substantially less than Plaintiff was making at Lanny Berg. The parties subsequently
agreed upon one or more increases in Plaintiffs salary. Plaintiff continued working for Thomas
Motors until Defendants sold the dealership to a third party in early 2006, without Plaintiffs
knowledge or consent.
At Plaintiffs insistence, in the year 2000 Defendants engaged an attorney to prepare an
Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets, a Commercial Lease and Purchase
Agreement, and a Management Contract containing extensive terms and conditions regarding
the sale of the business, including a number of terms not in the alleged 1997 oral agreement
between the parties. After a number of drafts and changes to the Agreements, Plaintiff signed
the three Agreements, all of which bear a date of September 1, 2000, on September 19, 2000.
The Agreements also bear Defendants' signatures and accompanying dates of September 16,
2000. However, Plaintiff insists that Defendants had signed the documents when he signed
them on September 19, 2000. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that, after he signed the Agreements,
Defendants represented that they had not signed the documents and that they did not intend to
sign the documents, because they did not intend to hold Plaintiff to the terms set forth in the
written agreements.
On or about March 15, 2006, Defendants sold Thomas Motors to a third party without
Plaintiffs prior knowledge or consent.

c0hslderation, but is not essential. ld. Whether a joint venture exists is primarily a question of fact for the trial
court. ld. Here, Plaintiff has mad~ no allegation that therewasa mutual right t{)' control tire busrneSsoefuf(i Ronald
Tllomas retired. ~Infact,many ofPlaintitrs claims revolve around the assertion that Ronald Thomas controlled the
business during the time Plaintiff was employed there. In addition, Plaintiff has made no claim that he had any
expectation of right to participate in the profits of the business prior to the transfer of Thomas Motors to him upon
the retirement of Ronald Thomas.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMl\tIARY JUDGMENT
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDA VIT IN
OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants move for an order striking the portions of Plaintiffs Affidavit in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment that assert: (1) The parties' oral agreement did not require
Plaintiff to pay Defendants any money in consideration for transfer of Thomas Motors and (2)
the oral agreement was that Defendants would transfer Thomas Motors to Plaintiff at the time
Ronald Thomas turned age sixty-two (62) or sixty-three (63) or when Ronald Thomas retired.
The basis for Defendants' motion is that such statements directly contradict Plaintiffs prior
sworn statements and were made solely for the purpose of defeating Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Pursuant to Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot, 124 Idaho 607 (1993) and In re Keevan,
126 Idaho 290 (Ct. App. 1994), in order to strike or disregard an affidavit submitted in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment as improperly interposed solely to avoid
summary judgment, the court must find that:
1. The affidavit directly contradicts the affiant's prior sworn testimony; and
2. The affidavit was interposed as a sham, solely for the purpose of avoiding summary
judgment.
Defendants correctly note that Plaintiffs Verified Complaint never refers to the retirement
of Ronald Thomas as the operative date for transfer of the business. In fact, on at least seven
different occasions, the Verified Complaint asserts that the oral agreement between Plaintiff and
Ronald Thomas provided for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. to the Plaintiff when Ronald
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Thomas turned either sixty-two (62) or sixty-three (63). However, in his affidavit in opposition
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states the operative date for transfer of
the business was the retirement of Ronald Thomas. Defendants seek an order striking this
portion of Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition on the ground that the reference to a retirement
contingency contradicts the allegations of the Verified Complaint and is interposed here solely
to defeat Defendants' assertion that the alleged oral agreement is barred by the Statute of
Frauds. While this discrepancy is certainly a factor for the trier of fact to consider with respect
to Plaintiffs credibility on this issue, the Court cannot find that it requires striking of Plaintiffs
Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for two reasons. First, at
least one paragraph of the Verified Complaint, Paragraph 10, asserts that Ronald Thomas agreed
to transfer the business to Plaintiff"by age 63." Although this allegation does not specifically
mention the retirement of Ronald Thomas as a contingency for transfer of the business, it is
consistent with such an assertion. Second, even if the Court were to strike or disregard this
portion of Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition, Plaintiffs deposition testimony, in which he
makes a number of references to the retirement contingency as part of the agreement, would still
be before the court. 2
Defendants also seek an order striking any statement by Plaintiff in his Affidavit in
Opposition that the parties' alleged oral agreement did not require Plaintiff to pay any monetary
consideration for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. Defendants assert that such statements
Even if Defendants had moved to also strike all portions of Plaintiffs deposition testimony referring to the
retirement conting~ncy, it is. not clear that the court could grant sUGh a motion based upon the doctrine serouf iff···
l'olmie Farms and Keevan, because both cases concerned affidavits that contradicted deposition testimony, not
deposition testimony that contradicted prior sworn statements, such as those contained in a verified complaint. In
this case, it would be difficult for the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs deposition testimony, which occurred prior to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, was made solely to defeat the summary judgment motion.
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contradict Plaintiffs deposition testimony that he expected to pay something for the business
and are interposed solely for the purpose of defeating Defendants' claim on summary judgment
that the terms of the alleged agreement are too indefinite to be enforced. Defendants correctly
point to several instances where Plaintiff indicated in his deposition that he expected to pay
something for the business. However, the Court cannot find any instance where Plaintiff
affirmatively stated that the parties' agreement required him to pay something for the business
as consideration for its transfer. Instead, such statements only conclusively establish some
subjective belief on Plaintiff s part that he would pay Defendants some amount of money at
some point at or after transfer of the business. In fact, Plaintiff also testified a number of times
that the agreement consisted of Defendants' promise to transfer the business to him in
consideration for him leaving Lanny Berg to work at Thomas Motors.
In light of the above, the Court finds that it is appropriate to leave the resolution of any
actual or apparent inconsistencies in Plaintiffs sworn statements in this case to the trier of fact.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In
det~r'1Jining

a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe all disputed facts

liberally in favor of the non-moving party; andfuust draw aIlreasonableiIlferences in favor of
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the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517
(1991).
Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made upon personal knowledge, set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. I.R.C.P. 56(e). Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit must be attached or served with the affidavit.
Jd When the moving party supports a motion for summary judgment with competent admissible

evidence, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in that
party's pleadings in order to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial, but must
set forth specific facts, in admissible form. Id
The moving party may satisfy his or her initial burden by establishing the absence of
evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. McCorkle v.

Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550, 554 (2005). The movant may establish such
lack of evidence either (1) by an affirmative showing based upon the moving party's own
evidence; or (2) by reviewing all of the nonmoving party's evidence to demonstrate that the
proof of an essential element is absent. Id Once the moving party does so, the burden again
shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact. Id

II. Count I: Breach of Oral Contract
A. Lack of Definite Material Terms
Defendants move for summary judgment· dismissing

Count f()t ihe·compiaInt, which

asserts a claim for breach of the alleged oral contract to transfer Thomas Motors, Inc. to
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Plaintiff, on the ground that the material terms of the alleged contract were not sufficiently
definite to permit its enforcement. Among other things, Defendants note the absence of any
agreed price term in the alleged oral agreement. Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts, in
Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, that the
essential terms of the agreement were, "I would leave Lanny Berg and give my efforts and
experience in building Thomas Motors in exchange for his' giving' me the business whenever
he retired."
In order for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds. Barry v.

Pacific West Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831 (2004). A meeting of the minds is
evidenced by a manifestation of the parties' intent to contract, which takes the form of an offer
and acceptance. Id The meeting of the minds must occur on all terms material to the contract.
Id The material terms of the contract must be sufficiently definite and certain in order for the
contract to be enforceable. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank,

NA., 119 Idaho 171, 173 (1991). As a general rule, if a contract is so vague and indefinite that
the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained, it is unenforceable. Barnes v. Huck, 97 Idaho
173, 178 (1975). The question of whether there was a sufficient meeting of the minds to form
an express agreement is for the trier of fact. R. D. Bischoff v. Quong- Watkins Properties, 113
Idaho 826, 828 (Ct. App. 1987). The trier of fact's inquiry into an alleged oral agreement is
three-fold: first, determining whether an agreement exists; second, interpreting the terms of the
agreement; and third, construing the agreement for its intended legal effect. Id
Here, the court finds that the agreement as alleged by Plaintiff in Paragraph 12 of his
Affidavit in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment - in consideration of Plaintiff

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
-9-

leaving his employment at Lanny Berg and contributing his efforts and experience to building
Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to transfer Thomas Motors upon the retirement of Ronald
Thomas - is supported by sufficient evidence in the record to preclude summary judgment
dismissing the claim for breach of that contract. 3 Defendants have not established that the price
or any other term not present in the contract as alleged is material as a matter of law. Cf Barry,
140 Idaho at 832 ("The scope of the work to be performed is a material term of a construction
contract."); Black Canyon, 119 Idaho at 174 (Terms such as the principal amount and applicable
interest rate are essential to a loan contract).
B. Statute of Frauds
Defendants also seek summary judgment dismissing the oral contract claim on the
ground that the alleged oral agreement is invalid, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 9-505,
because: (1) the agreement, by its terms, was not to performed within a year; and (2) the
agreement was for the sale of real property or an interest therein.
1. Contract Not To Be Performed Within a Year

Plaintiff alleges that he and Ronald Thomas entered into the oral agreement for the
transfer of Thomas Motors in 1997. As indicated earlier in connection with Defendants' Motion
to Strike portions of Plaintiffs Affidavit in Opposition, there is sufficient evidence in the record
for the jury to find that the oral agreement provided for the transfer of Thomas Motors when
Defendant Ronald Thomas reached age 62 or 63, or when he retired. Idaho courts construe the
provisions of Section 9-505 narrowly, permitting enforcement of an oral contract to be
Plaintiff, at various titries,nas also assertedth~tpart of the consideration he provided for Defendants' promise to
transfer Thomas Motors was his agreement to work at a salary well below what he might have otherwise been paid.
Since this is not necessary for determination of the existence ofan oral contract here, the Court will leave the
detemIination as to whether such a term was part of the parties' agreement to the trier of fact.

3
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performed upon the occurrence of a stated future event, if it was possible that such event could
occur within a year. Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1008 (Ct. App. 1986). Since it is
possible that Ronald Thomas could have retired within one year from the time the parties
allegedly entered into the contract, the contract would not be barred by the statute of frauds, if
the jury determines that the contract included the retirement contingency. If the jury determines
that an agreement existed, but did not include the retirement contingency, Defendants may
renew their motion.

2. Transfer of Real Property
Defendants also assert that the alleged oral contract is invalid under the statute of frauds
because it is for the transfer of real property or an interest therein. However, it does not appear
from any of Plaintiff's submissions that he has alleged Defendants promised to transfer anything
other than Thomas Motors. If the jury determines that the contract included a promise to
transfer real property, Defendants may renew their motion. 4
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing Count I of the Verified Complaint should be denied.

II. Count II: Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Defendants also seek summary judgment dismissing Count II of the Verified Complaint
which asserts a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the
oral contract which is the subject of Count I. The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is essentially derivative of the claim fot oreacn6ftne underlying contract, since it calls
4 Plaintiff asserts that the Court should estop Defendants from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense. Plaintiff
may raise such arguments in the event Defendants renew their motions based upon the statute of frauds.
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for an objective determination of whether the parties acted in good faith in carrying out the
terms ofthe contract. Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22 (2006).
In light of the fact that the Court denied Defendants' motion with respect to Count I, Defendants
have not established entitlement to dismissal of Count II.

Ill. Count Ill: Quasi-Contract Claim
In Count III of the Verified Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for relief in quasicontract, asserting that, in the event the jury does not find that there was an enforceable contract
to convey Thomas Motors, Defendants would be unjustly enriched if Plaintiff is not awarded
damages for the difference between his salary and the market rate for his services, since Plaintiff
accepted such reduced salary in reliance upon Defendants' promise to transfer the business.
Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing this claim on the ground that Plaintiff s
salary and wages were subject to a separate valid contract between the parties. 5
A claim for unjust enrichment requires proof that: (l) plaintiff conferred a benefit upon
the defendant; (2) the defendant accepted the benefit with knowledge; and (3) under the
circumstances, it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying the
plaintiff the fair value thereof.

Vanderford Company, Inc. v. Knudson, 165 P.3d 261, 272

(Idaho 2007). However, the Court will not employ the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment
where there is an enforceable express contract between the parties which covers the same

5 DefendantS also asserted that Plait'ltiffcannot prove that Defendants were unjustly enriched by Plaintiff's services
here. To the extent that assertion is distinct from the issue of whether the unjust enrichment claim is barred by
another contract between the parties, the Court finds that it involves damage issues which were the subject of
Plaintiff's Rule 56(1) motion and the Court will not consider them at this time.
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subject matter, because equity does not intervene when an express contract prescribes the right
to compensation. Id
Here, Plaintiff essentially seeks additional compensation for the services he performed
for Thomas Motors while employed there based upon the assertion that, pursuant to another
agreement, he agreed to accept less compensation for his services. Since the uncontroverted
evidence establishes that the parties had an express employment agreement pursuant to which
Plaintiff was paid a salary, including one or more raises during his employment, the Court finds
that it would be improper to change the terms of that employment agreement by application of
the doctrine of quasi-contract. 6 Plaintiff's assertion that he agreed to go to work for Thomas
Motors at a reduced salary in consideration for Defendants' promise to transfer the business
should stand or fall based upon the jury's determination of his express contract claim in Count

Accordingly, Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Count III of the
Verified Complaint asserting a claim based in quasi-contract should be GRANTED.

IV. Count IV: Breach of Written Contract

6 As Defendants correctly point out, applying the doctrine of unjust enrichment on these facts would have the
potentially pernicious effect of permitting parties to change the terms of an otherwise enforceable express contract
by asserting a claim for unjust enrichment based upon an entirely separate unenforceable promise that supposedly
altered or modified the terms of the express contract.
7 The Court's determination might have been different if Plaintiff were either challenging the validity of the
employment agreement or if Plaintiff were relying on terms of the oral agreement clearly distinct from his
employment contract with Thomas Motors, such as the plaintiffs in Harbough v. Myron Harbough Motor, Inc., 100
Idaho 295 (1979). In Harbough, the plaintiffs alleged that they left other careers to take control of their father's
business in consideration for the father's promis~e to transfer thebusines& totnem: fd at 298:' TheplainriflS also~
contended the agreement prOVIded that, in addition to their salaries, they would receive a credit for a portion of the
net profits of the business which would accrue toward the eventual purchase of the business. Id If there were a
similar term in Plaintiffs alleged agreement here, clearly separate and distinct from his salary, the court would have
been more inclined to find that an unjust enrichment claim is proper here.
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In Count IV of the Verified Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for damages for breach
of the 2000 written Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA).8 Defendants move for summary
judgment dismissing this claim on the ground that Plaintiff breached the PSA and failed to
perform or attempt to perform any of his obligations under the PSA. While the Verified
Complaint is not clear as to how Defendants aIIegedly breached the PSA, Plaintiff asserts that
there is a material issue of fact regarding whether Defendants signed the PSA before they sold
Thomas Motors in March 2006. Plaintiff further asserts that if Defendants signed the PSA
before seIling Thomas Motors in March 2006, they failed to notify Plaintiff of that fact and
Plaintiff''was stilI deprived of the benefit of Thomas Motors before he had an opportunity to
perform his obligations under the contracts. In other words, under those circumstances, Ron
would have breached the contracts by seIling Thomas Motors." In essence, Plaintiff claims that
Defendants either: (1) failed to sign the PSA before conveying Thomas Motors in March 2006,
in which case there was no enforceable written contract between the parties; or (2) signed the
PSA and breached it by transferring Thomas Motors to a third party in 2006. In the first case,
since there was no enforceable written contract, Plaintiffs claim for breach of the PSA is not
properly interposed. In the second case, Defendants could not have breached the PSA in March
2006, by the express terms of that Agreement.
Breach of contract occurs when there is an unexcused failure to perform a contractual
duty. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 160 P.3d 743, 748 (Idaho 2007). The PSA
provides, in Paragraph 2.1, that the contract was to close on September 1, 2001. There is no
In fact, Plaintiffreiterates in a footnote attached to the caption for Count IV that there was no written contract
between the parties. While the Court finds that it strains the concept of "pleading in the alternative" to deny
the existence of a contract and, at the same time, assert a claim for its breach, the Court cannot find a
basis upon which such a claim is improper, as a matter of law.

8

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
- 14 -

00070;';

evidence in the record that the parties agreed to postpone or change that closing date. In fact,
Plaintiffs own allegations that he was unaware Defendants ever signed the PSA precludes such
a finding. Pursuant to Paragraph 19.1 of the PSA, Plaintiffwas required, as a condition
precedent to closing, to obtain an exclusive franchise from Chrysler. Defendants have adduced
uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiff failed to obtain such a franchise. Pursuant to Paragraph
20.4 of the PSA, the failure to close on September 1,2001, due to the failure ofa condition
precedent set forth in Paragraph 19 of the PSA terminated the parties' respective obligations
under the PSA. In light of this, Defendants could not have breached the PSA by transferring
Thomas Motors to a third party in 2006. 9
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Count IV of the
Verified Complaint asserting a claim for damages for breach of the September 2000 PSA is
granted.

V. Count V: Fraud
Count V of the Verified Complaint seeks damages for fraud based upon Defendant
Ronald Thomas's alleged promise to transfer Thomas Motors to Plaintiff when he turned sixtytwo (62), sixty-three (63), or retired. Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing this
claim based upon the lack of any evidence in the record to support a finding or inference that the
alleged promise was false when made.

In fact, the specific terms of the PSA appear to have no relevance in this case, except possibly as evidence that the
parties intended to modifY any alleged prior agreement. However, there is no need for the Court to rule on this issue
at the present time.
9
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A party seeking to recover on a claim of fraud must establish nine different elements by
clear and convincing evidence: (1) A statement of fact; (2) that the statement was false; (3) that
the statement was material; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity when made; (5) the
speaker's intent to induce reliance on the statement; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the statement's
falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on the statement; (8) the hearer's right to rely on the statement;
and (9) consequent and proximate injury. Country Cove Dev't, Inc. v. May, 150 P.3d 288, 293
(Idaho 2006). Traditional principles and standards governing summary judgment generally also
govern the granting of summary judgment on the issue of fraud. Id. Thus, a plaintiff resisting a
motion for summary judgment on a fraud claim must show sufficient evidence in the record to
create a material issue of fact on each element. Id. With respect to the requirement that the
statement at issue be one of fact, generally, a claim for fraud will not lie for statements
regarding future events. Id. at 294. An exception to the general rule exists for a defendant's
promise or statement that he or she will undertake an act, if the plaintiff establishes that the
defendant made the promise with no intent to keep it. Id. Plaintiff apparently relies upon this
exception in opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on his fraud claim.
The Court has already found, in evaluating Count I of the Verified Complaint, that an
issue of fact exists as to whether Defendant Ronald Thomas promised to transfer Thomas
Motors to Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence in the record that would
support a finding that Ronald Thomas did not intend to keep the promise at the time he made it.
Instead, all of Plaintiff's evidence refers to events that allegedly occurred some time after
Ronald Thomas made the promise~ his alleged misus~ of funds fof his own

benefit, his aHeged

refusal to invest resources to improve the business, his alleged refusal to enter into a written
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contract, and his later sale ofthe business to a third party without Plaintiff's knowledge or
consent. In fact, Plaintiff himself has also adduced significant evidence tending to support a
finding that Ronald Thomas did intend to transfer Thomas Motors to Plaintiff. For instance, in
his Affidavit in Opposition, Plaintiff states that between 1997 and 2006, Ronald Thomas
"repeatedly stated to me, or in my presence, that Thomas Motors would be mine whenever he
retired." Plaintiff also asserts that, from 1997 through 2005, during family gatherings, Plaintiff,
Ronald Thomas, Defendant Elaine Thomas, and Plaintiff's brothers spent hours discussing the
future of Thomas Motors and that all of those discussions "turned on the assumption that
Thomas Motors would belong to me whenever Ron retired." This assertion is confirmed by the
affidavits of Monte Thomas and Rick Thomas. In addition, Monte Thomas states, in his
Affidavit in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, that, in August 2000, Ronald
Thomas announced to the staff that "Thomas Motors was going to be Drew's .... "
In light of this evidence, the Court cannot find that there exists sufficient factual
evidence for the jury to find that Ronald Thomas did not intend to keep his promise to transfer
Thomas Motors to Plaintiff at the time he allegedly made the promise. Accordingly, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment dismissing Count V of the Verified Complaint asserting a
claim for fraud.

ORDER
THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing Count I and Count II of the Verified Complaiiitis DENIED;

and Plaintiff's Motion
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for Summary Judgment dismissing Counts III, IV, and V of the Verified Complaint

IS

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

'J

~~~--

Dated this V1't> day of November, 2007.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse
basket; or by facsimile copy:

Sarah H. Arnett
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock St., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

Dated this

42 CfL

day of November, 2007.

SHELL Y GANNON
Clerk of the Court
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone:
(208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.:
2451,6023
wam@whitepeterson.com
dwilkinson@whitepeterson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

K DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

r

County of Canyon

: ss.
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
AFFIDA VIT OF DENNIS
WILKINSON IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

)
)

DENNIS WILKINSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

AFFIDA VIT OF DENNIS WILKINSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I
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1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action,

and make this Affidavit on the basis of my own personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference as if set

forth in full is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendants' First Set of

Discovery Requests.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

-Z '(' day of April, 2~_ _

~t'----

"
Dennis Wilkinson

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Dennis Wilkinson this
2008.

(SEAL)

;.4

day of April,

G~yuvVh
,++~ Q
Notary Public for Idaho
My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of April, 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John 1. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-342-2927

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, ID 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 208-365-4196

WHITE PETERSON, P .A.
ImhlW:\WorklT\Thomas, R Drew 21971 \Thomas Motors, IndlOO\PleadingslAff of DPW,Response to Partial SJ. doc
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EXHIBIT "A"

William A. Morrow
James M. Vavrek
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone:
(208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.:
2451, 7256
wam@whitepeterson.com
jvavrek@whitepeterson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO

DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS

.

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through his undersigned attorneys
of record, the law firm of White Peterson"

r.A.. and responds to Defendants' First Set of

Discovery Requests to Plaintiff, as follows:

00076~
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GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

Plaintiff objects to Defendants' First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff to the

extent they seek contentions and information which Plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to
develop.

Plaintiff has not completed its own discovery and investigation is continuing.

Accordingly, the responses that follow are based upon the best knowledge, information, and
belief of Plaintiff at this time and are to be considered preliminary in nature, subject to
substantial revision as Plaintiff has the opportunity to conduct further research and discovery.
Plaintiff will make a good faith effort to respond to all discovery requests based on the
information presently available to him, with the understanding that his responses are not
necessarily complete and further research may require revision of any and all responses.
Plaintiff reserves the right to make any further responses if it appears that any omission or error
has been made in connection with these responses or if more accurate information is or has
become available. These responses are made without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to use in later
discovery or to present at hearing such evidence as may later be discovered or evaluated.
2.

These responses are made subject to all objections as to competence, relevance,

materiality, and admissibility. These responses are subject to all objections that would require
the exclusions of any statement, material, or information herein provided if the discovery request
were asked concerning any statement, material, or information made or possessed by witnesses
present and testifying in court. All such objections are reserved and may be interposed at the
ti1ll1: uf trial or any hearing in this matter.

3-.

Plaintiff specifically objectS t() tIiesediscovery requests to the extent that they

seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and the
rules governing the discovery of facts of experts as set forth in Rule 26, Idaho Rules of Civil

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 2
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Procedure.

Plaintiff has, to the extent possible, construed each request as requesting only

information and/or documents not subject to any applicable protection.

lbis objection is

intended to apply to all discovery requests that seek such information and will not be repeated
specifically for each request to which it applies.
No incidental or implied admissions are intended. The fact that Plaintiff has responded to any
discovery request or part thereof should not be taken as an admission that Plaintiff accepts that
the discovery request or the response or objection thereto constitutes admissible evidence.
Similarly, the fact that Plaintiff has responded to all or part of a request is not intended to and
shall not be construed to be a waiver by Plaintiff of all or part of any objection to other requests.
Plaintiff's answers to any discovery requests herein do not constitute a waiver of Plaintiff's right
to object to any future additional, or supplemental discovery requests regarding the same or
similar matters.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please identify each and every individual or person who has or
purports to have personal knowledge of the facts of this case, whether it relates to the liability
issues or damages issues, and provide a statement of what personal knowledge you believe they
have or purport to have.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.1: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the
attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Subject to, and without waiving such objections,
discovery i$ ongoing; Plaintiff

nas··nof

identified every person who may have knowledge

regarding the facts of this case and, as such, reserves the right to supplement this answer when
such information is discovered pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), and/or the
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Court's scheduling order in this matter. At present, Plaintiff believes the following persons have
knowledge regarding this action:
(1)

R. Drew Thomas
CIO White Peterson

5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
(2)

Ronald O. Thomas

(3)

Elaine K. Thomas

(4)

Monte Thomas

(5)

Rick Thomas

(6)

1. Robin Wilde

P.O. Box 985
Emmett, Idaho 83617
(7)

Shirley Youngstrom

(8)

Sandy and Doug Mills

(9)

Jan Ron Flowers
715 W. Navaho
Emmett, Idaho 83617

(10)

Penny Hulbert
8620 Dewey Road
Emmett, Idaho 83617

(11)

Katie Peterson
CIO White Peterson

5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
(12)

Kyle Thomas
C/O White Peterson

5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
(13)

Vaughn Waggoner, Washington Trust Bank

(14)

John Nunley, Chrysler Financial
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(15)

Earling Johannesen

(16)

Don Rogers

(17)

Tracy Lankford - Service Manager, Thomas Motors

(18)

Richard Nunn - Parts Manager, Thomas Motors

(19)

Kari Garner-Secretary, Thomas Motors

(20)

Cory Thomas, Salesman, Thomas Motors

(21)

D. Spillett, Salesman, Thomas Motors

(22)

John Cates, Fonner OwnerlManager, NAPA - Emmett, Idaho

(23)

Heather Strand

INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please identify any and all lay witnesses you intend to can at the
trial of this action, and describe the substance of their anticipated testimony.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.2: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No.2 on the
grounds that Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure does not require a litigant to disclose
the names and addresses of intended witnesses. Furthennore, Plaintiff has not yet identified
witnesses to be called to testify in the trial of this matter but will disclose his witnesses pursuant
to the Court's Rule 16 Order. Without waiving, and subject to these objections, Plaintiff has not
yet identified witnesses for trial, but may call any or all of the persons identified in Answer to
Interrogatory No.1. TIris answer may be supplemented as discovery progresses.

INTERROGATORY NO.3: Please identify each and every person whom you expect to call as
an expert witness al trial, and describe the substance of their expected testimony. Pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 26{b)( 4), for each expert witness you intend to call at the trial of this case, please
describe the substance of the opinions to which each such expert is expected to testify, and
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explain the underlying facts and data upon which each such expert's opinions are based, in
conformity with Rule 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.3: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 4 to the
extent it seeks information regarding experts retained but not expected to testify in direct
violation of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Subject to, and without
waiving this objection, Plaintiff has not retained any experts at this time. To the extent Plaintiff
retains any experts, this response will be supplemented.
INTERROGATORY NO.4: Please identify any and all exhibits you intend to use at trial for

any purpose.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.4: Objection. TIris Interrogatory requires a disclosure
of material which is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or which is
work product protected from disclosure by IcJaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Without waiving,
and subject to these objections, Plaintiff has not yet determined which documents will be used as
exhibits at the trial of this matter. This answer will be supplemented pursuant to the Rule 16
Scheduling Order in this matter. Plaintiff also reserve the right to use as exhibits any and all
documents attached to or referred to in either party's discovery responses, or any documents
referred to or used as an exhibit to any depositions taken in this matter.
INTERROGATORY NO.5: In your Complaint in this case, you claim there was an agreement
by the individual defendants to "give" you the business of Thomas Motors, Inc. Regarding this
allegation, made several times in your Complaint, please identify and explain the details
surrounding this alleged agreement, inclUding the following:
(a)

The specific date(s) upon any such agreement was purportedly made;
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(b)

Identify each and every individual who participated in any communications

wherein this such agreement was allegedly reached;
(c)

Identify the location where such agreement was purportedly reached (e.g. by

phone, or in person, and if so, where);
(d)

Identify and explain each and every term of such agreement, including listing

each and everything you would have been "given" under this agreement, and each and every
thing you were requested to do under such agreement; and
(e)

If your response to subparagraph (d) includes any real property you believe you

would have been "given" in the agreement purportedly reached with your parents, identify with
specificity the real property you believe would have been included as part of that agreement.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.5: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis

and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the
attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Furthermore, this Interrogatory is vague and
overly broad and burdensome. Without waiving, and subject to these objections, Plaintiff states
that beginning in 1997 and continuing up until the few moIiths before Defendants began
marketing Thomas Motors for sale Ronald O. Thomas repeatedly had discussions with Plaintiff
indicating that in return for Plaintiff's work, knowledge, and experience at Thomas Motors it was
Ronald Thomas' intention to give the dealership and real property on which Thomas Motors was
situated to Plaintiff when he retired. It was in reliance on these conversations, that Plaintiff left
his job at Lanny Berg Chevrolet and went to Thomas Motors and it was in reliance on these
conversations and assurances thathereniainedat Thomas Motors over the course of Defendants'
ownership of Thomas Motors. Over the years, these conversations took place at various places
and locales including the Thomas' former residence in Sweet, Idaho, the Thomas Motors

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 7

00077J-.

dealership, the office at Lot of Cars in Emmett, Idaho, in various automobiles while Defendant
Ronald Thomas and Plaintiff went on drives to discuss the business, and in various telephone
conversations throughout the years. These conversations were often in private but persons with '
direct knowledge about these conversations as well as Defendant Ronald Thomas' agreement
with Plaintiff include, but are not limited to: Monte Thomas, Rick Thomas, Shirley Youngstrom,
Jan Flowers, Elaine Thomas, and Rob Wilde.
INTERROGATORY NO.6: Please provide your employment history, including the following:
(a)

IdentitY each of your employers;

(b)

IdentitY the dates of employment;

(c)

IdentitY your position or job title with each employer;

(d)

Identify and explain the job functions you performed for each such employer;

(e)

IdentitY your supervisor or boss at each such place of employment; and

(f)

Identify the compensation terms you had with each such employer, including the
specific rate of pay, and how much you earned on a weekly, monthly and/or
annually with each such employer as well as a description of any and all benefits
at each such employment (other than salary); and

(g)

Describe the reasons you left each such employment.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.6: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the
attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Furthermore, this Interrogatory is vague and
overly broad and burdensome in that it placesnotiIDe

lirilltatlons

on what it is requesting.

Furthennore, given the lack of a time limitation, Plaintiff believes that this Interrogatory is not
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calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving, and subject to these
objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
(1)

From approximately 1984 thought 1989, Plaintiff worked for Morris Roofing in

Washington State. Plaintiff performed general labor and roofmg work during this period and
worked for his then father-in-law. While Plaintiff is not exactly sure about the wage he was paid
during this period, to the best of his recollection he believes he was paid approximately $10.00
per hour. He left this position to return to the Treasure Valley and take a position selling cars
with Lanny Berg Chevrolet.
(2)

From approximately 1989 through early 1997 Plaintiff worked at Lanny Berg

Chevrolet in Caldwell, Idaho. During this period he rose from a salesman in the new and used
car division to manager of the new car division. During the majority of this period Plaintiff was
paid on a commission basis, however, when he was named manager he was assured he was to
make no less $60,000 per year (which had been his approximate salary as a salesman). Lanny
Berg was Plaintifr s supervisor while at Lanny Berg Chevrolet.
(3)

From approximately 1997 through 2005 Plaintiff was worked at Thomas Motors

in Emmett, Idaho. During this period he served as General Manager and was responsible for the
day-to-day operations of Thomas Motors. During this period, Plaintitrs salary ranged from
approximately $30,000 a year up to approximately $60,000 - well below market value for his
position of employment. Plaintiff took this position and salary based on the agreement he had
with Defendant Ronald Thomas whereby in return for working at this reduced, below-market

salary he would be given Thomas Mot()rs and the real property it was situated upon when Ronald
Thomas retired. Plaintifr s employment ended with Thomas Motors when Defendants sold
Thomas Motors in violation of any and all agreements with Plaintiff.
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INTERROGATORY NO.7: Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto is a copy of an "Agreement for
Purchase and Sale of Business Assets," which contains signatures for yourself and the individual
Defendants. In your Complaint in this action, you appear to dispute the validity of this contract,
where your Verified Complaint states ''that no written contract was ever validly executed
betwcen the parties." Regarding this allegation, please explain and describe in full and complete
detail each and every fact upon which you base the claim that this written contract was not
validly executed between the parties.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.7: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the
attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Furthennore, Plaintiff objects to the extent that
this Interrogatory attaches any validity and legal meaning and/or significance to Exhibit "A".
Without waiving, and subject to these objections, Plaintiff responds as follows: While Plaintiff
acknowledges at one point signing Exhibit "A," said agreement was never validly executed by
Defendants. In particular, circwnstantial evidence demonstrates that the signatures could not and
were not procured in the manner reflected on the purported agreement Furthermore, evidence
and testimony indicate that instead of signing the Exhibit "A" when it was presented to him,
Defendant placed the unsigned agreement into his desk. Furthermore, shortly after being
presented with Exhibit "A" Defendant Ronald O. Thomas telephoned Plaintiff and indicated that
he would not be signing Exhibit "A" proclaiming: "Why would I sell you something that I was
just going to give you?" Plaintiff then believed that the written agreement had not been agreed to
nor was he ever provided

any

·evidence or docwnentatlon to the contrary and the parties

continued to work under the existing verbal understanding without reference to any conditions
and/or requirements allegedly contained in Exhibit "A". Furthermore, it is the belief of Plaintiff
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that the signature of Defendant Elaine Thomas may not be her valid signature and instead her
signature was affixed to Exhibit "A" by Defendant Ronald O. Thomas well after the date at
which it was purportedly signed.
INTERROGATORY NO.8: In your Complaint in this matter, you claim that as a result of an
alleged breach of contract, you have been damaged in an amount to be proven with specificity at
trial, but in excess of $500,000. Regarding this damages claim, please identify and explain the
following:
(a)

Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard;

(b)

Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and

(c)

To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above,

please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in
such amounts.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.8: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the
attorney/client andlor work product privileges. Subject to, and without waiving these objections,
Defendants are currently in the process of itemizing the damages they have suffered. When said
list is completed, Defendants will disclose the same. Damages are expected to include, but may
not be limited to, the following:
(1)

Loss of right to ownership interest and income in Thomas Motors and real

on which Thomas Motors is situated;
(2}

Loss of income based on reliance on agreement and promises with Defendants

based on his taking a position with Thomas Motors at a substantially below market salary
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thereby providing Defendants with a substantial benefit for which Plaintiff is now entitled to
compensation based on Defendant's sale of Thomas Motors to a third party;
(3)

Loss of future income from Thomas Motors as Defendants sold Thomas Motors

to third party in breach of agreement with Plaintiff.
Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as more information is obtained
through the discovery process.
INTERROGATORY NO.9: In Count Two of your Complaint in this action, you claim that as a
direct result of Defendants' purported breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
you have suffered damages in an amount exceeding $10,000 to be proved with specificity at
trial. Regarding this claim of damages, please identify, describe, and explain in full and
complete detail, the following:
(a)

Identity with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard;

(b)

Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and

(c)

To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above,

please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in
such amounts.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please see Answer to Interrogatory Number 8.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: In Count Three of your Complaint in this action, you claim that
the costs of Defendants' failure to compensate you for the actual value of the benefit you
conferred upon them, the Defendant has been unjustly enriched in an amount in excess of

$lOOyOOO to be proved with specificity af triaL Regarding t:IUs claim of damages, please identify,
describe, and explain in full and complete detail the following:
(a)

Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard;
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(b)

Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and

(c)

To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above,

please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in
such amounts.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please see Answer to Interrogatory Number 8.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: In Count Four of your Complaint in this action, you claim as a
result of the Defendants' purported breach of the written agreements, you have been damaged in
an amount to be proven with specificity at trial, but in excess of $500,000. Regarding this claim
of damages, please identify, describe, and explain in fun and complete detail the following:
(a)

Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard;

(b)

Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and

(c)

To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above,

please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in
such amounts.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please see Answer to Interrogatory Number 8.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: In Count Five of your Complaint in this action, you claim that as
a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' purported fraudulent assertions, you have been
harmed in an amount to be proven with specificity at trial, but is in excess of$100,000.
(a)

Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard;

(b)

Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and

(c)

To the extent not a1readyaddress in response to sub:pamgraphS (a) and (b) above,

please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in
such amounts.
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please see Answer to Interrogatory Number 8.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: In Count Four of your Complaint in this action, you claim that
you reviewed written documents prepared by an attorney, and signed said documents, which
were then delivered to the Defendant Ronald Thomas, with regard to this assertion at paragraph

43 of your Verified Complaint, please identify the written documents or agreements being
referenced in this assertion, and the date that you signed said documents.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the
attorney/client andlor work product privileges. Without waiving, and subject to these objections,
Plaintiff responds by referring you to please see Response to Request for Production Number 10
and Answer to Interrogatory Number 7.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: In Count Four of your Complaint in this action, referencing
written agreements between you and the Defendants, you claim at paragraph 45 that the
Defendants failed to abide by the terms of said agreement and as such have materially breached
it. Regarding in this assertion, please identify and describe in full and complete detain each and
every term of said agreement you believe the Defendants failed to abide by, and describe in full
and complete detain how the Defendants failed to abide by said terms.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the
attorney/client andlor work product privileges. Furthermore, Plaintiff objects to the extent that
this Interrogatory attaches any validity and legal meanitlg andlor signIficance to any alleged
written agreement. Finally, Plaintiff is still in the process of reviewing these documents and
determining the extent to which any performance was rendered pursuant to same and, therefore,
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Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as discovery takes place in this matter.
Without waiving, and subject to these objections Plaintiff states the following:

(1)

With regard to the alleged "Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets,"

pursuant to Section 16.3, within ten (to) days of the agreement being entered Defendants were
required to provide to Plaintiff: (a) a census of Defendants' employees; (b) a written disclosure
of all benefits made available to Defendants' employees; and (c) access to all personnel files for
Defendants' employees.
(2)

With regard to the alleged "Management Contract," Plaintiff believes that the

Defendants failed in the following respects:
(a)

Defendants' failed to loan Thomas Motors $300,000 as required by

(b)

Defendants failed to turn over responsibility for any and all decisions with

Section 5.

regard to the operation of Thomas Motors as required by Section 2.
(c)

Defendants' failed to turn over control over the decision making ability

regarding the expenditure of revenues and working capital as required by Section 2.
(d)

Defendants failed to turn over control of all employment, compensation,

and termination of all corporate employees to Plaintiff as required by Section 2.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto is a copy of an "Agreement for
Purchase and Sale of Business Assets," which contains signatures for yourself and the individual
Defendants in this action. Please describe and explain in full and complete detain each and every
effort made by you to comply with the requirements of this Agreement.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the
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attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Furthermore, Plaintiff objects to the extent that
this Interrogatory attaches any validity and legal meaning and/or significance to any alleged
written agreement. Finally, Plaintiff is still in the process of reviewing these documents and
determining the extent to which any performance was rendered pursuant to same and, therefore,
Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as discovery takes place in this matter.
Without waiving, and subject to these objections, Plaintiff states that because this agreement was
not ever validly executed no performance was required of him and the acts of Defendants, based
on their failure to either perform required acts and/or inform Plaintiff that the agreement had
been executed excused any performance that mayor may not have been required.

RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please produce copies of any and all exhibits you
intend to use at the trial of this action.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please see Answer to Interrogatory
Number 4.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please attach a copy of the educational and
professional qualifications of all expert witnesses you will call at trial and also attach copies of
each and every report generated by each expert witness referred to herein.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please see Answer to Interrogatory
Number 3.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please produce copies of your tax returns for the
calendar years 1995 through 2005 inclusive:
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please see documents produced
herewith (Bates Nos. 1-75. Plaintiff will supplement this response as he is able to acquire copies
of additional returns responsive to this request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce copies of any and all docwnents
contained in your personnel file regarding your employment with Lanny Berg Chevrolet.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Objection. This Request for
Production seeks information that is not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
However, subject to, and without waiving this objection, Plaintiff has no responsive docwnents
in his possession.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Please produce copies of any and all documents
which have any tendency to prove or relate to the amount of damages you arc claiming in this
action under each or any of Counts One through Five, inclusive, of your Complaint.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: See Answer to Interrogatory
Nwnber8.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Please produce copies of any and all written
agreements between you and any or all of the Defendants in this action.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Plaintiff objects to this Request for
Production in that it is vague. Furthennore, Plaintiff objects to the extent that this Request
attaches any validity and legal meaning and/or significance to any purported written agreement.
However, subject to and without waiving said objection, please see documents produced
herewith (Bates Nos. 76-117.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Please produce copies of any and all docwnents
which you believe have any tendency to prove or relate to any alleged oral agreement between
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you and any of the Defendants to the effect that the Defendants agreed to "give" you the business
when the Defendant Ron Thomas turned 63 years old.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Plaintiff objects to this Request for
Production in that it is vague. Plaintiff further objects to this Interrogatory on the basis and to the
extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the attorney/client and/or
work product privileges. Subject to, and without waiving this objection, Plaintiff is not in
possession of any documents that are responsive to this request. As discovery in this matter is
taken, Plaintiffwill supplement its response.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: To the extent not otherwise covered by any other
Request above, please produce copies of any and all documents which describes, lists, proves, or
relates to all compensation you earned while working for Lanny Berg Chevrolet.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: Plaintiff objects to this Request in
that it is vague, overly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. Subject to, and without waiving this objection, please see documents
produced herewith. This response will be supplemented as Plaintiff is able to locate documents
that are responsive to this request.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto is a copy of an
"Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets." Please produce copies of any and all
documents which have any tendency to evidence, support, or relate to any efforts you made to
comply with the provisions of this Agreement.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST Fo.R PRODUCTION NO.9: Plaintiff objects to this
interrogatory in that the Request assumes that the "Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business
Assets" was validly executed between the parties. Further, this Interrogatory seeks information
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that is protected by the attorney/client and/or work product privilege. Subject to, and without
waiving this objection, Plaintiff is not possession of any documents that are responsive to this
request at this time. This response will be supplemented as Plaintiff is able to locate documents
that are responsive to this request.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce copies of any and all of the written
documents or agreements referenced in your response to Interrogatory No. 13 above.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: See Response to Interrogatory
Number 13 and documents produced herewith (Bates Nos. 76-117).
~

DATED this

Jff- day of July, 2006.
WHITE PETERSON, P .A.

~~:!t.ek~~":========-----=-----
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
)

County of Canyon

R. DREW THOMAS, being first duly sworn, depose and say that he is the Plaintiff in the
above-entitled matter, hat he has read the foregoing document, knows the contents thereof, and
believes the facts therein stated to be true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

ti
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DATED this;(f day of April, 2008.

SUBSC~P'.~P',~ND SWORN to before me this
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Notary Public for Idaho
My Commission Expires:
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John 1. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH. LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street. Stc. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise. JD 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927

t·;A~

0
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H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett. Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
A ttomeys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW Tl lOMAS.
Plaintift:

)
)

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)
VS.

)
)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS. ELAINE K.
fHOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS.
fNe., an Idaho Corporation.

)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON
MOTION };'OR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUI)GMENT

)
Dctendants~

}

...

)
)

* '" * * *
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ORIGINAL

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs response to the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment falls
far short of being legally or factually sufficient to support the defeat the Motion. In short, there is
simply no legitimate question about the fact that Idaho's Statute of FratJds bars that part of the
plaintiff s claim that the alleged oral agreement at issue in this case inclu<ied the future transfer of
real property.
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CLIARL Y
DOES NOT APPLY HERE
The plaintiffs primary response to the Statute of Frauds argl}Il1ent is, as predicted, to
claim that the defendants are equitably estopped. The plaintiff makes this argument, however, on
the basis of a flawed and incorrect interpretation of the elements of such defense, which are
otherwise very well-established in Idaho.
The plaintiff argues the "elements of equitable estoppel are not the same as those of
fraud." A short answer to this is - yes, they are, at least in all material senses that matter here. As
the Am Jur treatise states:
In its last analysis, the Doctrine of Estoppel rests upon the principles
of fraud. Equitable estoppel requires deliberate deception and is
based on fraud, actual or constructive; without such fraud there can
be no estoppel.
28 Am Jur. 2d, "Estoppel and Waiver" § 47.
More specifically, the plaintiff argues that the difference between the elements of
fraud and equitable estoppel are that with equitable estoppel "there is nQ requirement that thedefendants knew or should have known that the statements were materially false when they were
made as in the case of fraud."

(Plain/~fJ's

Briefat p. il). There are no citations or legal support of
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any kind offered for this statement. This is entirely inaccurate, as Idaho l_w makes clear.
There are no shortage of appellate cases in Idaho addressing the elements of equitable
estoppel. See, e.g., Youngv. Idaho Dept. o/Law Enforcement, 123 Idaho 870,853 P.2d 615 (1993);
Medical Services Group. Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. 310. 126 Idaho 90,878 P.2d 789 (1994); Scott v.
Castle. 104 Idaho 719, 662 P.2d /163 (Ct. App. 1983); Record Steel & ColtSt. Inc. v. Martel Const.
Inc., 129 Idaho 288, 923 P.2d 995 (Ct. App. 1996); Bjornstad v. Pery, 92 Idaho 402, 443 P.2d 999
(1968): Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465, 531 P.ld 227 (1975); Tiffany v.
City ofPayette. 121 Idaho 396.825 P.2d ';93 (1992); JR. SimplotCo. v. Chemetics Intern, Inc., 126
Idaho 532,887 P.2d 1039 (1994). Every single one of these cases lists as the first element that the

party claiming equitable estoppel must prove there was "a false representation or concealment of a
material fact."
The most recent appellate decision in Idaho addressing the elements required to
establish equitable estoppel appears to he Sorensen v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 141
Idaho 754, 118 P.3d 86 (2005). There the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly stated:

Four elements are required to establish a claim for equitable estoppel:
(1) there must be a false representation or concealment of!\ material
fact made with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) the
party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the
truth; (3) there was intent that the misrepresentation be relied upon;
and (4) the party asserting estoppel relied upon the misrepresentation
or concealment to his or her prejudice. All of the above factors are
of equal importance and there can be no estoppel absent any of these
elements.
Sorensen, supra, 1,J] Idaho at 759 (emphasis addedL The Idah();\ppellate Courts have thus made

it clear, including in its most recent pronouncement. that in order to establish equitable estoppel, a
party must prove there was a "false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual
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or constructive knowledge of the truth." Jd. Otherwise stated, it is clear that the plaintiff needs to
establish that any statements made by the defendant Ron Thomas back in 1997 when the oral
agreement was made, was a representation that was false when made with actual or constructive
knowledge of the truth at that time. This is frankly not a debatable point ofIdaho law.

It is also not debatable that this required element to establish equitable estoppel tracks
exactly with the initial elements necessary to establish fraud. It has already been established as the
law of this case that the plaintiff cannot satisfy this element. The Court has already dismissed the
plaintiff s fraud claim on the basis that the plaintiff was unable to establish that the defendants made
any knowingly false statements at the time the alleged oral agreement was reached. As was
addressed at length in the prior summary judgment proceedings, the best the plaintiff could possibly
establish, even construmg every doubt in his favor, would be to the effect that the defendants'
statements about wanting to give the business to the plaintiff at the time the oral agreement was
reached was true when made, but that the defendant subsequently changed his mind years after the
fact. See, Order on De/imdants ' Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 16-17.
As such, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot establish the elements necessary to invoke
the doctrine of equitable estoppel here as a matter oflaw. The Statute of Frauds thus legally bars the
plaintiffs claim for breach of oral agreement as involving the transfer of any real property.
It is also worth noting that there would be nothing even remotely unusual about such

a ruling. The plaintiff is seeking to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel which is well
recognized to be a doctrine that is not favored in the law and should be applied only in exceptional~
circumstances (which are definitely not present here). As stated in the Am Jur treatise:
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Inasmuch as the doctrine of estoppel operates to prevent showing the
truth, and is more or less in the nature of a forfeiture, estoppels have
often been characterized as not favored in the law. They are to be
applied rarely, only from necessity, and only in extraordinary
circumstances. The Doctrine of Estoppel must be applied with great
care and the equity must be strong in its favor.

***
Estoppel will be sustained only upon clear and convincing evidence.
The Doctrine of Estoppel when misapplied may be a most effective
weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.

28 Am Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver. § 3. The Statute of Frauds defense sought to be invoked by the
defendants here,

011

the other hand, represents a time-honored principle of Idaho law. In fact, the

section ofIdaho's Statute of Frauds that applies to real property has remained unchanged since the
Territorial Legislature adopted it in 1881, more than 125 years ago. See, e.g., Lexington Heights v.

Crandlemire. 140 Idaho 276.280.92 P.3d 526 (2004)

THE PlJHPOn.J'ED AGREEMENT DOES NOT EVEN CONTAIN
A DESCIUPTION OF TilE REAL PROPERTY TO BE SOLD
The plaintiff now submits yet another affidavit to the Court changing or otherwise
adding to the terms of the alleged oral agreement he claims to have reached with the defendants back
in 1997, compared with his prior deposition testimony or affidavits. Without going into these prior
inconsistencies, this time the plaintiff affirmatively attests that when the defendants promised him
the Thomas Motors business when he retired, he now adds: "The business, as I understood it,
included the real property that Thomas Motors was on." Affidavit (!f R. Drew Thomas at ~ 5 at p.
2. It is noted of course that the plaintiff does not even claim in this new Affidavit that the defendant
actually made a specific promise that he would give him real property. Instead, the plaintiff claims
that the defendants told him he would be getting "the business," and that he understood that such
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business would include the real property upon which the business was located. The plaintiff is thus
apparently looking to bind the defendants to an obligation to give him valuable real property, when
they actually made no specific promise to do so.
In addition, the only description of the property that the plaintiff"understood" he was
supposed to get was "the real property that Thomas Motors was on." This hardly amounts to an
adequate description of the real property, and in fact, is fatally incomplete under Idaho law.
It has been the law in Idaho for a century that any agreement involving real estate

must not only be in written form, "but that the agreement must also contain such a description ofthe
property agreed to be sold that it can be ascertained without resort to parol evidence." See, e.g..
Allen v. Kitchen. 16 Idaho 133. 137, 100 P. 1052, (1909); Lexington Heights v. Crandlemire, 140
Idaho 276, 281. 92 P.3d 526 (12004).

The Idaho Appellate Courts have strongly adhered to this

principle, a point illustrated in the Lexington Heights decision made just several years ago. In
Lexington Heights.

the owner/seller of real property owned a 95 acre parcel of property. A

developer entered into a written contract with the owner/seller purchasing 90 of the 95 acres, with
the owner/seller retaining 5 acres. Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 278. The written agreement
specified that the five acres to be kept by the owner/seller were five acres that would include the
already existing residential dwelling, tennis court, volleyball court and swimming pool. Id
However, the written agreement did not provide a specific legal description of those five acres. Id
This turned out to be fatal to the entire purchase and sale agreement. Ada County District Judge
McLaughlin granted a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that "The agreement wa&
unenforceable because it did not contain a sufficient legal description of the property being sold."
Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 280. Despite numerous arguments by the appellant/developer on
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appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court unanimously ruled: "The District did not err in holding that the
Agreement was invalid because it did not contain a sufficient description of the property to be sold."
Lexington Heights, J.f.O Idaho at 285.

In the present case. the description of the real property being offered by the plaintiff
as supposedly being part of an oral agreement is even less specific than that which was at issue in
the Lexington Heights case. The plaintifI here is simply offering a self serving conclusion that he
"understood" the real property was to be included in the oral agreement and was the land "that
Thomas Motors was on." That is no more specific, of course, than the five acre parcel at issue in the
Lexington Heights case which identified a five acre parcel that held the residential dwelling, a tennis

court, a swimming pool and a volleyball court. In fact, in Lexington Heights, there was an existing
fence surrounding the structures that contained the house, swimming pool, tennis court and
volleyball court. and the amuunt of land located inside that fence line was very close to being five
acres in size. Lexington Heights, J.f.() Idaho at 283. The Idaho Supreme Court nevertheless held that
the agreement was still invalid tor failure to more specifically identify or describe the five acre
pan'c1

though the agreement was otherwise in a very detailed written agreement. Id. The same

result should apply here, particularly when this case involves a pure oral agreement that is far less
specific than the agreement involved in Lexington Heights.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS BARS ANY AGREEMENT INVOLVING
TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY
The plaintiff also has a short section of his brief which appears to argue the Statute
of Frauds is not applicahle to the land part of the oral agreement at issue in this case, because it was
"incidental" part of the agreement.

The plaintiff is seemingly suggesting that an

agreement involving a transfer of reai property does not have to be in writing and comply with the
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Statute of Frauds if the land part ofthe deal is somehow "incidental" to the overall agreement. If this
argument is actually being made here, it is entirely without legal merit. There is no such rule oflaw
in Idaho, and never has been.
The only legal authority mentioned at any point in this short section of the plaintiffs
brief is Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (]995). The Spence decision, however, in
no way supports the proposition that an agreement involving transfer of land does not have to
comply with the Statute of Frauds (i.e. be in writing) if it is "incidental" or otherwise just a part of
a different oral agreement. Far frol11 it, the Spence court made it clear that the oral contract at issue
in that case did not involve the transfer of land. As stated by the Court:
The oral contact involved in this case simply does not fall within the
purview of the Statute of Frauds. It was not an oral contr<wt for the
sale of land .. , The oral contract was for the formation of a
partnership for the purpose of developing a Christian retreat ranch.
Incidental to thi5. oral contract was the transaction involving the land,
but the initial dgreement did not depend on the transfer of land,
except for the alleged tax purposes. The land had already been
purchased and designed for the retreat, prior to the oral contract.

***
The oral contract clearly was for the development of the retreat, and
not for the sale of land.

Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho at 771 (emphasis added). There is simply no reasonable way the
Spence decision can be interpreted to mean anything other than what it says. The oral agreement at
in Spence simply "did not involve the transfer ofreal property or land." In fact, the Court
indicated the land "had already been purchased ... prior to the oral contract." The Court also made
it

that the oral contract at issue in the case was "clearly for the development of the retreat, and

not for the sale of land." In dealing with the Statute of Frauds issue, the decision could hardly have
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made it clearer that a transfer of land was not part of the oral agreement that was sought to be
enforced by the plaintiff in that case.
The Spence decision can in no way be said to support the proposition that a party can
avoid the Statute of Frauds, and have an enforceable oral agreement that involves the transfer of
land, if they could simply argue the land part of the deal was "incidental" to some other part of the
deal. As stated above, there is no such rule of law in Idaho, and there never has been. The Idaho
Statute of Frauds applying to real property has been the law of Idaho for more than 125 years, and
there has never been an appellate case suggesting one can circumvent this finnly entrenched
principle of Idaho law so easily, by just claiming the land part of the deal was somehow just an
"inCIdental" part of a bigger deal. On the contrary, for as long as Idaho has been a state it has been
the clear and unequivocal rule of law that any agreement "for the sale of real property. or of an
interest therem" is ab<;olutely "invalid" unless it is in writing. I.e. § Q-503;

I.e.

§ 9-505.

CONCLUSION
In summary, and based upon the foregoing, the defendants respectfully request that the
Court grant the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which would preclude any real property being
included in the plaintiffs claim for breach of oral contract.
DATED this;l

1_1Ja.day of April, 2008.
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
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The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofIdaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise ~gaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this li~ay of April, 2008, he caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

[Xl

William A. Morrow
Dennis Wilkinson
WHITE. PETERSON, PA
5700 E. Franklin Rd .. Ste. 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901

U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
PD. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

LX] u.s. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (F~)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff, .
vs.

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS,
and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CV-2006-492

)

INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged breach by Defendants, his parents,
of an oral contract to transfer an automobile dealership, on a date certain or to be determined, in
consideration of Plaintiff undertaking to manage operation oftnat dealership in the interim
period.
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In addition to denying the material allegations of the complaint, Defendants assert a
number of defenses including two defenses based upon the existence of a written agreement
between the parties that superseded any oral agreement between the parties.
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in part on
the basis that the alleged contract was not sufficiently definite to be enforceable and that Plaintiff
was barred from adducing evidence of the contract by the statute offrauds. The court filed an
order on November 26, 2007 denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect
to Plaintiffs Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Claims (Counts I & II of the Complaint) and granting the motion with respect to the claims based
upon Quasi Contract, Breach of certain written contracts, and Fraud.
In denying Defendants' MSJ with respect to the breach of contract claim, the court found:
That the agreement as alleged by Plaintiff in Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in Opposition
to the Motion for Summary Judgment - in consideration of Plaintiff leaving his
employment at Lanny Berg and contributing his efforts and experience to building
Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to transfer Thomas Motors upon the retirement of
Ronald Thomas - is supported by sufficient evidence in the record to preclude summary
judgment dismissing the claim for breach of that contract. Order on MSJ, pp. 9-10.

Subsequently, in addressing Defendants' Statute of Frauds argument, the Order states:
However, it does not appear from any of Plaintiff s submissions that he has alleged
Defendants promised to transfer anything other than Thomas Motors. If the jury
determines that the contract included a promise to transfer real property, Defendants may
renew their motion. (FN) Order, p. 11.

DEFENDANTS' PRESENT MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants now move for partial summary judgment dismissing "any claim by the
plaintiff that his alleged oral agreement with the defendants includes any real property or land.
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This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that there are no genuine issues of
material fact in establishing that any claim involving land is barred by Idaho's Statute of
Frauds."

I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In
determining a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all disputed facts liberally
in favor of the non-moving party, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 (1991).
Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made upon personal knowledge, set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. I.R.C.P.56(e). Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit must be attached or served with the affidavit.

Id. When the moving party supports a motion for summary judgment with competent admissible
evidence, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in that
party's pleadings in order to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial, but must
set forth specific facts, in admissible form. Id
The moving party may satisfy his or her initial burden by establishing the absence of
evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. McCorkle v.
Northwestern Mutual Lifo Ins: Co:, 141 Idaho 550, 554 (2005). The movant may establish such

lack of evidence either (1) by an affirmative showing based upon the moving party's own
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evidence; or (2) by reviewing all of the nonmoving party's evidence to demonstrate that the
proof of an essential element is absent. Id. Once the moving party does so, the burden again
shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact. Id.
II. Defendants' Motion

It appears that Defendants made the instant motion because of the court's reservation of
ruling, in its prior Order, on the statute of frauds issue pending the jury's resolution of whether
or not the alleged oral agreement for the sale of Thomas Motors included real property. The
court's intent in reserving ruling on the statute of frauds issue was to account for the possibility
that Thomas Motors owned the real property alleged to be part of the oral agreement between
the parties. It was not clear to the court, from the record on the prior motions, whether Thomas
Motors owned any of the real property at issue. However, the parties established at the hearing
on the instant motion that Thomas Motors does not, in fact, own the real property at issue. In
light of this fact, the court finds that Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment
dismissing any claim by Plaintiff for breach of an oral agreement to transfer real property should
be granted.
A. Evidence of an Agreement
As noted above, in denying Defendants' prior motion for summary judgment on the
breach of contract claim, the court found that that there were issues of material fact precluding
summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff asserted that Defendants agreed to transfer Thomas
Motors to him in consideration of his agreement to go to work for Thomas Motors. In addition,

the court found that theaHegedagreemefif;as s() defined~was suffiCiently specific to survive
Defendants' definiteness challenge on summary judgment. Since the parties have now clarified

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
-4-

O( )O

'''''~

(

I'J()

that Thomas Motors does not, in fact, own any real property, the alleged agreement to transfer
real property is not within the agreement as defined by the court in its prior Order. In fact,
Plaintiffs have not adduced sufficient evidence, either on the prior motion or the instant motion,
for the court to conclude that there exist sufficient issues of material fact regarding the existence
of an agreement for the transfer of real property to deny Defendants summary judgment on that
issue.
Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting ofthe minds as evidenced
by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701,
703 (1989). This manifestation takes the form of an offer and acceptance. Id In a dispute over
contract formation it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove a distinct and common
understanding between the parties. Id Acceptance of an offer must be unequivocal and
identical to the offer made. Potts Construction Co. v. North Kootenai Water District, 141 Idaho
678,681 (2005). The parties' minds must meet on as to all the terms before a contract is formed.
Id Proof of a meeting of the minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the terms of

the agreement and the assent of both parties. Id
Plaintiffs Affidavit filed on August 13,2007, in opposition to Defendants' prior motion
for summary judgment does not appear to mention real property at all. For instance, in
paragraph 3 of that affidavit, Plaintiff states:
As I also testified, my father repeatedly told me that if I left Lanny Berg to run the new
car dealership in Emmett, the dealership would be mine whenever he retired ....
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In paragraph 12 of that affidavit, the portion upon which the court relied in defining the
agreement, for purposes of surviving summary judgment on the grounds of definiteness, Plaintiff
states:
Our agreement was that I would leave Lanny Berg and give my efforts and experience in
building Thomas Motors in exchange for his "giving" me the business when I retired.
In fact, a subsequent statement in that same paragraph seems to militate against a conclusion that
there was a subsidiary agreement for the transfer of real property:
While I felt it would be fair and wanted to ensure that Ron and my mother received some
retirement income from the business, I need to clarify that my receiving the business was
not contingent upon my paying them retirement income. The retirement income might
have been in the form of rental payments ....
(emphasis added). The reference to rental payments seems reasonably to support the conclusion
that Defendants were to retain ownership of any real property upon which the business was
located.
In his Affidavit in Opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff states:
4.
During my conversations with Ron prior to and during the summer of 1997 and
repeatedly during the years 1997 through 2006, when I was managing and operating
Thomas Motors, Ron made numerous promises to me that the business would be mine
when he retired.
5.
That business, as I understood it, included the real property that Thomas Motors
was on.
6.
At no time during our numerous conversations regarding the transfer of the
business did Ron ever indicate that the real property was not part of the business that he
was going to transfer to me upon his retirement.

Plaintiff also directs the court to his answer~ tQ :Dt!fenrlants.interrogatoriesin which Plaintiff···
states, in response to Interrogatory No.8:
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